SUDAN - MOI AS SPECIAL ENVOY, IGAD SUMMIT, AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NAIROBI 003227

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FOR AF A/S FRAZER AND AF/SPG FROM THE AMBASSADOR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/08/2027
TAGS: PREL KE SU
SUBJECT: SUDAN - MOI AS SPECIAL ENVOY, IGAD SUMMIT, AND
NEXT STEPS

REF: STATE 110313

Classified By: Ambassador Ranneberger for reasons 1.4 (b,d).


1. (C) Summary. This message responds to reftel. It
reports on the role ex-President Moi wants to play as the
newly appointed Special Envoy on Sudan and discusses possible
next steps, including the proposed IGAD summit. These steps
could include mobilizing U.S. and international support for
this initiative. Moi would like to see me next week,
following his planned August 11 visit to Khartoum. End
summary.

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Moi as Special Envoy and Desire for Close Collaboration with
the U.S.
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2. (SBU) The Kenyan government recently named ex-President
Moi as Special Envoy for Sudan. Moi is uniquely qualified
for this, given the crucial role he played in working with us
to bring about the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA).


3. (SBU) I hosted retired General Sumbeiywo on August 7 for
lunch to discuss Moi's new role and possible next steps.
Sumbeiywo is involved with the Moi Institute and is one of
the ex-President's closest advisers. Sumbeiywo made clear
that Moi considers close collaboration with us, and with
other key countries in supporting roles, as crucial in order
to achieve results in his mission to help bolster the CPA.
As previously reported, President Kibaki and his government
are gravely concerned about apparent stagnation in
implementing key provisions of the CPA and the danger they
believe this poses for an unraveling of that peace process.
This is the main rationale for the appointment of Moi (which
also has a political dimension given Kibaki's efforts to
ensure Moi's support for his re-election efforts). Kibaki
and his team have also made clear their view that
collaboration with us on Sudan is vitally important.


4. (C) The government -- while in some respects wary of
Sumbeiywo's international profile as the IGAD negotiator of
the CPA and the potential that profile gives him to play a
political role here, although he is not doing so --
nevertheless fully appreciates the key role that Sumbeiywo
will play in helping Moi as Special Envoy. Sumbeiywo will
travel with Moi to Khartoum.


5. (C) Sumbeiywo indicated that Moi will be in Khartoum
August 11 for meetings with President Bashir and others.
GOSS President Kiir is expecting Moi to visit Juba at a date
still to be worked out. Moi will use the Khartoum visit,
based on detailed input from Sumbeiywo, for a general
exploration with Bashir about his willingness to cooperate
with Kenya and others to revitalize the CPA. This is viewed
as an initial get re-acquainted visit, rather than as a
detailed focus on specific issues.


6. (C) Sumbeiywo said Moi wants us to know that he considers
the U.S. role as the key to ensuring the success of the CPA.
Sumbeiywo also said that Moi appreciates the relationship
between the CPA and Darfur, and the need for a holistic
approach to achieve progress in Sudan.


7. (C) Sumbeiywo emphasized the need to mobilize
international support for Moi's initiative. This could, he
said, be something along the lines of what was in place
during the CPA negotiations: a troika composed of the U.S.,
UK, and Norway, coupled with a broader group of friends. Moi
may also reach out to the IGAD Partner's Forum as a way of
seeking international support.


8. (C) Sumbeiywo stressed the need for concrete support,
specifically funding in order for Moi to carry out his role
as Special Envoy. Given the Kenyan government's priorities
to fund the electoral process, Sumbeiywo does not expect any
significant funding from that source. The Moi Institute does
not have much funding. Though no final decisions have been
made, Moi will likely use the Moi Institute to support his
efforts. He does not anticipate any Kenyan government
objection to funding provided through the Institute. Moi will
seek funding from the U.S. and other donors to support his
special envoy role (much as we supported Sumbeiywo and the
IGAD secretariat during the CPA negotiations).


9. (C) Moi (like Kibaki) supports the idea of convening an
IGAD summit to focus on the CPA. Tom Vraalsen of the

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Assessment and Evaluation Commission could provide a detailed
agenda for the summit in an effort to move specific major
issues ahead. The summit must however, Sumbeiywo said, be
carefully prepared. Moi will have to do some exploratory
work with IGAD members. Late September would, therefore,
probably be the earliest possible timeframe for a summit.
Sumbeiywo said that Moi has maintained good relations with
Eritrean President Isaias. Isaias, Sumbeiywo said, has
indicated that he would attend an IGAD summit if was arranged
by Moi (with, of course, Kenyan government involvement as
well). Moi sees the holding of a summit as only one part,
albeit an important one, of his broader efforts to push
implementation of the CPA.


10. (C) Sumbeiywo stressed the need to get the international
community to increase support for the southern Sudanese as a
means of putting pressure on the north. He urged that we
push ahead on support for the southern Sudanese military and
find a way to promote U.S. private sector investment in the
south. Sumbeiywo was aware of Kenyan government
foot-dragging on their commitment to training the southern
military, but urged that we press on this. (Sumbeiywo
suggested as a possible alternative using a contractor who
could recruit retired Kenyan military.)

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Possible Next Steps
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11. (C) From my perspective, the appointment of Moi as
Special Envoy offers a major opportunity to keep the CPA on
track and, potentially, to help influence developments in
Darfur, given the clear connection between the two issues.
Moi has good relationships with virtually all the Sudanese
and international players, and immediate expertise through
Sumbeiywo.


12. (C) Moi has credibility with all the Sudanese parties
given the role he played with us in helping broker the CPA.
He has relationships within IGAD that can help to bring
together IGAD support, including a summit. Moi clearly
intends to carry out his role with close support from General
Sumbeiywo, essentially the same collaboration as during the
CPA negotiations. Sumbeiywo left the CPA negotiations with
high marks from us and the Sudanese parties, and knows all
the sensitivities involved. Moi is reaching out to us to seek
our views, our support, and our collaboration. He sees the
U.S. as key to mobilizing resources to support his role and
to help bring together key international players. He will be
open to our suggestions on how best to shape his efforts and
the way forward. Moi, Sumbeiywo said, is taking a broad
perspective, including noting the need to bring the Chinese
into a more constructive role, using their desire to avoid
any negative public image for the Olympics as leverage.


13. (C) Moi's new role could provide a focal point for
energizing efforts on the CPA. Lending our strong support to
this initiative deserves serious consideration. Doing so
expeditiously will be essential as Moi launches his efforts.
However, how we proceed will, of course, depend in part on
our assessment of the viability of this initiative following
Moi's visit to Khartoum and our further discussions with him.


14. (C) Moi has indicated that he would like to see me after
his return from Khartoum.
RANNEBERGER