SUDAN, DARFUR: UN ADVISOR PEKKA HAVISTO BRIEFS SE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NAIROBI 003059

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR S/E NATSIOS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/20/2027
TAGS: PREL UN AU SU ER ET LY CD
SUBJECT: SUDAN, DARFUR: UN ADVISOR PEKKA HAVISTO BRIEFS SE
NATSIOS JULY 4

REF: KHARTOUM 1083

Classified By: POLCOUNS LARRY ANDRE, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B,D)


1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Pekka Haavisto, senior UN Advisor on
Darfur, briefed the U.S. President's Special Envoy for Sudan
Andrew Natsios on UN/AU efforts to organize effective peace
talks for Darfur. Haavisto discussed the upcoming Tripoli
and Mombasa (Center for Humanitarian Dialogue, CHD) meetings
in the context of the UN/AU roadmap, which he sees leading
toward peace negotiations in August. Haavisto offered
thoughts on the various regional and rebel players, where
they stand, and how they can be brought into the roadmap
framework, as well as on AU/UN cooperation. END SUMMARY.


2. (SBU) Special Envoy Natsios met with Pekka Haavisto,
Senior Advisor to UN Special Envoy Jan Eliason, July 4 for a
two-hour discussion of the UN/AU efforts to organize
effective peace talks for Darfur. S/E Natsios was
accompanied by his COS Andrew Steinfeld, SA Lisa Witte, and
Acting Nairobi Polcouns Craig White (notetaker).

Wider View: Elections 2009 and the SPLM
--------------


3. (C) Haavisto said that both the National Congress Party
and the SPLM want the 2009 elections to take place. He said
Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) President Salva Kiir is
planning a big Darfur civil society meeting in August, "with
signatories of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) and
non-signatories." Kiir's timeline runs through January 2008,
which is too long a process for the AU/UN time frame. The
head of the SPLM task force on Darfur recently asked for
telephone numbers of the rebels, indicating that the task
force had not been in touch with key participants.

Radicalized Camps
--------------


4. (C) Haavisto said the younger generation in the Darfur
camps is becoming "very radical." They see the SLM (Sudan
Liberation Movement) as having failed, and do not even want
to be registered in the camps. Paris-based Abdulwahid al-Nur
has become a "mythological leader" for the youth. The Fur,
he said, traditionally want a single, very strong leader, and
young people now see other SLM leaders as "part of the mess."
"By saying no to everything," Abdulwahid has embodied the
dreams of the younger generation in the camps.

Government Attacks in Jebel Mara
--------------


5. (C) S/E Natsios told Haavisto that Abdulwahid reported
four recent attacks in the Fur area, two of which succeeded.
Haavisto said the groups in the eastern Jebel Mara area are
very weak, and their forces are intended "for home defense
only." The government claimed it sent in forces to calm the
border between rebel leaders Abdulshafi and Abdulwahid's
forces, an area Haavisto agreed was very tense. Haavisto
believed the government move might have aimed at "controlling
not occupying" the area.

One Major Difficulty
--------------


6. (SBU) Each of the regional powers "has its favorite rebel
group," Haavisto observed. Each player can "change the
balance by giving 50 Toyotas here or there," leading to new
facts on the ground that any negotiations have to take into
account.

Darfur Rebel Leaders
--------------


7. (C) Abdulwahid al-Nur: Abdulwahid "has 650 fighters in the
East." He was needed for the CHD talks in Mombasa, but was
still "pending," Haavisto said. He added that a recent
suggestion he had heard from the UN was to put Abdulwahid
under "temporary travel sanctions." Haavisto thought the
idea a good one, as it might push Abdulwahid back into the
region and pressure him to join talks. He has an Eritrean
passport, Haavisto noted, and no refugee status. Haavisto
complained that Abdulwahid's precondition for talks is
disarmament of the janjaweed. He offered to transport
Abdulwahid to one set of talks in a helicopter with him,
saying "if they try to kill you, they will get me too," but
Abdulwahid turned him down. Despite this unhelpful attitude,
"he is a hero" in the camps.


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- Ahmed Diraij: Diraij "has 1,000 fighters," but they are
in the East, and the Eritreans "are taking care of them,"
Haavisto said. Diraij was willing to come to the CHD talks.

- Ahmed Abdulshafi: Abdulshafi, like Diraij, was willing
to come to the CHD talks, Haavisto said. However, he has
lost clout among the rebel leaders, as some of his commanders
have gone to the government, and some to Asmara. The
Eritreans say he is "ten years too young" to lead the rebels,
Haavisto reported, and in a meeting among the rebel leaders,
his silence and the lack of deference paid him showed his
current weak status among them.

- Khalil Ibrahim: Khalil will not go to Asmara in the
near future, Haavisto said. Haavisto met him "on the ground"
in Darfur after he had been "kicked out of Chad." Haavisto
said Khalil "had 50 Toyotas" and impressive new anti-aircraft
weapons, and was in a good mood. When Haavisto told him
"Chad kicked you out," he responded "no, we finished helping
Deby." He introduced his commanders to Haavisto, who noted
they were all Zaghawas, and between 30 and 40 years old, "not
child soldiers like some of them have."

Eritrea
--------------


8. (C) The AU/UN recently "had a big success" in taking the
Eritreans to South Sudan, leading to three-way discussions,
Haavisto said. The success in Haavisto's view, however, is
the fact that the discussions took place, as he indicated the
Eritrean approach is not helpful to southern Sudanese,
because it will not lead to the peace the South needs. The
Eritreans "know the SPLM is the baby of the international
community," and "want to use it as a Trojan horse." When S/E
Natsios asked why, in Haavisto's view, Eritrea with it's
small population is so intensely involved in so many trouble
spots, Haavisto said it is "not a country but a movement,"
which makes borders irrelevant for the leadership.


9. (C) Asmara's leadership was working to foment a coup (in
Sudan) in 2004, one Eritrean leader told Haavisto "after five
whiskeys," but after the CPA, the Eritrean said, "we
changed." Havisto said the GOS has two tracks for a
political process. One is through Eritrea and one is through
the UN/AU. Foreign Ministry Undersecretary Mutrif Siddiq
told Haavisto that "the Eritreans are negotiating for us, we
need them, but we will never trust what they agree to--you
shouldn't either." Haavisto found that a dangerous game,
because key participants will not have bought into parts of
the agreement, a situation that also occurred in eastern
Sudan.


10. (C) Center for Humanitarian Dialogue (CHD) Initiative:
Asmara leadership tends to believe the CHD initiative is an
attempt to "break the Asmara front" and "humiliate Eritrea,"
a "hostile takeover," Haavisto said, and as a result said
initially that SLM leader Khamis Abdullah would not go to
Mombasa. The Eritreans began by insisting that talks take
place in Asmara. Haavisto told the Eritreans that neither
Shafi (Ahmed Abdulshafi) nor Khalil Ibrahim would go to
Asmara, and Salva Kiir says Khalil Ibrahim is not welcome in
southern Sudan (and others such as Shafi would not go),so a
neutral venue had to be found. Haavisto was concerned that
Asmara could either prevent "its" SLM leaders from going to
Mombasa, or send them with a disruptive agenda. Several
leaders, including Abdulwahid, could be spoilers. (Haavisto
said he told the Eritreans that "everyone is fed up with
Abdulwahid.") Asmara created the National Redemption Front
(NRF) and believes the SLM as a whole will never unite, so
attempts to unite it are actually aimed at undermining Asmara.


11. (C) Haavisto believed the AU and UN need to be firm with
Asmara. He believed the Eritrean leadership would send
representatives to Tripoli despite not being happy with that
meeting. The Eritreans are ready to cave on the Mombasa
meeting if a firm line is taken, he said. However, both the
Tripoli and the Mombasa meetings are tests for Asmara, he
added. Haavisto thought U.S. engagement with Asmara on the
CHD meeting would be useful. He encouraged S/E Natsios to go
to Asmara or to meet with the Eritreans on the margin of
upcoming meetings.

Government of Sudan
--------------


12. (C) S/E Natsios asked what Haavisto thought the message
to Khartoum should be. Haavisto responded with three points:
(1) the GOS is invited to Tripoli, and its presence there is
important, whatever its current problems with Libya. (2)

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Please close down the separate Asmara track, bring it under
the AU/UN umbrella. (3) Prepare to show flexibility on the
DPA.

- U.S. Embassy Khartoum, and Street Opening: MFA Chef de
Cabinet Ali Yusuf told Haavisto the MFA had warned Bashir
that opening the road in front of the U.S. Embassy was too
inflammatory a step, Haavisto said. It was Bashir who
insisted, Yusuf told Haavisto.

The AU/UN Strategy
--------------


13. (C) The Special Envoys want to see whether, in the
Tripoli and Mombasa meetings, the political leaders accept
the AU/UN road map, Haavisto said. If so, there needs to be
another meeting "to create a common platform." Then the
third phase, "the talks," would follow. "In my dreams, this
happens in August," Haavisto said. After mid-July (and
assuming the rebels agree roughly on a common position),it
will be time to press the government side. "I would hope for
final talks in two weeks, not one year." Although the DPA
has been rejected by most rebel groups, they admit to
Haavisto that "they can live with 80 percent of it." We
can't go back to the declaration of principles, Haavisto
said. A one or two page statement is needed, covering the
key issues, "to show the people." An appendix can be added
to this which is essentially the DPA, but without that name.
The elements of a deal are: a Vice President for Darfur,
compensation, a serious reconstruction plan, disarmament (of
heavy weapons) of both the janjaweed and the rebels. (The
rebels understand that nomads need some weapons, he added.)
The rebels don't trust the planned referendum, which they
think, as does Haavisto, will be designed to "split the Fur."
Haavisto said one good element is that the AU wants to
renegotiate the ceasefire.


14. (U) S/E Natsios' staff cleared this message after
departure.
SLUTZ