Somalia -- Update on AMISOM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NAIROBI 002631 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF/E AND A/S FRAZER E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/26/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL ASEC PTER SO ET SUBJECT: Somalia -- Update on AMISOM NAIROBI 00002631 001.2 OF 002 ZFR---ZFR---ZFR MSG CANCELLED WILL BE RESENT UNDER NEW MRN ZFR---ZFR---ZFR REF: IIR 6 854 0249 07 Classified by PolOff Mitch Benedict for reasons 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (C) The following (paras 2-14) is a retransmission in Department format of Reftel titled "Ugandan Peacekeeping Presence in Somalia, mid-June 2007" disseminated by Embassy Nairobi's Defense Attache Office (DAO) on June 25. ¶2. (S/REL TO USA, ACGU) SUMMARY. As of mid-June 2007, the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) peace support contingent was staffed by 1,629 Ugandan soldiers. They currently maintain a 24/7 presence at the international airport, KM-4 traffic circle, Villa Somalia (the presidential residence),and the new seaport. The bulk of the force remains at the airport. The other sites are staffed by a company of approximately 100 men. The force at each site is rotated regularly with new troops coming from the airport. End Summary. ¶3. (S//REL TO USA, ACGU) KM-4 Traffic Circle. AMISOM maintains a force of approximately 100 men at the circle. The AMISOM forces are not stopping or searching any vehicles there; the mission of the force is to observe the passing traffic and report suspicious looking vehicles to AMISOM headquarters located at the airport. AMISOM personnel then pass the information to the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) police and to Ethiopian forces (NFI). DAO's source did not have any direct information about what the TFG or Ethiopian did with the information, but assumed they sent patrols to find and question the vehicles' occupants. AMISOM worked with businesses in the area to improve security. Together, they cleared out (relocated) the ad-hoc kiosks that were in the vicinity and only established businesses in permanent structures remain. ¶4. (S//REL TO USA, ACGU) Seaport. There is a company (-) size force (approximately 100 men) of Ugandans at the new seaport. Their mission is to supervise the security measures implemented by TFG port authorities. The AMISOM troops do not stop and search people and vehicles; rather, they ensure that the port authorities do. DAO's source reported that, when AMISOM first started working at the seaport, due to clan and personal interests, port authorities were very selective in which vehicles they stopped and searched. All vehicles are now stopped and all persons are questioned. DAO's source attributed this change to two reasons -- newly appointed port officials and the AMISOM presence scrutinizing their procedures. In early-April it was difficult to search each vehicle but, as of mid-June, business into the port had dropped so much that it is now possible to question everyone coming into or out of the port. (DAO Source Comment: It appears there are less than half the number of ships coming into port than were arriving in April. That may be because of piracy or it may be because business is dropping off all over the city. End Comment) ¶5. (S//REL TO USA, ACGU) Villa Somalia. AMISOM maintains approximately 100 men to protect the presidential residence at Villa Somalia. The force patrols the area outside the wall and controls access to the gates. TFG President Abdulahi Yusuf, maintains his own personal guard inside the walls. AMISOM does not provide any protection for TFG Prime Minister Mohamed Ali Gedi's residence. (Comment: DAO's contact did not know the location of Gedi's residence. End Comment) ¶6. (S//REL TO USA, ACGU) Escort Duties. AMISOM is also called on to provide escorts and protection for various members of government or visitors. The size of the patrols varies but usually includes armored vehicles and armed security. ¶7. (S//REL TO USA, ACGU) Sustainment. AMISOM forces are almost completely self-reliant. They receive two re-supply flights per month that provide them almost all of their needs. They are only purchasing meat on the local economy. (DAO Source Comment: Being self contained ensures the quality and quantity of the supplies and lessens the chance of getting into a sub-clan conflict because of inadvertently favoring one clan over another when purchasing supplies.) ¶8. (S//REL TO USA, ACGU) Water. AMISOM has two water purification units. One provides 15,000 liters of non-potable water per day which the men use for cleaning and one provides 10,000 liters of drinking water per day. Since the second purification unit became operable in late-April, the numbers of AMISOM personnel with acute watery diarrhea has dropped dramatically (NFI). ¶9. (S//REL TO USA, ACGU) Medical Care. AMISOM has 3 doctors and 40 medical aids/nurses. The medical staff maintains a medical-surgical unit inside the AMISOM headquarters for AMISOM staff and trauma cases and a medical outpatient clinic outside the airport for civilian patients. The outside clinic work load has increased dramatically since May 2007. The clinic assists 100 to 120 patients per day. The majority of the illnesses are respiratory infections, diarrhea, malnutrition, and women's health cases (NFI). Civilian trauma cases are brought inside the AMISOM area to the medical-surgical ward. DAO source attributes the increased number of patients at the AMISOM civilian clinic to the fact that there is growing trust for the AMISOM capabilities among the local Mogadishu residents. Medical staff reported that civilian patients complain about lack of medicines at the other health care facilities and the fear of going to clinics in areas controlled by the TFG or rival clans (NFI). NAIROBI 00002631 002.2 OF 002 ZFR---ZFR---ZFR---ZFR MESSAGE CANELLED WILL BE RESENT UNDER MRN ZFR---ZFR---ZFR---ZFR ¶10. (S//REL TO USA, ACGU) Vulnerabilities. The anti-government elements do not appear to be targeting AMISOM soldiers or civilians. Since late-May, their targets seem to be TFG or Ethiopian forces. However, DAO's source observed that civilians frequently get caught in the crossfire or sustain collateral damage. ¶11. (S//REL TO USA, ACGU) Coordination with TFG and Ethiopian Authorities. There is a weekly meeting with members of the TFG to discuss security issues. Mohamed Omar Habeb Mohamed Dheere, Mayor of Mogadishu; Abdi Hassan Awale Qeybdid, nicknamed "Abdiqeybdid," Mogadishu police commander; General Abdillahi Ali Omar, Chief of Staff of the Somali National Army; and Colonel Mohamed Warsame Farah, nicknamed "Darawiish," Head of the TFG Intelligence Service attend regularly. Personnel from the Ethiopian forces also attend but DAO's source did not identify them. However, other than the weekly meeting, there is very little interaction between AMISOM and Ethiopian forces. ¶12. (S//REL TO USA, ACGU) National Reconciliation Conference (NRC) Preparations. AMISOM has completed little, if, any preparations for security of the NRC. DAO's source reported that AMISOM forces had fairly good control of the area within the triangle enclosed by the airport, Villa Somalia, and the new seaport. However, little has been done or could be done to improve security in the area around the NRC venue. In fact, DAO's source didn't know where the conference was scheduled to be held. (Comment: The NRC is currently scheduled to be held at the motor pool of the former Mogadishu Police Headquarters. This is approximately three kilometers north east of AMISOM's current locations.) DAO's source reported that it would take all 8,000 troops originally planned for AMISOM to adequately protect the venue, its access, and the accommodations of the delegates. The only way all this could be protected now it with significant Ethiopian and TFG assistance. ¶13. (S//REL TO USA, ACGU) The Chief of Staff for AMISOM is Ugandan Colonel Emanuel Musinguzi, Mogadishu telephone number 252-62-329-580; Ugandan numbers +256-772-447-780 and +256-752-447-780. (Note: The last six digits of both Uganda numbers are the same. End Note) ¶14. (S//REL TO USA, ACGU) COMMENT: AMISOM has been able to maintain its facade of neutrality by minimizing its direct interaction with Mogadishu residents to humanitarian actions such as the outpatient clinic set up outside the airport. DAO's source hedged questions about the ability of AMISOM to protect the NRC venue. This was probably because he was unwilling to speak critically of his policy-makers' decisions. However, it was quite clear from his lack of knowledge of the venue site and the lack of coordination with the TFG and Ethiopian, that AMISOM forces in Mogadishu are not currently capable of -- or planning to -- provide security for the NRC. End Comment. RANNEBERGER