READOUT OF OMANI FOREIGN MINISTER VISIT TO TEHRAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MUSCAT 000709

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/24/2017
TAGS: PREL KNNP EPET ENRG ECON IR IZ MU
SUBJECT: READOUT OF OMANI FOREIGN MINISTER VISIT TO TEHRAN

Classified By: Ambassador Gary A. Grappo for Reasons 1.4 (b, d)

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SUMMARY
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1. (C) Omani Minister Responsible for Foreign Affairs Yusef
bin Alawi told the Ambassador that during his July 17 stop in
Tehran, Iranian officials expressed a desire to advance their
dialogue with the U.S. on Iraq, but were concerned over
reports that the U.S. was arming tribal groups in Anbar
province. Bin Alawi claimed that the Iranian government was
"seriously trying" to work with the IAEA and the
international community to avoid further UN sanctions, which
he asserted would only serve to embolden hard-liners in
Tehran. He dismissed reports that Oman and Iran were
planning a formal cooperative security agreement, but
confirmed ongoing bilateral discussions on the export of
Iranian gas to Oman, though such an energy deal was "far
away." End Summary.

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IRANIAN VIEWS ON IRAQ
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2. (C) During a July 22 meeting with the Ambassador, Omani
Minister Responsible for Foreign Affairs Yusef bin Alawi gave
a brief readout of his July 17 visit to Tehran. Noting that
he was in the Iranian capital "for just a few hours" on his
way to Moscow, bin Alawi said that he met with both Ali
Larijani and Foreign Minister Mottaki, who claimed that they
were "trying to make things easier" for the U.S. to talk to
Iran regarding Iraq, as well as other subjects. They also
asserted, according to bin Alawi, that the Iranian government
was "upset" by reports that the U.S. was providing arms to
tribes in western Iraq, purportedly because Iran feared that
tribe members would sell the weapons to al-Qaeda or other
terrorist groups. Bin Alawi further remarked that the
Iranians "will never allow the Sunnis to regain control of
Iraq," and would likely attempt to fill any "vacuum" left by
the withdrawal of U.S. forces.

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TEHRAN KEEN TO AVOID MORE SANCTIONS
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3. (C) Concerning Iran's nuclear program, bin Alawi stated
that the Iranians were "coordinating" with EU High
Representative Javier Solana and "working better" with the
IAEA. He commented that Iran appeared "more forthcoming" on
issues related to its nuclear activities and was "very
concerned" about another UN Security Council sanctions
resolution. Bin Alawi said he believed the Iranians were
"seriously trying" to come up with a solution to the nuclear
file through talks with the IAEA, and accordingly advised the
U.S. to "give (the Iranians) more time" before taking further
action in the UN Security Council. If the nuclear issue had
to go back to the Security Council, bin Alawi continued, the
Council should issue a statement rather than announce new
sanctions as further punitive measures "will only make
hard-liners in Tehran stronger."


4. (C) Asked by the Ambassador if Supreme Leader Ali
Khamenei backed alleged efforts by Larijani and others to
negotiate a solution to the nuclear impasse, bin Alawi
responded that "they could not do this without his support."
He said that he did not ask to see Iranian President
Ahmadinejad since the National Security Council, chaired by
the Supreme Leader, made all the truly important decisions in
Iran.

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THE UPSIDE OF GASOLINE RATIONING
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5. (C) In an apparent reference to recent gasoline rationing
in Iran, bin Alawi joked that he "found Tehran beautiful this
time" as there was little traffic and less air pollution. He
asserted that while there was "grumbling" among Iranians when
rationing was first implemented, the public was adjusting to
the restrictions, which were saving Iran roughly 15 million
liters of gasoline per month. According to bin Alawi, Iran
did not appear to be was making a concerted attempt to crack
down on the black market smuggling and sale of gasoline as it
allowed "those who can afford it" an opportunity to buy
needed fuel. Per the minister, Tehran also plans to build
two refineries to eventually increase gasoline supplies.

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MISLEADING PRESS REPORTS
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6. (C) When questioned about Iranian news service reports on

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plans for a Oman-Iran security cooperation or mutual defense
agreement, bin Alawi was dismissive and said that such
exaggerated or false stories were issued by Tehran for
political reasons. He explained that he had been asked by
press about the possibility of a collective security
agreement between the GCC and Iran, but said that he had
responded that this was unnecessary since GCC countries
already had bilateral agreements with Iran on security
issues. Asked by the Ambassador to clarify this point, bin
Alawi responded that Oman and Iran, for example, had already
agreed to cooperate on maritime security matters such as
preventing the smuggling of illegal migrant workers through
Iranian waters to Oman.

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OMAN "FAR AWAY" FROM IRANIAN GAS DEAL
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7. (C) Bin Alawi shared that there were "ongoing
discussions" between Muscat and Tehran for the eventual
export of Iranian gas to feed Omani industrial development,
but said that "we're still far away" from a deal. The Omani
minister claimed that due to an acute need for gas, Oman was
willing to finance completely and even operate a gas platform
in Iranian waters near Iran's Qeshm island if this would
guarantee an abundant and stable supply of gas, although he
doubted that Iran would accept such a proposal. (Note: Bin
Alawi commented that Oman was also talking with Qatar in a
bid to acquire more gas. End note.) If Oman eventually
reached a gas agreement with Iran, bin Alawi said, a pipeline
would likely have to be built from the relevant field through
the Strait of Hormuz and around Oman's Musandam peninsula to
the port city of Sohar.
GRAPPO