Somalia - Meeting with Ethiopian State Minister

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NAIROBI 002151

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF/E AND A/S FRAZER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/21/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL ASEC PTER SO ET
SUBJECT: Somalia - Meeting with Ethiopian State Minister


Classified by PolOff Mitch Benedict for Reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) Summary: As requested, the Ambassador met May 20 with Tekeda
Alemu, Ethiopian State Minister for Foreign Affairs to discuss a
joint U.S.-Ethiopian approach on Somalia. Tekeda pressed on a
U.S.-Ethiopia meeting with Somalia Transitional Federal Government
(TFG) President Yusuf to be held in Mogadishu at the earliest
possible date. The Ambassador agreed on the need to meet Yusuf, but
said security concerns would likely prohibit U.S. travel to
Mogadishu. Baidoa was discussed as an alternative site for a
meeting. Tekeda agreed on the need to pursue a political dialogue,
and to replace PM Gedi with a more credible Hawiye leader. End
Summary.

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Joint U.S.-Ethiopia Action
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2. (C) The Ambassador met May 20 with Tekeda Alemu, Ethiopian State
Minister for Foreign Affairs to discuss next steps on Somalia and
possible joint U.S.-Ethiopian approaches. Tekeda strongly supported
a U.S.-Ethiopia meeting with President Yusuf, in Mogadishu, for the
purpose of committing Yusuf to pursuing political dialogue as a means
to achieving lasting peace and stability. The Ambassador fully
agreed on the value of meeting jointly with President Yusuf, and
possibly separately with the Hawiye leadership, if the Yusuf meeting
produced concrete results worth following up. Acting in concert the
U.S. and Ethiopia could facilitate an agreement between Yusuf and the
Hawiye that would create the conditions for a successful National
Reconciliation Congress (NRC).


3. (C) The Ambassador counseled that security concerns would likely
prohibit our traveling to Mogadishu at this time. Tekeda pressed on
the symbolic importance of going to Mogadishu, and argued that only
Mogadishu would permit effective "shuttle diplomacy" between Yusuf
and the Hawiye if that were to materialize. The Ambassador submitted
that Nairobi or Baidoa would be a more realistic venue for us to meet
President Yusuf. Tekeda dismissed Nairobi as a viable alternative.
He then interrupted the meeting to call Foreign Minister Seyoum
directly to get his views. Reportedly, Seyoum confirmed Mogadishu as
the preferred location for a joint meeting with Yusuf; Baidoa would
be acceptable as a last resort.

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Agenda for Yusuf Meeting
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4. (C) Tekeda advised that one must be very firm in dealing with
Yusuf. We should have a "very frank and very open" conversation with
Yusuf on the subject of Gedi, who, Tekeda noted, does not even have
the support of his own clan. While we both want to see the defeat of
the Shabaab and extremists, Tekeda said the TFG has to demonstrate
governance capabilities in order to gain respect and legitimacy. He
said they need credibility with the people of Mogadishu in
particular, and changing the prime minister would help address this
issue.


5. (C) Additionally, the issue of the Benadir administration and the
governance of the Mogadishu region must to be addressed, as does the
planning for the NRC. However, knowing that Ali Mahdi's National
Governance and Reconciliation Commission is to be independent of the
TFG, Tekeda said we must be cautious but nonetheless discuss with
Yusuf in advance NRC planning and preparations in order to ensure a
good outcome. The Ambassador agreed that Yusuf needs to support the
announcement of an agenda for the NRC at the earliest possible date.
He noted that based on Tekeda's comments, U.S. and Ethiopian views on
how to proceed appear to track closely.

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Hawiye Leadership Committee
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6. (C) Tekeda cautioned us that the Hawiye are not a tightly knit
homogeneous "family." Divisions within the Hawiye are greater than
we think, he said. Tekeda told us the GOE reacted very negatively to
U.S. and European efforts to meet in Nairobi with the Hawiye
Leadership Committee (HLC),which has been engaged in on-again
off-again dialogue with President Yusuf and the TFG in Mogadishu.
Tekeda asserted that a meeting of the international community in
Nairobi with the HLC would amount to "undercutting what President
Yusuf is trying to do," and would therefore be counterproductive to
the political process underway in Mogadishu.


7. (C) The Ambassador emphasized that we had no intention to weaken
the TFG's position; in fact, quite the contrary. Our efforts are to
strengthen the prospects for real reconciliation. By meeting with
them, said the Ambassador, we can press the Hawiye to stay in the
political process, to isolate the extremists, and to participate

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fully in the National Reconciliation Congress. Tekeda held to the
view that international engagement with the HLC in Nairobi undermines
the TFG.


8. (C) According to Tekeda, Ethiopia suspects that the HLC is nothing
but a "Trojan horse" for the Hawiye/Haber Gedir/Ayr. He claimed that
the major personalities behind the HLC are all Ayr, and the Ayr have
been the most associated with opposition to the TFG. Therefore,
Ethiopia believes it more important "to deal with" the Ayr directly
than with the HLC.

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Mogadishu
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9. (C) Tekeda said the current situation in Mogadishu is "very good."
He praised Mohamed Dheere's performance as Mayor of Mogadishu.
Dheere, according to Tekeda, is gaining in popularity through civic
action such as organizing youth to pick up trash and clean
neighborhoods. However, Tekeda acknowledged that the status quo
cannot be maintained without grievances being addressed, and the
grievances are not limited to the Hawiye. Even among the Darod,
President Yusuf's own clan, there are dissatisfactions. Tekeda
warned that the situation in Kismayo, where control over local
administration has lead to conflict between the Majerteen and Marehan
sub-clans of the Darod, bears continued close monitoring.

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Arab League Intentions Suspect
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10. (C) Tekeda said the Arab League has not been helpful; indeed,
some members are working to scuttle the political process. Egypt was
singled out as actively engaged in undermining Ethiopian engagement
in Somalia. They are promoting Hassan Dahir Aweys, who is an
extremist with links to terrorist groups, said Tekeda. What the U.S.
overlooks, according to Tekeda, is that "we are at cross purposes"
with Cairo. Saudi intentions were also viewed as suspect. The
Ambassador said we are working with the Saudis and other Arab states
to elicit their financial and political support for reconciliation
and dialogue in a way that does not bring the Islamic Courts into the
process. Tekeda agreed that there is no role for the Islamic Courts
in the process.

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International Contact Group
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11. (C) The April 3 meeting in Cairo of the International Contact
Group (ICG) was "disappointing" to the GOE. Tekeda said the agenda
appeared to be largely under the control of the Arab League meeting.
He said Ethiopia has requested to become a member and is awaiting a
reply. According to Tekeda, Ethiopia has been asked to comment on
the prospect of Egypt becoming a member. Addis Ababa does not intend
to reply until such time as Ethiopia has been invited to join. The
Ambassador remarked that the next ICG meeting is scheduled to be held
in early June in London, where the U.K. and U.S. will likely exert
significant control over the agenda.
RANNEBERGER