FPU NAIROBI: FRAUD, FRAUD, EVERYWHERE

UNCLAS NAIROBI 002307 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR CA/EX - PAUL CANTRELL DEPT FOR CA/FPP PASS TO MELISSA LEDESMA-LEESE PASS TO KCC PASS TO INL/HSTC POSTS FOR FRAUD PREVENTION MANAGERS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: KFRD CVIS CPAS CMGT ASEC KCRM KE SUBJECT: FPU NAIROBI: FRAUD, FRAUD, EVERYWHERE ¶1. Summary: Nairobi's Fraud Prevention Unit (FPU) sees a wide variety of NIV, IV, and ACS fraud on a daily basis. May 15, 2007 proved to be an excellent example of the depth and breadth of fraud encountered over and beyond the normal workload, and is illustrative of a day in the life of our FPU section's lone investigation assistant. As such, Post believes that our current FPU staff of one full-time FSN is insufficient. Post requests that Washington fund a second full-time FSN grade 7 position to give us the resources to better pursue fraud. NIV - SPONSORSHIP FRAUD AND FAKE IDENTITIES -------------- ¶2. In the first NIV case of the day, a prospective student returned with his sponsor at the request of the adjudicating officer, who felt in the first interview that his sponsorship somehow seemed "funny." The student presented his sponsor who confirmed (per the applicant's assertions) that he was a clearing and forwarding agent. FPU's investigation assistant first determined that the sponsor's national identification card was a forgery. After several focused questions, he also determined that the sponsor knew nothing about his purported business, and was not the owner of the bank statements provided. Post decided against arresting the mystery sponsor due to the workload inherent in taking the individual to the police station, swearing statements, and subsequent court cases. ¶3. Later that morning, adjudicating officers encountered a number of fraudulent bank statements that were high quality scans printed on perforated bank paper to make them appear as if they were genuine statements. These bank statements, which appear to be from the same source, were examined and the fraud detection points were reviewed in real time with the adjudicators resulting in rapid refusals of several applicants. ¶4. Subsequently, a student applicant produced a suspected fraudulent high school certificate which was confirmed by the investigations assistant as the applicant waited at the window. Since this was a new style of fraudulent document, the investigations assistant then shared his catch with other adjudicators, updating them on the new trend. IV - HOW MANY PRINCIPAL APPLICANTS CAN A CASE HAVE? -------------- -------------- ¶5. Before NIV adjudications began, one of our IV clerks met briefly with the FPU manager and investigations assistant to discuss fraud in a Diversity Visa (DV) case she had encountered. The IV clerk had fielded an odd request from a DV principal applicant, which led her to scrutinize a case. Working with the FPU investigations assistant, she pulled the case file and found that three persons were claiming to be the principal applicant in a DV case, and each claimed-principal applicant was attempting to add-on a different spouse, all of them coming from the same particularly fraud-prone applicant pool. All principals claim to have the same name and date of birth, but have supplied different pictures, suggesting that they are capable of gaining birth certificates and passports in the identity of their choosing. ¶6. Later in the day, a DV applicant attempted to include a "pop-up" spouse to her case file. They chose to prove the relationship with pictures that were photo-subbed. Earlier in the day, the investigations assistant met with an informant regarding a DV fraud ring, providing detailed information to include phone numbers, address, and location of the ringleader's office. She described how the fraud ring changes the applicants' addresses so they control all information that KCC sends the applicants regarding their applicant and interview. She went on to describe how the ring pays villagers to pose in "relationship" photographs in an attempt to build a fictitious history between the principal applicant and the person that the ring chooses as their spouse. ¶7. In the afternoon, the investigations assistant carried-out a time-consuming and detailed Stokes interview to build evidence against a DV applicant and their added spouse. The "ghost marriage" fraud rings (as detailed in 06-04 Fraud Digest of July 2006) are now perpetuating more complicated fraud, to include, photo albums, shared bank accounts, and even pregnancies. ACS - REAL CHILD, FAKE DOCUMENTS -------------- ¶8. Around midday, an ACS clerk encountered a Sudanese Amcit and his wife who were attempting to obtain a CRBA and passport for their newborn. Suspicions were raised, and the ACS clerk consulted FPU's investigation assistant who confirmed that the parents' marriage certificate and child's birth certificate were forgeries. Thanks to the investigation assistant's quick work, the ACS section was able to turn away the parents and request that they seek original documents to support their child's application. Post will likely request DNA testing to confirm the maternal and paternal relationship to the applicant. ACTION REQUEST - NAIROBI NEEDS MORE FPU STAFF -------------- ¶9. Action Request: Given the volume and variety of fraud that FPU encounters on a daily basis, Nairobi requests that Washington fund (potentially through DV-related funds) an additional FPU grade 7 investigation assistant position at a cost of approximately $30,000, plus additional office-related costs of $9,000. Post has seen an increase in case volume and complexity in IV, NIV, and ACS; and with those increases a correlated increase in fraud trends. At this point, Post's previous stopgap of using FSNs from NIV to offer part-time assistance to the lone FPU investigations assistant is no longer tenable given the increases in NIV volumes year-over-year. Nairobi also urgently needs more FSN staffing for IV and ACS. However; given the escalating fraud environment, Post requests that Washington give priority to funding an additional FPU FSN position. RANNEBERGER