OMAN DOWNBEAT ON IRAQI PM MALIKI IN ADVANCE OF GCC

C O N F I D E N T I A L MUSCAT 000041

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

CAIRO/RIYADH PASS TO S PARTY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/15/2017
TAGS: PREL IZ MU
SUBJECT: OMAN DOWNBEAT ON IRAQI PM MALIKI IN ADVANCE OF GCC
PLUS 2 MEETING IN KUWAIT

REF: A. STATE 03592

B. MUSCAT 00036

Classified By: Ambassador Gary A. Grappo for Reasons 1.4 (b, d)


1. (C) Ambassador met on January 15 with Omani Minister
Responsible for Foreign Affairs Yousef bin Alawi in advance
of the GCC plus 2 meeting in Kuwait to discuss the
President's January 10 announcement on Iraqi policy (ref A),
as well as the recent visit of Lebanese Prime Minister
Siniora to Muscat (septel). Bin Alawi said that while the
media was focused on the deployment of additional U.S. troops
to Iraq, the "political component" of the President's policy
was more important since "purely military actions" were, on
their own, doomed to fail. He commended the renewed emphasis
on improving the lives of the Iraqi people, and remarked that
"everything" appeared to be in the new policy except for one
critical element -- a detailed strategy on how to achieve
reconciliation between the different Iraqi factions.


2. (C) Echoing his previous comments on the subject (ref B),
bin Alawi doubted that Iraqi PM Maliki was in a position to
achieve reconciliation with Sunni leaders. According to bin
Alawi, Maliki was not working to represent the interests of
Iraq's Sunni population, but rather was pursuing a partisan
agenda favoring the Shi'a majority. If the U.S. wanted Oman
and its other Arab friends to help "take responsibility" for
the President's strategy -- for example, by actively engaging
Iraqi Sunni leaders and bolstering the Iraqi government -- it
must push Maliki and his cabinet to "create the right
environment" for a sustained and sincere reconciliation
effort with Sunni leaders.


3. (C) Simply waiting to see if Maliki would finally
negotiate with Sunni leaders in good faith was not a viable
option, bin Alawi stated. Instead, if the U.S., working with
the GCC plus 2, could not remove Maliki, it should present
him with a list of actions needed to reconcile with Sunni
groups and oblige him to carry them out. While Maliki and
other Iraqi officials could be included in drafting such a
reconciliation action plan, bin Alawi continued, the U.S.
should make clear that its implementation was mandatory for
continued U.S. support for the Iraqi government. Bin Alawi
was hopeful that if Iraq's Sunnis saw genuine moves to
respond to their key concerns, such as legislation that would
equitably distribute Iraq's oil revenues and/or revisions to
the Iraqi constitution, they would have reason to trust the
government and lay down their arms.
GRAPPO