SUDAN - MOI AS SPECIAL ENVOY, IGAD SUMMIT, AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NAIROBI 003227 SIPDIS SIPDIS FOR AF A/S FRAZER AND AF/SPG FROM THE AMBASSADOR E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/08/2027 TAGS: PREL KE SU SUBJECT: SUDAN - MOI AS SPECIAL ENVOY, IGAD SUMMIT, AND NEXT STEPS REF: STATE 110313 Classified By: Ambassador Ranneberger for reasons 1.4 (b,d). ¶1. (C) Summary. This message responds to reftel. It reports on the role ex-President Moi wants to play as the newly appointed Special Envoy on Sudan and discusses possible next steps, including the proposed IGAD summit. These steps could include mobilizing U.S. and international support for this initiative. Moi would like to see me next week, following his planned August 11 visit to Khartoum. End summary. -------------- Moi as Special Envoy and Desire for Close Collaboration with the U.S. -------------- ¶2. (SBU) The Kenyan government recently named ex-President Moi as Special Envoy for Sudan. Moi is uniquely qualified for this, given the crucial role he played in working with us to bring about the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). ¶3. (SBU) I hosted retired General Sumbeiywo on August 7 for lunch to discuss Moi's new role and possible next steps. Sumbeiywo is involved with the Moi Institute and is one of the ex-President's closest advisers. Sumbeiywo made clear that Moi considers close collaboration with us, and with other key countries in supporting roles, as crucial in order to achieve results in his mission to help bolster the CPA. As previously reported, President Kibaki and his government are gravely concerned about apparent stagnation in implementing key provisions of the CPA and the danger they believe this poses for an unraveling of that peace process. This is the main rationale for the appointment of Moi (which also has a political dimension given Kibaki's efforts to ensure Moi's support for his re-election efforts). Kibaki and his team have also made clear their view that collaboration with us on Sudan is vitally important. ¶4. (C) The government -- while in some respects wary of Sumbeiywo's international profile as the IGAD negotiator of the CPA and the potential that profile gives him to play a political role here, although he is not doing so -- nevertheless fully appreciates the key role that Sumbeiywo will play in helping Moi as Special Envoy. Sumbeiywo will travel with Moi to Khartoum. ¶5. (C) Sumbeiywo indicated that Moi will be in Khartoum August 11 for meetings with President Bashir and others. GOSS President Kiir is expecting Moi to visit Juba at a date still to be worked out. Moi will use the Khartoum visit, based on detailed input from Sumbeiywo, for a general exploration with Bashir about his willingness to cooperate with Kenya and others to revitalize the CPA. This is viewed as an initial get re-acquainted visit, rather than as a detailed focus on specific issues. ¶6. (C) Sumbeiywo said Moi wants us to know that he considers the U.S. role as the key to ensuring the success of the CPA. Sumbeiywo also said that Moi appreciates the relationship between the CPA and Darfur, and the need for a holistic approach to achieve progress in Sudan. ¶7. (C) Sumbeiywo emphasized the need to mobilize international support for Moi's initiative. This could, he said, be something along the lines of what was in place during the CPA negotiations: a troika composed of the U.S., UK, and Norway, coupled with a broader group of friends. Moi may also reach out to the IGAD Partner's Forum as a way of seeking international support. ¶8. (C) Sumbeiywo stressed the need for concrete support, specifically funding in order for Moi to carry out his role as Special Envoy. Given the Kenyan government's priorities to fund the electoral process, Sumbeiywo does not expect any significant funding from that source. The Moi Institute does not have much funding. Though no final decisions have been made, Moi will likely use the Moi Institute to support his efforts. He does not anticipate any Kenyan government objection to funding provided through the Institute. Moi will seek funding from the U.S. and other donors to support his special envoy role (much as we supported Sumbeiywo and the IGAD secretariat during the CPA negotiations). ¶9. (C) Moi (like Kibaki) supports the idea of convening an IGAD summit to focus on the CPA. Tom Vraalsen of the NAIROBI 00003227 002 OF 002 Assessment and Evaluation Commission could provide a detailed agenda for the summit in an effort to move specific major issues ahead. The summit must however, Sumbeiywo said, be carefully prepared. Moi will have to do some exploratory work with IGAD members. Late September would, therefore, probably be the earliest possible timeframe for a summit. Sumbeiywo said that Moi has maintained good relations with Eritrean President Isaias. Isaias, Sumbeiywo said, has indicated that he would attend an IGAD summit if was arranged by Moi (with, of course, Kenyan government involvement as well). Moi sees the holding of a summit as only one part, albeit an important one, of his broader efforts to push implementation of the CPA. ¶10. (C) Sumbeiywo stressed the need to get the international community to increase support for the southern Sudanese as a means of putting pressure on the north. He urged that we push ahead on support for the southern Sudanese military and find a way to promote U.S. private sector investment in the south. Sumbeiywo was aware of Kenyan government foot-dragging on their commitment to training the southern military, but urged that we press on this. (Sumbeiywo suggested as a possible alternative using a contractor who could recruit retired Kenyan military.) -------------- Possible Next Steps -------------- ¶11. (C) From my perspective, the appointment of Moi as Special Envoy offers a major opportunity to keep the CPA on track and, potentially, to help influence developments in Darfur, given the clear connection between the two issues. Moi has good relationships with virtually all the Sudanese and international players, and immediate expertise through Sumbeiywo. ¶12. (C) Moi has credibility with all the Sudanese parties given the role he played with us in helping broker the CPA. He has relationships within IGAD that can help to bring together IGAD support, including a summit. Moi clearly intends to carry out his role with close support from General Sumbeiywo, essentially the same collaboration as during the CPA negotiations. Sumbeiywo left the CPA negotiations with high marks from us and the Sudanese parties, and knows all the sensitivities involved. Moi is reaching out to us to seek our views, our support, and our collaboration. He sees the U.S. as key to mobilizing resources to support his role and to help bring together key international players. He will be open to our suggestions on how best to shape his efforts and the way forward. Moi, Sumbeiywo said, is taking a broad perspective, including noting the need to bring the Chinese into a more constructive role, using their desire to avoid any negative public image for the Olympics as leverage. ¶13. (C) Moi's new role could provide a focal point for energizing efforts on the CPA. Lending our strong support to this initiative deserves serious consideration. Doing so expeditiously will be essential as Moi launches his efforts. However, how we proceed will, of course, depend in part on our assessment of the viability of this initiative following Moi's visit to Khartoum and our further discussions with him. ¶14. (C) Moi has indicated that he would like to see me after his return from Khartoum. RANNEBERGER