OMAN DOWNBEAT ON IRAQI PM MALIKI IN ADVANCE OF GCC

C O N F I D E N T I A L MUSCAT 000041 SIPDIS SIPDIS CAIRO/RIYADH PASS TO S PARTY E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/15/2017 TAGS: PREL IZ MU SUBJECT: OMAN DOWNBEAT ON IRAQI PM MALIKI IN ADVANCE OF GCC PLUS 2 MEETING IN KUWAIT REF: A. STATE 03592 ¶B. MUSCAT 00036 Classified By: Ambassador Gary A. Grappo for Reasons 1.4 (b, d) ¶1. (C) Ambassador met on January 15 with Omani Minister Responsible for Foreign Affairs Yousef bin Alawi in advance of the GCC plus 2 meeting in Kuwait to discuss the President's January 10 announcement on Iraqi policy (ref A), as well as the recent visit of Lebanese Prime Minister Siniora to Muscat (septel). Bin Alawi said that while the media was focused on the deployment of additional U.S. troops to Iraq, the "political component" of the President's policy was more important since "purely military actions" were, on their own, doomed to fail. He commended the renewed emphasis on improving the lives of the Iraqi people, and remarked that "everything" appeared to be in the new policy except for one critical element -- a detailed strategy on how to achieve reconciliation between the different Iraqi factions. ¶2. (C) Echoing his previous comments on the subject (ref B), bin Alawi doubted that Iraqi PM Maliki was in a position to achieve reconciliation with Sunni leaders. According to bin Alawi, Maliki was not working to represent the interests of Iraq's Sunni population, but rather was pursuing a partisan agenda favoring the Shi'a majority. If the U.S. wanted Oman and its other Arab friends to help "take responsibility" for the President's strategy -- for example, by actively engaging Iraqi Sunni leaders and bolstering the Iraqi government -- it must push Maliki and his cabinet to "create the right environment" for a sustained and sincere reconciliation effort with Sunni leaders. ¶3. (C) Simply waiting to see if Maliki would finally negotiate with Sunni leaders in good faith was not a viable option, bin Alawi stated. Instead, if the U.S., working with the GCC plus 2, could not remove Maliki, it should present him with a list of actions needed to reconcile with Sunni groups and oblige him to carry them out. While Maliki and other Iraqi officials could be included in drafting such a reconciliation action plan, bin Alawi continued, the U.S. should make clear that its implementation was mandatory for continued U.S. support for the Iraqi government. Bin Alawi was hopeful that if Iraq's Sunnis saw genuine moves to respond to their key concerns, such as legislation that would equitably distribute Iraq's oil revenues and/or revisions to the Iraqi constitution, they would have reason to trust the government and lay down their arms. GRAPPO