Somalia - Travel Plan and Security Assessment

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 NAIROBI 003175

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NOFORN

C O R R E C T E D COPY (Classification and NOFORN
Caption)

FOR AF, DS, AND M FROM AMBASSADOR RANNEBERGER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/06/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL ASEC PTER SO ET
SUBJECT: Somalia - Travel Plan and Security Assessment

REF: A. NAIROBI 02756

B. AMB Ranneberger/A/S Griffin E-Mails

C. Nairobi RSO/DS/IP/AF E-Mails

D. NAIROBI 2452

E. DS Broadcast/TDY Somalia Security Coordinator Position

NAIROBI 00003175 001.2 OF 002



F. STATE 85610

G. NAIROBI 2605

H. MSD Operational Plan for travel to Baidoa

Classified By: Ambassador Michael E. Ranneberger for reasons 1.4
(b,c,d)

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Summary
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1. (S/NF) This is an action request. See para 10. This message
proposes travel to Somalia during the next three months. I consider
this travel essential to advance the high USG foreign policy priority
to promote security and stability in Somalia. The travel is aimed
at: facilitating our interaction with key interlocutors to advance
the national reconciliation process; intensifying coordination with
the Transitional Federal Government; enabling timely analysis and
reporting of the situation in Somalia; and supporting implementation
of U.S. assistance programs, among other objectives. Travel will be
undertaken to several locations in Somalia. The Mission security
assessment, contained in this cable, is that travel can be carried
out to these specific areas with appropriate support and within the
limits of prudent risk. End summary.

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Proposed Travel
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2. (SBU) Post proposes travel into three (3) Somalia regions, none of
which include Mogadishu. The proposed locations and reasons for
travel include:

-- Baidoa in the Bay Region on a bi-weekly or monthly basis to meet
with the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and USAID partners
UNDP, UNICEF, CRD, and World Vision. Baidoa will also be used as a
venue to meet with key civil society and clan/sub-clan leaders as
part of efforts to advance the national reconciliation process. This
travel is particularly important and timely given the fact that the
Somalia National Reconciliation Congress is currently meeting. This
Congress is regarded as the last realistic chance to obtain
reconciliation and stability, and USG interaction with participants
is vitally important.

-- Beletweyne in Hiiran Region once during the 3-month period to
engage with key civil society and clan/sub-clan leaders as part of
efforts to advance the national reconciliation process. Beletweyne
may also be used as an alternate location if civil society or other
Somali interlocutors are unable to travel to Baidoa.

-- Bossaso in the Bari Region (Puntland) once during the 3-month
period to visit Population Refuge Migration (PRM)-funded partners
UNHCR, WFP, andMercy Corps. The visit will also be used to meet wth
local officials, civil society leaders, and clan/sub-clan leaders in
support of the national reonciliation process. Discussions with
Puntland oficials are particlarly important to support natinal
reconciliation efforts and the TFG given Punland's quasi-autonomous
status.

-- Hargeisa inthe Northwest Region (Somaliland) to meet with
Smaliland officials and to visit USAID partners Eduational
Development Center, CARE, WFP, UNICEF, II, APD, and University of
Hargesia.


3. (C) Other countries have also recognized the necessity for timely
travel to Somalia to support the national reconciliation process.
European diplomats and international organization staff are traveling
at an increasing pace to Mogadishu itself. The International
Advisory Council for the national reconciliation process (comprised
of key international stakeholders including the U.S.) is now sending
weekly missions to Mogadishu on UN aircraft. Non-participation by
the U.S. in these missions is undercutting U.S. policy by sending a
signal contradictory to our stated support for the Somali national
reconciliation process. (Travel to Baidoa and other sites in
southern/central Somalia would help offset this perception. At the
same time, the issue of possible travel to Mogadishu should be kept
under constant review.) The UN has had to increase from 10 to 17 the
number of international staff, including Americans, who are permitted
in Baidoa on any given day. Two or three international staff are in
Galkayo every day. On August 2, according to the UN, there were at
least 105 international staff throughout Somalia.


NAIROBI 00003175 002.2 OF 002


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Security Assessment
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4. (S/NF) Embassy Nairobi's Mission security assessment, coordinated
by the RSO, is that travel to Baidoa, Beletweyne, Bossaso, and
Hargeisa is feasible given appropriate support, and within the bounds
of prudent risk to accomplish high priority policy objectives.


5. (S/NF) On August 1, UN Department of Safety and Security for
Somalia (UN/DSS-Somalia) advised RSO that they have a minimal
security presence in some of the above locations; in the others they
have the ability to move UN security assets into the area as
required. UN assets consistently monitor the security environment
for travel into and throughout the areas, threats, and incidents.
Travel to these areas by UN personnel for humanitarian and assistance
purposes is conducted only with the assistance of UN and local
security assets, together with UN-provided armored vehicles, which
are not available to US personnel absent full coordination with
UN/DSS-Somalia.


6. (S/NF) Any official USG presence is assessed to be higher profile
in nature than UN international relief efforts. Mission notes that
Assistant Secretary Frazer visited Baidoa earlier this year. The
threat level could potentially increase with repeated visits to the
same location, although those visits could be staggered in order to
make them unpredictable.


7. (S/NF) Travel to locations within Somalia is provided by UN
flights, which are generally conducted weekly. UN compounds are
present in each of the seven locations. UN/DSS reports that a
maximum of twelve (12) UN personnel are permitted at each location at
any given time (Note: Per para 3 this ceiling is being raised).
Meetings only take place within these UN compounds, with the
exception of Hargesia and Garowe, where local protocols dictate that
meetings occur at local government facilities. All travel throughout
these locations is conducted via motorcades supplemented by security
elements provided by either the TFG/Special Police Unit (SPU) or
local militias. These militias are paid for their services.
Motorcades consist of two UN armored vehicles and two TFG/SPU or
local militia vehicles providing lead and follow protection.


8. (S/NF) UN/DSS-Somalia advised that all visitor movements to these
locations are known and closely monitored by locals, to include
militias and insurgent groups. Local Security Assistants (LSA)
resident in each location provide current assessments to
UN/DSS-Somalia Field Security Coordination Officers. Canceling trips
based on current conditions is not uncommon.


9. (S/NF) UN/DSS-Somalia has an established mechanism for securing
travel to and throughout each of the seven proposed locations. Their
embedded security professionals provide ongoing and real-time
assessments and assistance. Therefore, should the Department
determine that USG and DOS policy imperatives mandate that USG
personnel must travel into the proposed Somalia locations, then RSO
Nairobi would recommend that all travel to these locations be in
coordination with the UN/DSS-Somalia and have full protective
security support from MSD assets.


10. (SBU) Action requested: Mission requests approval of this travel
plan. In order to support the proposed travel, the Mission requests
that MSD elements be deployed to Nairobi ASAP to commence operational
planning and requisite formulation of detailed methodology to support
official USG travel to the proposed locations as conducted in Ref H.
RSO Nairobi views MSD support as absolutely vital to any travel into
these proposed locations. Furthermore, for sustained coordination of
USG efforts as put forth by this travel proposal, the assignment of
the approved TDY Somalia Security Coordinator should be carried out
immediately. While Post appreciates the announcement of the DS TDY
Somalia Security Coordinator Position (Ref E),the above information
accentuates the critical nature of filling this position immediately.
As this quarterly travel plan to Somalia proposes multiple visits to
different locations, the currently understaffed RSO office cannot
properly support the security planning requisite for such activity.
RANNEBERGER