SOMALIA--THE WAY FORWARD

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 NAIROBI 001867

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF/E AND AF A/S FRAZER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/30/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER MOPS EAID SO ET
SUBJECT: SOMALIA--THE WAY FORWARD

REF: NAIROBI 1401

Classified By: Ambassador Michael Ranneberger. Reason 1.4 (d)


1. (U) Summary. Building on Nairobi 1401, this message lays
out a roadmap for influencing Somalia towards security and
stability. Many of the elements we delineated in reftel
remain relevant to current developments. End summary.


2. (C) The fighting in Mogadishu in recent weeks has clouded
efforts to move Somalia forward towards security and
stability. Despite the fighting, however, there continue to
be reasonable prospects that this can be achieved. Important
to considering the roadmap for the way forward is our
analysis of the basis of the fighting. Information from
multiple sources indicates that the fighting was
fundamentally stimulated by a feeling of alienation from the
TFG on the part of key Hawiye sub-clans. Hardline Islamic
Courts' elements, particularly through the al-Shabaab
militia, are seeking to take advantage of this situation to
get an insurgency underway. As we know, al-Qaeda East Africa
elements are linked to the al-Shabaab. All of this makes for
a highly dangerous combination, but it is still possible to
marginalize the spoilers.

3. (C) Since shortly after their removal from power, hardline
elements of the Courts seeking to act as spoilers have found
some support within some of the Hawiye sub-clans
(particularly the Haber Gedir/Ayr) because these sub-clans
feel alienated and threatened by the Transitional Federal
Government. The TFG/Ethiopian efforts to attempt disarmament
of the Hawiye/Haber Gedir sub-clan reaffirmed concerns.


4. (C) There is a chicken and egg question with respect to
the violence: did these actions play into the hands of the
Islamic Courts remnants seeking to start an insurgency, or
did the activity of Islamic Courts remnants precipitate the
security concerns that led to the effort to disarm and
subsequent fighting? Regardless of the answer, the
bottom-line is that mistrust between the TFG and key Hawiye
is as great as ever, and the Islamic Courts remnants continue
to exploit it.


5. (C) It seems open to question whether an insurgency in the
classic sense has developed. What is happening in Mogadishu
is not shades of Iraq or even Afghanistan. The Hawiye's
motivation to engage the TFG in combat is based on their
perception of political alienation and physical vulnerability
resulting from the attempted disarmament. While groups of
Islamic Courts remnants work to foment violence, it would be
a mistake to over-emphasize their influence at this point;
and we should recognize that the TFG tends to brand its
political opponents as "terrorists". Maintaining the strength
of the traditional Hawiye leadership is critical to
marginalizing the al-Shabaab.


6. (C) Our analysis leads us to conclude that the Somalia
process can still be moved forward in a positive direction.
This will require continuing vigorous U.S. engagement with
all the Somali actors and with Ethiopia. As the visit of A/S
Frazer to Baidoa made clear, the TFG realizes that U.S.
support is crucial to its legitimacy and is therefore
receptive to U.S. influence.


7. (S) The following lays out the lines along which we have
been working and steps to move the Somalia process forward.

--Enhance TFG legitimacy and credibility. Following up on
A/S Frazer's discussions with the senior TFG leadership, we
have made clear to the TFG that the fighting, resulting in
substantial civilian casualties, and other missteps
(including restrictions imposed on humanitarian assistance
and the Deputy Defense Minster's call to expel the Haber
Gedir from Mogadishu),have undermined its credibility and
legitimacy. The TFG has been responsive to specific
requests. The Ambassador wrote to President Yusuf requesting
that the TFG take several steps to unblock humanitarian
assistance. The TFG (per septel) has taken action, and
assistance is now flowing. We will continue to monitor the
TFG's interaction with the humanitarian assistance community.
The Ambassador also urged Yusuf to make public statements
expressing regret about the violence and emphasizing his
commitment to dialogue. Yusuf made such a statement on April
28 that has been reasonably well-received within Somalia.
The Ambassador had also requested that the statement made by
Deputy Defense Minister Salad Ali Jelle calling for expulsion
of certain groups from Mogadishu be retracted. Jelle issued a
lukewarm retraction in a radio broadcast over a week ago.


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Building on this and the very constructive discussions which
A/S Frazer had with the TFG leadership in Baidoa, we must
move quickly to disburse critically needed assistance.
First, we need to move ahead with disbursement of the $10
million in development assistance. Second, we should move
the $25 million section 1207 funding ahead as quickly as
possible. And, third, the additional $60 million requested
from Congress will be essential to maintain momentum. Moving
ahead with development projects and security assistance will
help enhance the TFG,s credibility, legitimacy, and
effectiveness.

We should continue to urge Arab support for the TFG,
particularly from the Gulf states and Egypt. This should
include both political and financial support.

--Promote dialogue. Yusuf's call for dialogue in his recent
press conference is helpful. Reporting in multiple channels
indicates that serious attempts at dialogue are taking place,
and these must be encouraged. The Ethiopians remain in
contact with key Hawiye leaders, and they are reported to
have coordinated a meeting between members of the Hawiye
Leadership Council and Yusuf on April 29. There are also
indications that the Hawiye leaders are seriously interested
in working out a political accommodation and appreciate, just
as A/S Frazer argued in Baidoa, that this is the only viable
way to marginalize the radical remnants of the Courts. (Some
reporting suggests that the Hawiye leaders are prepared to
sever links with radical Islamists such as Aden Ayro.)
Without inserting ourselves into the middle of such dialogue,
the U.S. must continue to urge all actors to talk. The
Ambassador has continued to emphasize this with radio
interviews widely heard in Somalia. We remain in
communication with a broad spectrum of contacts within
Somalia to encourage dialogue.

In order to help reassure the Hawiye and reestablish some
momentum in the wake of the recent fighting, we are urging
the TFG and its national reconciliation committee headed by
Ali Mahdi to spell out publicly the agenda for the national
reconciliation congress (specifically: discussion of
power-sharing and a roadmap for the 2009 transition,
including constitutional drafting arrangements). We also
should encourage the TFG to begin the process of establishing
local administrative, judicial, and security structures in
accordance with the Transitional Federal Charter. We will
continue to work closely with the UNDP and other donors to
coordinate financial, advisory, and observer support for the
congress.

We should continue to explore the possible utility of
supporting or acquiescing in the replacement of Prime
Minister Gedi in the context of the reconciliation congress.
His removal and replacement by a Hawiye more broadly
acceptable to that community may be essential to achieve a
viable political accommodation. (Latest rumors are that Gedi
is asking $30-40 million to step down.)

--Influence and harmonize efforts with the Ethiopians. The
Ethiopian interest in ending their costly involvement and
leaving behind a secure outcome gives them some common ground
with us. In addition to the close dialogue that we are
already engaged in, there may be possibilities to enhance
coordination of efforts. Specifically, it may be possible to
coordinate more closely messages that we and they are sending
to the TFG and to other Somali actors, particularly the
Hawiye. We presumably have shared interests in doing so in
order to help make the national reconciliation congress a
success.

--Refine our public diplomacy message. We should continue to
recognize in our public statements that the fighting in
Mogadishu is in some measure due to al-Qaeda and Islamic
Courts' efforts to spoil chances for stability by exploiting
clan mistrust. We should also emphasize the human tragedy
associated with the long-standing clan warfare in Somalia,
and our efforts to bring about reconciliation. Somalis tend
to react negatively to characterizing the conflict through a
purely terrorist prism, overshadowing our positive
humanitarian and political messages, and diluting our
influence with the general Somali public.

--Dangle carrots. The national reconciliation congress )
and the discussions leading up to it that will likely
"pre-cook" the event ) is emerging as virtually a
make-or-break opportunity to advance security and stability.
It might be useful to announce before the congress the
international community,s willingness to host a donor

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conference on a date certain ) but conditioned on a
successful outcome from the congress. That dangles the
carrot of the kind of large international investment Somalis
are calling for, with the stick also evident that we will not
provide such assistance if the Somalis cannot get their act
together.

--Accelerate AU deployment and push the UN process.
Facilitating the withdrawal of the Ethiopians and bolstering
security through deployment of AU forces remains ever more
urgent. Continuing to move forward UN consideration of a
peacekeeping force will also be helpful. In the meantime, we
should work to extend the AMISOM mandate that expires in June.


8. (U) This message has been cleared by relevant offices and
agencies.




RANNEBERGER