Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07MUSCAT461
2007-05-11 10:31:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Muscat
Cable title:  

OMANI FOREIGN MINISTER ON UPCOMING VISIT OF

Tags:  PREL IR MU 
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OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK
DE RUEHMS #0461 1311031
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 111031Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY MUSCAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8204
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHSW/AMEMBASSY BERN 0010
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L MUSCAT 000461 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/11/2017
TAGS: PREL IR MU
SUBJECT: OMANI FOREIGN MINISTER ON UPCOMING VISIT OF
IRANIAN PRESIDENT TO MUSCAT

REF: 445 MUSCAT (NOTAL)

Classified By: Ambassador Gary A. Grappo per 1.5 (B and D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L MUSCAT 000461

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/11/2017
TAGS: PREL IR MU
SUBJECT: OMANI FOREIGN MINISTER ON UPCOMING VISIT OF
IRANIAN PRESIDENT TO MUSCAT

REF: 445 MUSCAT (NOTAL)

Classified By: Ambassador Gary A. Grappo per 1.5 (B and D).


1. (C) The principal reasons for the visit of Iranian
President Mahmud Ahmadi-Nejad to Muscat are to give the
Sultan an opportunity to meet and talk to the president and
to discuss "Iran's image in the international community,"
according to Omani Minister Responsible for Foreign Affairs
Yusef bin Alawi. Receiving me at his MFA office in the early
evening May 11 (Oman's weekend),the Minister indicated that
Ahmadi-Nejad's visit to Muscat is now scheduled for Monday,
May 14, vice the previously reported Saturday (reftel). (No
reason was given for the date change.) The Iranian
president's stay is expected to last several hours only.


2. (C) Bin Alawi said that because the Iranians listen to
and trust the Omanis, the Sultan will explain Oman's
perception of Iran's image in the world and what the Iranians
can do to rectify it. On this visit, however, the Sultan
does not plan to get into details of the nuclear issue or
Iran's troublemaking activities in Iraq or elsewhere,
although these are obviously part of the problem Iran faces
with Arab governments, the U.S., and the rest of the
international community, bin Alawi said.


3. (C) I referred to the recent visit of Central Command
Commander Admiral Fallon, who had explained the dangerous
levels of Iranian interference in Iraq, especially Iranian
support for both Sunni as well as Shi'a armed factions and
extremists and the supply of weapons used to kill U.S.
soldiers. Bin Alawi agreed that "things have gotten worse"
and said the Omanis will share their "frank views" with the
Iranians.


4. (C) On the matter of Iran's nuclear program, bin Alawi
said he still plans to travel to Tehran on May 17 to discuss
"fresh ideas," which have been discussed in some detail with
the Swiss. Swiss officials have visited both Muscat and
Tehran in the last few weeks, according to bin Alawi. A
reportedly "U.S.- and EU-approved paper" was presented to the
Iranians recently, and he will follow up on it during his
visit. The paper purportedly addresses not only the question
of suspension of enrichment and related activities but also
what Iran would need to do vis--vis IAEA inspection
compliance to eventually resume enrichment at some point down
the road. Per bin Alawi, the Iranians have been receptive to
this idea, "especially the second part." He also confirmed
that he has been talking mainly to Expediency Council
Chairman Rafsanjani and SCNS Secretary Ali Larijani on these
matters. He repeated that he does not expect the Sultan to
get into details of these issues with Ahmadi-Nejad on Monday.


5. (C) Bin Alawi will travel from Tehran to London and then
to Washington by May 21 and will brief the Secretary on his
discussions with the Iranians then. He agreed to see me
later this week for a review of the Iranian president's visit.


6. (C) Comment: This will be Sultan Qaboos' first meeting
ever with the Iranian president. It comes almost 10 months
after the GCC proposed that the Omanis approach the Iranians
on behalf of the GCC to discuss Tehran's policies in the
region and ways to ease tensions. Muscat, which has no
significant bilateral issues of concern with the Iranians,
never formally responded to the GCC request. The Omanis have
used the intervening period -- including through frequent
visits of high level officials, telephone conversations and
flattering (but non-substantive) public pronouncements -- to
further nurture its relations with Iran and reassure its
leadership of Omani objectivity. Nevertheless, Omani
internal security and military officials remain concerned
about Iran's policies and actions and the potential for
creating instability throughout the region.
GRAPPO

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