SCENESETTER FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO OMAN

S E C R E T MUSCAT 000167 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS STATE FOR NEA/ARP WHITE HOUSE FOR OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT FROM THE AMBASSADOR E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/2017 TAGS: OVIP PREL ECON MU SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO OMAN Classified By: Ambassador Gary A. Grappo, reasons 1.5 b and d -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (S) Embassy Muscat and I warmly welcome you to Oman. Oman remains a strong friend and ally in the Global War on Terrorism. Regional threat issues continue to be a prominent concern for Oman's leadership. Oman is disturbed by Iran's growing influence in the region and its inability to come to terms with the U.S., other P5 members and Germany over its nuclear program; nevertheless, Oman's perspective on the Iranian threat is different than that of the USG and even its GCC partners. Instability and sectarian violence in Iraq (which Oman fears could spread elsewhere in the region) and the Israel-Palestinian conflict are two other key regional concerns for Oman. Our overall bilateral relationship is strengthening, as we are working with our Omani counterparts to expeditiously bring the U.S.-Oman Free Trade Agreement (FTA),signed by the President last September and the Sultan in October, into force. Technical assistance programs offered through the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) have enabled us to promote cooperative reform efforts over a broad spectrum of areas. End Summary. -------------- Your Meeting with the Sultan -------------- ¶2. (C) I have requested a meeting for you with Sultan Qaboos. The Sultan is currently on his annual "meet-the-people" tour outside Muscat. In these annual tours, which last from four to eight weeks, the Sultan will set up camp in interior areas and, with his ministers, meet daily with tribal sheikhs and the general public to discuss domestic matters and resolve problems. We are working with his staff at the Diwan of the Royal Court to arrange a time when you might visit him in the desert before your departure. -------------- Regional Security Concerns -------------- ¶3. (S/NF) While neither the political nor military leadership wants to describe Iran as a threat (they are quick to remind us that "Iran is not an enemy"),Omani officials have indicated that they are very concerned with Iran's nuclear ambitions. Of particular concern is the possibility of a nuclear-capable Iran and the probable reaction of countries like Saudi Arabia and Egypt in pursuing their own capabilities. However, Omani officials also express reservations about a U.S. military operation against Iran. The Omani government is also increasingly concerned over continued violence between Sunni and Shi'a groups in Iraq, which it worries could easily spill into other Gulf countries. Omani officials fear Iranian meddling and trouble-making in the region, particularly in Iraq and Lebanon, and are concerned about the long term consequences if left unchecked. ¶4. (S/NF) Oman's leadership remains deeply concerned with Iraq's future and is interested in the direction the U.S. will take in Iraq in the coming months. Omani government officials have voiced no opposition to the U.S. troop surge as part of the President's new strategy for Iraq, but assert that military force alone will not bring stability to Iraq. Senior Omanis, including Armed Forces Supreme Commander (and de facto #2 in the Sultanate) General Ali bin Majid al-Ma'mari and the Minister Responsible for Foreign Affairs Yusuf bin Alawi, have told me they do not believe that Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki is genuinely interested in, and/or capable of, pursuing reconciliation with Sunni leaders, which they see as critical to ending the insurgency. -------------- Strengthening Ties -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Our bilateral economic relationship has strengthened considerably with the ratification of the FTA. The Agreement will take effect once all regulatory requirements are in place. Bilateral trade is expected to eclipse the $2 billion mark in 2006, the highest figure ever. As Oman drives toward industrialization and economic diversification, several billion dollars of U.S. investment have poured into the country, including from Dow Chemical (petrochemical complex), Occidental Petroleum, AES (power and water desalination),and Bechtel (aluminum smelter). Oman has also been a recipient of USG assistance efforts under the MEPI program, which focuses on judicial, educational, economic and political reform, as well as women's empowerment. Furthermore, Oman is an active participant in two port/cargo security programs sponsored by the USG: the Container Security Initiative (administered by the Department of Homeland Security),which pre-screens containerized cargo before onward transport to the U.S.; and the Department of Energy's MegaPorts Initiative, which is working to install equipment at Omani ports to identify nuclear material. -------------- Foreign Policy Context -------------- ¶6. (S) Though not a major financial donor, Oman supports USG efforts to promote security and political stability in Iraq. Iraq's Foreign Minister met with his Omani counterpart in Muscat on November 14, 2005; the Omani government has completely forgiven Iraqi debt. On February 16, 2007, Oman's Deputy Prime Minister received Iraq's Minister of State for Representative Affairs. The Sultanate has publicly condemned several high-profile terrorist attacks, while stressing religious tolerance at home. Determined to maintain normal relations with Iran, Oman supports efforts to discourage Tehran's nuclear weapons programs through dialogue, rather than confrontation. Oman has used its ties with Tehran to urge the Iranians to adopt a more conciliatory approach in addressing Western concerns over its nuclear activities, including acceptance of last summer's P5 plus 1 proposal. Senior Omani government officials likewise advise us that sanctions against Iran could prove counter-productive and may strengthen hard-line attitudes in Tehran. Oman closed the Israeli Trade Mission in Muscat in 2000 during the Second Intifada, but supports the Roadmap process and still maintains good (though non-public) communications with Israeli officials, including at the Foreign Minister level. ¶7. (S) Oman and Saudi Arabia are the only GCC states that have not yet signed NATO's Istanbul Cooperative Initiative, though we continue to encourage Omani officials to give it serious consideration. The Omani government has assured us of its adherence to the principles of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI),though it is reluctant to publicize its support for this initiative. While the Sultan and military leaders understand the benefit of open coalition operations, there is no indication that Oman is prepared to participate in them. -------------- A Looming Bilateral Problem -------------- ¶8. (C) Throughout the nearly 175 years of official relations, America and Oman have enjoyed a nearly problem-free relationship. Last year, however, the State Department designated Oman as a Tier II Watchlist country for human trafficking. Oman vehemently denies the justification behind the ranking, but the government has been unable to provide relevant data to substantiate its argument. Last spring, we presented to the Omanis a draft action plan for addressing the problem, which included legislative action, public awareness campaigns, release of data, and support for safe houses. In conjunction with the FTA, Oman implemented far-reaching labor reform, which covers some TIP-related concerns, but has yet to act on any of the Embassy's proposed initiatives. We continue our engagement with the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and of Manpower. A Tier III designation would result in a cutoff of our FMF program unless waived by the President. GRAPPO