OMANI FOREIGN MINISTER PROVIDES READOUT FROM MARCH

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C O R R E C T E D COPY (ADDING PARA MARKING)

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/11/2017
TAGS: PREL IR LE MU
SUBJECT: OMANI FOREIGN MINISTER PROVIDES READOUT FROM MARCH
MEETINGS IN TEHRAN

REF: MUSCAT 00185

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Classified By: Ambassador Gary A. Grappo for Reasons 1.4 (b, d)


1. (C) Summary: Oman's Foreign Minister told the Ambassador on
March 10 that Iranian officials during his most recent trip
to Tehran were eager to restart negotiations to resolve
concerns over Iran's nuclear program. They asserted,
however, that suspension of uranium enrichment activities
could only be a result of such negotiations, rather than a
precondition for talks. Iranian leaders remained fearful
that the U.S ultimately sought "regime change" in Tehran, and
would not agree to freeze Iran's enrichment program in
exchange for dropping UN sanctions against Iran. The
Iranians claimed that they were supportive of efforts by
Saudi King Abdullah and the Arab League to broker a
compromise between the government and oppositionsists in
Lebanon. End Summary.

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"TECHNICAL PROBLEM" IMPEDING NEGOTIATIONS WITH IRAN
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2. (C) Recently returned from Tehran for a meeting of the
Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation, Omani
Minister Responsible for Foreign Affairs Yousef bin Alawi
gave a readout on March 10 to the Ambassador on his
discussions during the event with Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani,
Chairman of Iran's Expediency Council, and Ali Larijani,
Secretary of Iran's Supreme Council for National Security.

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Bin Alawi stated that the overall purpose of his latest trip
to Tehran was to "get a sense" from both Rafsanjani and
Larijani on latest developments in the Iranian nuclear file
as he had been unable to meet with either man during his last
visit to Iran to meet with President Ahmadi-Nejad (reftel).


3. (S) According to bin Alawi, both Rafsanjani and Larijani
were very eager to "find a way to start negotiations," and
had stressed to him that they were ready to "do their part"
to achieve a peaceful resolution through dialogue. The two
officials had commented positively on recent statements by
the Secretary, and told bin Alawi that EU High Representative
for the Common and Foreign Security Policy Javier Solaa was
currently attempting to help restart talksbetween Iran and
the West. Larijani also believd and was pleased that the
U.S. and Switzerland wre "cooperating" on messages sent to
Tehran fromBern. However, bin Alawi continued, there is a
ajor "technical problem" concerning the proposed trms of
renewed negotiations, as well as a questin over whether
talks should be under a joint P5 pus 1 framework, or whether
Solana should take th lead. Iran strongly preferred a P5
plus 1 apprach so as to include the U.S. The Iranians, binAlawi related, did not rule out freezing their enrchment
activities, but were adamant that they would not agree to an
enrichment suspension prior to talks as such a freeze mst be
a result of the negotiations, rather than aprecondition.

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"SUSPENSION FOR SUSPENSION" A ON-STARTER IN TEHRAN
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4. (C) Bin Alawi said hat his Iranian hosts had ruled out a
"suspension(of enrichment) for suspension (of sanctions)"
frmula for talks as they claimed that the lifting o
sanctions would have "little effect" on Iran, wile
suspension of enrichment would "affect thousnds on the
ground" working on Iran's nuclear program and in its research
facilities and thus cause financial hardship. (Note: Bin
Alawi remarked that he did not attempt to go into the basis
for such a claim as it would have been "a waste of time."
End Note.) What the Iranians said they wanted from
negotiations, stated bin Alawi, was an agreed method to
confirm for the international community that their nuclear
program was not military in nature. To help achieve this,
the Iranians claimed that they were amenable to giving the
IAEA more responsibility and access for inspections. If the
U.S. and the West, on the other hand, continued to involve
the UN Security Council and seek ever more stringent
sanctions, the Iranians asserted that they saw "no point" in
trying to negotiate. Part of the reason for this attitude,
bin Alawi said, was deep concern that the ultimate U.S. goal
regarding Iran was regime change. Both Rafsanjani and
Larijani said that sanctions that directly impacted Iran's
"sovereignty" could be construed as "an act of war" and would
never be accepted by the Iranian public. Bin Alawi opined
that Iran was likely to wait until the UN Security Council
concluded debate on a new sanctions resolution before it
"formalized" its position.


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5. (C) The Ambassador told bin Alawi that any agreement to
verify the allegedly peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear
program was implicit in any deal that might be reached with
Iran. However, more was required of the Iranians -
specifically suspension of nuclear enrichment activities and
full cooperation with the IAEA on its requests for
information and inspections - given their past deceitful
behavior and the justifiable lack of trust in the West
regarding Tehran's intentions. Reminded by the Ambassador of
the incentives offered by the P5 plus 1 proposal given to
Tehran in 2006, bin Alawi responded that the Iranians did not
appear to be "looking seriously" at the package as they
thought it did not offer enough benefits. He added that the
Iranians also suspected that the U.S. would try and make its
suspension of uranium enrichment permanent.

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IRAN AFRAID U.S. OUT TO "UNDO" REVOLUTION
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6. (C) Asked by the Ambassador if he had noticed any
difference in Rafsanjani's or Larijani's views on the nuclear
question, bin Alawi replied that he had not. He recalled
that Larijani previously told him that a Western policy
seeking sanctions against Iran would "only make the people of
Iran take hostile positions" and strengthen public support
for Iranian President Ahmadi-Nejad and the Revolutionary
Guard. Bin Alawi agreed that Rafsanjani's status within Iran
was likely rising and observed that the Chairman seemed very
concerned about the possibility of a conflict with the U.S.


7. (C) While emphasizing that Oman definitely did not seek
to play the role of mediator in the current "impasse" between
Iran and the West, bin Alawi stated that Oman wished to be
helpful by "clarifying positions" and supporting the efforts
of Javier Solana and IAEA Director General Mohammed
al-Baradei. He claimed that he often emphasized to Iranian
officials that the West had very legitimate concerns about
its nuclear activities, and that there was no easy way to
restrict the use of nuclear technology for non-military
purposes. Bin Alawi asked the Ambassador if Washington would
try to develop "new ideas" to take advantage of Iran's desire
to resolve the nuclear issue. He said that he shared the
Ambassador's hope that a strong, unified stance by the
international community would succeed in prodding Tehran to
change its behavior and positions on talks. He further
advised that any new UN Security Council resolution should
not/not make any mention of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard
as this would been seen as an affront to Iran's sovereignty
and help solidify hardliner opinions in Iran that the U.S.
was ultimately out to "undo" the revolution.

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IRAQIS URGING TEHRAN TO TALK WITH U.S.
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8. (C) Turning to Iraq, bin Alawi reported that the
Iranians claimed that they had received appeals from "many
Iraqi leaders" for Iran to negotiate with the U.S. on both
the nuclear issue and how to end sectarian strife in Iraq.
The Iranians didn't take these entreaties too seriously,
however, as the Iraqis simply and summarily advised Tehran to
"talk to (U.S. Ambassador to Iraq) Khalilzad" when asked how
to go about this. Rafsanjani and Larijani had confirmed to
bin Alawi that Iran would participate in the sub-ministerial
Iraqi Neighbors prepcon in Baghdad on March 10. (Note: Bin
Alawi claimed that Riyadh had declined to either host a
ministerial-level Iraqi Neighbors' Conference or send a
minister to Baghdad as this could have been seen by the SAUDI
public as strong royal support for Iraqi PM Maliki. Turkey,
he stated, then proposed a deputy-level prepcon meeting in
Baghdad to include the P5 and others to make the event more
palatable to the Saudis and critics of the Iraqi government
in the Gulf. End Note.)

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IRAN SUPPORTS LEBANESE COMPROMISE?
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9. (C) Bin Alawi said that he did not ask the Iranians (or
the Saudis) about the recent visit of Ahmadi-Nejad to Riyadh.
Neither had he inquired about Iran's current relations with
Syria. Bin Alawi speculated that Ahmadi-Nejad traveled to
Saudi ARABIA to "be seen as more moderate" and to assure
Saudi King Abdullah that Iran would not be an obstacle in his
efforts to help broker a deal between the government and
oppositionsits in Lebanon and form a national unity
government within the Palestinian territories. Rafsanjani
personally told him that Tehran supported King Abdullah's

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efforts on these fronts, as well as Arab League attempts to
achieve a compromise between the different factions in
Lebanon. Bin Alawi continued that in his opinion, all
parties in Lebanon - including "key players" Hassan Nasrallah
of Hezbollah and Saad Hariri - had finally realized that the
current situation was "hurting everyone" and could not be
allowed to continue indefinitely. Persuading Druze leader
Walid Jumblatt and Michel Aoun to agree to a compromise
solution, bin Alawi mused, would be particularly difficult.
GRAPPO