SCENESETTER FOR U.S.-OMAN GULF SECURITY DIALOGUE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 MUSCAT 000984 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/24/2017 TAGS: PARM PREL PTER MASS KNNP MU SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR U.S.-OMAN GULF SECURITY DIALOGUE (OCTOBER 31, 2007) REF: A. STATE 143813 ¶B. MUSCAT 829 Classified By: Ambassador Gary A. Grappo for Reasons 1.4 (b, d) ¶1. (U) Embassy Muscat warmly welcomes Ambassador Mull and the U.S. delegation to the next round of the U.S.-Oman Gulf Security Dialogue (GSD) in Muscat. Post expects that the meeting will increase understanding and strengthen bilateral cooperation on mutual security issues facing the Gulf region. The composition of the Omani delegation has yet to be determined, but it will be led by Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Secretary General Sayyid Badr al-Busaidi (newly promoted to ministerial rank) who has played the leading Omani role in past GSD discussions. -------------- PERCEPTIONS OF IRANIAN THREAT -------------- ¶2. (C) Oman continues to maintain a unique perspective on regional concerns as compared to its GCC neighbors. On Iran, the Omani leadership is generally satisfied with its relatively cordial, although mostly non-substantive, relationship with Tehran, which it believes helps mitigate any aggressive intentions that Iran might have towards the Sultanate. Accordingly, Oman prefers dialogue and cooperation on mutual maritime security and other shared interests -- including the possible importation of Iranian gas -- rather than isolating the regime in Tehran. It is less certain about the extent to which Iran may pose a threat. As expressed during the last GSD meeting held in June in Washington, the MFA continues to maintain that Iran is not a direct threat to Oman's national security and should be positively engaged by the international community to change its behavior. Confronting Iran with sanctions, according to the MFA, will only strengthen the hands of hard-liners in Tehran. Leaders in Oman's military and security services, however, take a more pragmatic view and worry about growing instability in the region resulting from expansionist Iranian policies in Iraq, Lebanon and elsewhere, which they fear could provoke a strong and unsettling reaction from other states. ¶3. (C) No senior Omani official, military or civilian, wants to see Iran develop the capability to produce a nuclear weapon as they recognize the destabilizing impact that a nuclear-capable Iran would have on the region and the resulting arms race it could provoke. Oman's leadership, however, asserts that economic sanctions against Iran will not force Iran's leaders to abandon the country's nuclear enrichment program. (Comment: It is difficult to judge how much these statements reflect firm convictions, rather than attempts to restrain the U.S. from pursuing what Omanis perceive as provocative policies. End Comment.) Oman is thus unlikely to go beyond the letter of UNSC resolutions 1737 or 1747. Omani officials are even more adamantly opposed to any military action against Iran, fearing the consequences of such a military conflict perhaps even more than Iranian possession of a nuclear weapon. ¶4. (C) Ultimately it is the Sultan who is the final arbiter of Oman's policy towards Iran, and it is his long-standing general strategy to foster dialogue and address tensions with carrots rather than sticks. While he has not made his thoughts on Iran entirely clear, his statements in meetings with visiting U.S. and other Western officials suggest that he may view Iran's eventual acquisition of nuclear weapons as a fait accompli that may be delayed, but not permanently derailed. Consequently, he likely does not wish to support a short-term policy of harsher sanctions and isolation that would constrain Oman's (and perhaps the West's) diplomatic maneuverability in the long-term. ¶5. (C) Oman's objective, pragmatic and non-confrontational approach to Iran should not be mistaken for neutrality. Sultan Qaboos and his government are decidedly pro-West and a firm American ally as evidenced by the long-standing base access agreement (unprecedented in the Gulf when first signed in 1980) and the U.S.-Oman Free Trade Agreement. Omani officials continue to look to the U.S. as their indispensable partner in ensuring the Sultanate's security. Moreover, they use their good relations with Tehran to argue for moderation, temperance and closer engagement and compromise with the West. MUSCAT 00000984 002 OF 002 -------------- IRAQ & REGIONAL ISSUES -------------- ¶6. (C) Oman remains generally supportive of our efforts to promote security and political stability in Iraq, but is very concerned that Prime Minister Maliki (who visited Muscat in April 2007) does not have effective control over Iraqi security forces or the stature to lead the country over the long-term. Omani MFA officials repeatedly state that Maliki needs to act more like the prime minister of "all Iraqis," and be less beholden to particular factions/groups. Some in Oman's leadership increasingly argue that extremism and sectarianism in Iraq pose an equal or greater danger to regional stability (and to Oman) than does Iran. Oman is not a source or transit country for either illicit funds or foreign fighters destined for Iraq. ¶7. (C) The Israeli-Palestinian conflict continues to be a source of high-level interest; the Omani government has cautiously welcomed the President's proposed Middle East peace conference to energize dialogue towards finding a resolution, but would like to see inclusive participation (i.e., Syria, Lebanon and other Arab and Muslim countries). On Lebanon, Oman supports the government of PM Siniora (who met with the Sultan in January 2007),but hopes that the different Lebanese factions can reach a consensus to resolve the political crisis there. Omani communication and influence with Syria is minimal. -------------- OMANI MILITARY NEEDS -------------- ¶8. (S/NF) Oman urgently needs not only to enhance its self-defense capabilities, but also to raise its level of interoperability with U.S. and GCC forces. Currently, from an Omani perspective, the hardware at the center of the GSD's military pillar (BADI and Patriot missiles) does not hold much appeal due to cost concerns -- Oman's military budget is small compared to the rest of the GCC -- and the leadership's opinion that an Iranian missile attack is unlikely. Omani military leaders believe that Oman is more susceptible to asymmetrical, terrorist operations and would like to modernize their capability -- both defensive and deterrent -- to help counter these more likely threats. As this Mission outlined in a review of GSD-related military needs (ref B),the following systems are of the most immediate importance to the Omani government and would enhance Oman's interoperability with U.S. systems in responding to regional security threats: -- HIMARS (High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems) with ATACMS -- SLAMRAAM (Surface Launched Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile) -- C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) -- AIM-9X -- Maritime Surveillance Aircraft (both fixed and rotary) -- UAVs -- F-16 Fighter Aircraft ¶9. (S) The comparatively small amount of funding Oman receives through the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) Program limits Oman's ability to purchase these weapons systems. It also affects the government's ability to maintain the systems it currently operates. As a result, it is essential for the USG to identify alternative or creative financing techniques through the GSD to enable Oman to acquire the appropriate military systems in sufficient time to achieve our mutual security goals. Without such an arrangement, the high cost (USD 3-4 billion) of recovery from tropical cyclone Gonu (which hit Oman in June),along with the skyrocketing cost of construction, will instead delay or cancel future major acquisitions for the Sultan's Armed Forces. GRAPPO