Somalia - Travel Plan and Security Assessment

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 NAIROBI 003175 SIPDIS SIPDIS NOFORN C O R R E C T E D COPY (Classification and NOFORN Caption) FOR AF, DS, AND M FROM AMBASSADOR RANNEBERGER E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/06/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL ASEC PTER SO ET SUBJECT: Somalia - Travel Plan and Security Assessment REF: A. NAIROBI 02756 ¶B. AMB Ranneberger/A/S Griffin E-Mails ¶C. Nairobi RSO/DS/IP/AF E-Mails ¶D. NAIROBI 2452 ¶E. DS Broadcast/TDY Somalia Security Coordinator Position NAIROBI 00003175 001.2 OF 002 ¶F. STATE 85610 ¶G. NAIROBI 2605 ¶H. MSD Operational Plan for travel to Baidoa Classified By: Ambassador Michael E. Ranneberger for reasons 1.4 (b,c,d) -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (S/NF) This is an action request. See para 10. This message proposes travel to Somalia during the next three months. I consider this travel essential to advance the high USG foreign policy priority to promote security and stability in Somalia. The travel is aimed at: facilitating our interaction with key interlocutors to advance the national reconciliation process; intensifying coordination with the Transitional Federal Government; enabling timely analysis and reporting of the situation in Somalia; and supporting implementation of U.S. assistance programs, among other objectives. Travel will be undertaken to several locations in Somalia. The Mission security assessment, contained in this cable, is that travel can be carried out to these specific areas with appropriate support and within the limits of prudent risk. End summary. -------------- Proposed Travel -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Post proposes travel into three (3) Somalia regions, none of which include Mogadishu. The proposed locations and reasons for travel include: -- Baidoa in the Bay Region on a bi-weekly or monthly basis to meet with the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and USAID partners UNDP, UNICEF, CRD, and World Vision. Baidoa will also be used as a venue to meet with key civil society and clan/sub-clan leaders as part of efforts to advance the national reconciliation process. This travel is particularly important and timely given the fact that the Somalia National Reconciliation Congress is currently meeting. This Congress is regarded as the last realistic chance to obtain reconciliation and stability, and USG interaction with participants is vitally important. -- Beletweyne in Hiiran Region once during the 3-month period to engage with key civil society and clan/sub-clan leaders as part of efforts to advance the national reconciliation process. Beletweyne may also be used as an alternate location if civil society or other Somali interlocutors are unable to travel to Baidoa. -- Bossaso in the Bari Region (Puntland) once during the 3-month period to visit Population Refuge Migration (PRM)-funded partners UNHCR, WFP, andMercy Corps. The visit will also be used to meet wth local officials, civil society leaders, and clan/sub-clan leaders in support of the national reonciliation process. Discussions with Puntland oficials are particlarly important to support natinal reconciliation efforts and the TFG given Punland's quasi-autonomous status. -- Hargeisa inthe Northwest Region (Somaliland) to meet with Smaliland officials and to visit USAID partners Eduational Development Center, CARE, WFP, UNICEF, II, APD, and University of Hargesia. ¶3. (C) Other countries have also recognized the necessity for timely travel to Somalia to support the national reconciliation process. European diplomats and international organization staff are traveling at an increasing pace to Mogadishu itself. The International Advisory Council for the national reconciliation process (comprised of key international stakeholders including the U.S.) is now sending weekly missions to Mogadishu on UN aircraft. Non-participation by the U.S. in these missions is undercutting U.S. policy by sending a signal contradictory to our stated support for the Somali national reconciliation process. (Travel to Baidoa and other sites in southern/central Somalia would help offset this perception. At the same time, the issue of possible travel to Mogadishu should be kept under constant review.) The UN has had to increase from 10 to 17 the number of international staff, including Americans, who are permitted in Baidoa on any given day. Two or three international staff are in Galkayo every day. On August 2, according to the UN, there were at least 105 international staff throughout Somalia. NAIROBI 00003175 002.2 OF 002 -------------- Security Assessment -------------- ¶4. (S/NF) Embassy Nairobi's Mission security assessment, coordinated by the RSO, is that travel to Baidoa, Beletweyne, Bossaso, and Hargeisa is feasible given appropriate support, and within the bounds of prudent risk to accomplish high priority policy objectives. ¶5. (S/NF) On August 1, UN Department of Safety and Security for Somalia (UN/DSS-Somalia) advised RSO that they have a minimal security presence in some of the above locations; in the others they have the ability to move UN security assets into the area as required. UN assets consistently monitor the security environment for travel into and throughout the areas, threats, and incidents. Travel to these areas by UN personnel for humanitarian and assistance purposes is conducted only with the assistance of UN and local security assets, together with UN-provided armored vehicles, which are not available to US personnel absent full coordination with UN/DSS-Somalia. ¶6. (S/NF) Any official USG presence is assessed to be higher profile in nature than UN international relief efforts. Mission notes that Assistant Secretary Frazer visited Baidoa earlier this year. The threat level could potentially increase with repeated visits to the same location, although those visits could be staggered in order to make them unpredictable. ¶7. (S/NF) Travel to locations within Somalia is provided by UN flights, which are generally conducted weekly. UN compounds are present in each of the seven locations. UN/DSS reports that a maximum of twelve (12) UN personnel are permitted at each location at any given time (Note: Per para 3 this ceiling is being raised). Meetings only take place within these UN compounds, with the exception of Hargesia and Garowe, where local protocols dictate that meetings occur at local government facilities. All travel throughout these locations is conducted via motorcades supplemented by security elements provided by either the TFG/Special Police Unit (SPU) or local militias. These militias are paid for their services. Motorcades consist of two UN armored vehicles and two TFG/SPU or local militia vehicles providing lead and follow protection. ¶8. (S/NF) UN/DSS-Somalia advised that all visitor movements to these locations are known and closely monitored by locals, to include militias and insurgent groups. Local Security Assistants (LSA) resident in each location provide current assessments to UN/DSS-Somalia Field Security Coordination Officers. Canceling trips based on current conditions is not uncommon. ¶9. (S/NF) UN/DSS-Somalia has an established mechanism for securing travel to and throughout each of the seven proposed locations. Their embedded security professionals provide ongoing and real-time assessments and assistance. Therefore, should the Department determine that USG and DOS policy imperatives mandate that USG personnel must travel into the proposed Somalia locations, then RSO Nairobi would recommend that all travel to these locations be in coordination with the UN/DSS-Somalia and have full protective security support from MSD assets. ¶10. (SBU) Action requested: Mission requests approval of this travel plan. In order to support the proposed travel, the Mission requests that MSD elements be deployed to Nairobi ASAP to commence operational planning and requisite formulation of detailed methodology to support official USG travel to the proposed locations as conducted in Ref H. RSO Nairobi views MSD support as absolutely vital to any travel into these proposed locations. Furthermore, for sustained coordination of USG efforts as put forth by this travel proposal, the assignment of the approved TDY Somalia Security Coordinator should be carried out immediately. While Post appreciates the announcement of the DS TDY Somalia Security Coordinator Position (Ref E),the above information accentuates the critical nature of filling this position immediately. As this quarterly travel plan to Somalia proposes multiple visits to different locations, the currently understaffed RSO office cannot properly support the security planning requisite for such activity. RANNEBERGER