SCENESETTER FOR CENTCOM COMMANDER GENERAL JOHN P.

S E C R E T MUSCAT 000129 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS CENTCOM FOR GENERAL ABIZAID FROM AMBASSADOR GRAPPO E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/06/2017 TAGS: PARM PREL PTER KNNP MARR MASS MNUC MOPS OVIP MU SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR CENTCOM COMMANDER GENERAL JOHN P. ABIZAID'S VISIT TO MUSCAT Classified By: AMBASSADOR GARY A. GRAPPO FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) Summary -------------- ¶1. (S) General Abizaid: Embassy Muscat and I warmly welcome your return to Oman. Sultan Qaboos and your colleagues in the Omani armed forces look forward to seeing you and hearing your perspective on activities in the region, especially in Iraq and Iran. Oman remains a strong friend and ally in the Global War on Terrorism. Our engagement with the Omani security forces continues to grow and deepen, especially in the area of border security. Regional threat issues remain a prominent concern for the Omani leadership; however, Oman's perspective on the threat posed by Iran often is different than that of the USG and even its GCC partners. Instability and sectarian violence in Iraq (which Oman fears could spread elsewhere in the region) and the Israel-Palestinian conflict are two other key regional concerns for Oman. You will be visiting just as the Oman-hosted GCC exercise concludes. Preparations for this exercise consumed the Omani military, but may prove to be a springboard for better regional security cooperation, particularly in the areas of Command and Control and Joint operations. On a personal note, Sultan Qaboos and LTG Nabahani both value their relationship with you and will be interested in your plans following the change of command. Our IMET and FMS operations are active and significant, and we have had some success in using other DoD programs, such as 1004 funds, to assist Oman's efforts to control its borders. End Summary. Regional Security Concerns -------------- ¶2. (S/NF) While neither the political nor military leadership wants to describe Iran as a threat (they are quick to remind us that "Iran is not an enemy"),Omani officials have indicated that they are very concerned with Iran's nuclear ambitions. In one candid conversation, a senior officer remarked that the Omani military could not decide which is the worse option: a strike against Iran's nuclear capability and the resulting turmoil it would cause in the Gulf, or inaction and having to live with a nuclear-capable Iran (and the probable reaction from Saudi Arabia and Egypt to pursue their own capabilities). The Omani government is growing increasingly concerned over continued violence between Sunni and Shi'a groups in Iraq, which it worries could easily spill into other Gulf countries. Omanis also increasingly fear Iranian meddling and trouble-making in the region, particularly in Iraq and Lebanon, and are concerned about the long term consequences if left unchecked. We have added the military pillars of the Gulf Security Dialogue into the upcoming JMC in order to provide a forum to discuss the way-ahead on these issues. ¶3. (S/NF) The Omani leadership is deeply concerned with Iraq's future and will want to hear your views on the situation there, as well as the direction the U.S. will take in Iraq in the coming months. Omani government officials have voiced no opposition to a U.S. troop surge as part of the President's new strategy for Iraq, but assert that military force alone will not bring stability to Iraq. Senior Omanis, including the Minister Responsible for Foreign Affairs, also do not believe that Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki is genuinely interested in, and/or capable of, pursuing reconciliation with Sunni leaders, which they see as critical to ending the insurgency. Omani officials will also be eager to hear your thoughts on Afghanistan/Pakistan, especially as Oman is seeing an increase in illegal smuggling of people (mostly migrant workers) and drugs coming from that region, often with Iranian involvement. ¶4. (SBU) While U.S. military engagement with Oman remains strong, there have been other important developments in the bilateral relationship. The U.S.-Oman Free Trade Agreement was ratified in September 2006; the Agreement will take effect once all regulatory requirements are in place. As Oman drives toward industrialization and economic diversification, several billion dollars of U.S. investment have poured into the country, including from Dow Chemical (petrochemical complex),Bechtel (aluminum smelter) and Occidental Petroleum. Oman has also been a recipient of USG reform assistance efforts under the Middle East Partnership Initiative, which focuses on judicial, educational, economic and political reform, as well as women's empowerment. Furthermore, Oman is an active participant in two port/cargo security programs sponsored by the USG: the Container Security Initiative (administered by the Department of Homeland Security),which pre-screens containerized cargo being shipped to the U.S.; and the Department of Energy's MegaPorts Initiative, which is working to install equipment at Omani ports to identify nuclear material. Foreign Policy Context -------------- ¶5. (S) Though not a major financial donor, Oman supports USG efforts to promote security and political stability in Iraq. Iraq's Foreign Minister met with his Omani counterpart in Muscat on November 14, 2005; the Omani government has completely forgiven Iraqi debt. The Sultanate has publicly condemned several high-profile terrorist attacks, while stressing religious tolerance at home. Determined to maintain normal relations with Iran, Oman supports efforts to discourage Tehran's nuclear weapons programs through dialogue, rather than confrontation. Oman has used its ties with Tehran to urge the Iranians to adopt a more conciliatory approach in addressing Western concerns over its nuclear activities, including acceptance of last summer's P5 plus 1 proposal. Senior Omani government officials likewise advise us that sanctions against Iran could prove counter-productive and may strengthen hard-line attitudes in Tehran. Oman closed the Israeli Trade Mission in Muscat in 2000 during the Second Intifada, but supports the Roadmap process and still maintains good (though non-public) communications with Israeli officials, including at the Foreign Minister level. ¶6. (S) Oman and Saudi Arabia are the only GCC states that have not yet signed NATO's Istanbul Cooperative Initiative, though we continue to encourage Omani officials to give it serious consideration. The Omani government has assured us of its adherence to the principles of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI),and sent observers to the PSI exercise "Anatolia Sun" in May 2006. It declined, however, to participate in the most recent "Leading Edge", citing late notice and preparations for GCC military exercises, and is reluctant to publicize its support for PSI. While the Sultan and military leaders understand the benefit of open coalition operations, there is no indication that Oman is prepared to participate in them. Domestic Counter-Terrorism Efforts -------------- ¶7. (S) Border control is one of Oman's top priorities. From May-July 06, Omani forces conducted operations to round-up illegal aliens in the country. The combined force, led by the Royal Army of Oman with the assistance of the Air Force, police and the Sultan's Special Forces, was quickly surprised by the scope of the problem. When finished, they had arrested over 7500 persons, the vast majority of whom were economic migrants or workers with expired visas, along with some smugglers. Most surprising was the admission by the RAO CDR that they had suspected that al-Qa'ida members would be arrested, though the operation reportedly did not result in the detention of any such persons. Since then, the Royal Oman Police Coast Guard (ROPCG) is reporting an increase in the number of smugglers and illegal migrant workers arrested with some now coming from the former Soviet republics in Central Asia and more Somalis attempting to enter via Yemen. One unofficial estimate placed the number of illegal immigrants apprehended in 2006 at over 25,000. OMC works with the various military and police services to enhance Oman's ability to both monitor and police its borders. One result of these operations is the realization among the military leadership that they have much to learn in combined/joint operations. OMC is working to assist in this area. ¶8. (S/NF) The Omani security and intelligence services are professional, well-funded and motivated. Oman is not a regional or offshore financial center and, accordingly, does not have a significant money laundering or terrorist financing problem. While there have been no reported incidents of international or domestic terrorism in Oman, there were arrests of an Ibadi extremist group in 2005, members of which included military, clerical, and private citizens. One of those arrested was previously convicted in the attempted murder of two British nationals in two separate incidents, one in 2003 and one in 2004. Also in 2005, two Omani citizens accused of participation in extremist activities were repatriated from abroad, one of whom was arrested while attempting to conduct a suicide operation against coalition forces. Oman with its relatively open and welcoming society and increasing numbers of Western tourists remains vulnerable to terrorist attacks. Confident in its security forces and procedures, however, Omani officials continue to argue, "It can't happen here." Recently, Omani security forces have shown an increased interest in counter-IED training. It is unknown if they have reason to suspect an IED threat or are simply taking pro-active steps to counter potential security threats. Overall Mil-Mil Programs -------------- ¶9. (S) Operations and WRM: Oman has fully supported all access, basing and over-flight requests we have made. NAVCENT flies P-3 patrols from Masirah Island on an irregular single-ship deployment basis. We are enhancing the method in which we share information from these flights with the Omani Navy and Coast Guard. NAVCENT has also begun to use Al Qarin bombing range when US aircraft carriers transit off the coast. CENTAF's War Reserve Materials (WRM) sites at Seeb, Masirah and Thumrait are robust and active. The closure of the military side of Seeb will be a phased reduction starting in 2010 and completion by 2025. This new timeline may be an opportunity to budget funding for construction of the US side of the new airbase, al Masanah. The Omanis would like CENTAF to be a part of this base to include relocating Seeb's WRM site. Funding, though, appears to be an issue. ¶10. (S) Exercises and Engagements: Oman has been preparing during the latter half 2006 and January of 2007 of this year, for the GCC exercise. RAFO has requested from CENTAF's Executive Coordinating Agency (ECA) to borrow equipment to support a bare-base airfield for the exercise. Primary WRM loaned assets included 8 R-11 aircraft refuelers and 32 medical center cots. Some facilities were also made available at Masirah and Thumrait. In addition, OMC and ECA were able to get excess WRM equipment (cots, kitchen equipment, etc.) scheduled to be auctioned, to instead be declared excess in order to allow RAFO to obtain it as EDA property. The CDR RAFO was very grateful for this effort. Because of the GCC exercise and US PERSTEMPO, most major exercises were canceled this year. However, OMC was able to schedule a number of smaller seminars and training events, such as ARCENT's artillery and counter-IED seminars. JCETS are scheduled for early this year and OMC is integrating counter-IED training into the biennial SAFE HANDLING ordnance disposal training. The COSSAF was very happy with the CENTCOM/J2 Affiliation Seminar it hosted last year and is looking forward to another seminar in late Spring, 2008. ¶11. (U) IMET/CTFP/NESA: FY06 IMET program was USD 1.089M with Oman sending 27 students to the U.S.; five students were sent under the Counter Terrorism Fellowship (CTF) Program. FY07 IMET request is USD 1.135M. Currently, there are 49 Omani NESA alumni. Foreign Military Sales -------------- ¶12. (C) FY06 and FY07 FMF is USD 13.86M, a decrease from FY05's USD 19.84M. However, proposed FMF for FY08 calls for an increase to around USD 22M. Numerous FMF cases are in process, to include NVDs, Naval and Coast Guard boats, M-16 rifles, Javelin and TOW-IIB. Key FMS cases are: a. (U) F-16s: Eleven of the 12 aircraft are in country, with the last aircraft (the test plane) now undergoing retrofitting. Overall, the case has been managed very well and the Omanis are proving extremely capable as pilots, maintainers and logisticians. Case value is USD 750M. b. (U) Mobile Field Hospital: This was a high-visibility FMF case that required great team effort to deliver two weeks before the Omanis used the hospital at the GCC exercise. The hospital, one that the US Army still does not have in its inventory, has been a tremendous success and has served as a showcase to all Service Commanders, GCC counterparts and the Sultan. Case value is USD 3.1M. c. (U) Tropospheric Scatter Network (Troposcatter) and 1kW HF Radios: Omani officials cite these cases when they complain about the slow nature of FMS. These systems will provide integrated national C2; they gained in priority after the Omani operation to roundup illegal immigrants. Company design of system requirements and availability has taken two years. Troposcatter LOA is still pending. d. (C) Counter Narcotics/Counter Terrorism/Border Security: The Royal Oman Police, parent organization of the ROP Coast Guard, used Article 1004 funding to upgrade the command and control facility at ROP/HQ and to obtain secure HF radios for Coast Guard boats and stations. The radio upgrade was completed Dec 06 and provided the ROP with the ability to intercept more illegal smugglers than using its old system of cell phones. ROP and OMC are working to obtain additional 1004 and 1033 money to institute further border control and counter narcotic/terrorism programs. ¶13. (S/NF) Bilateral Intel Exchanges: Oman and the U.S. have an active intelligence exchange program that is now focused on Iranian military activity. With the demise of the ELINT information sharing program (Cluster Spectrum),due to aging U.S.-provided equipment, Oman is looking to acquire new ELINT/SIGINT equipment to fill the gap. ¶14. (C) Omani officials will ask you for an update on the situations in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as current U.S. thinking on Iran. In addition to briefing Omani officials, your visit to Muscat will afford us an important opportunity to gauge the views of senior Omanis, and the Sultan in particular, on Iran and other regional issues. Below are some questions that you may wish to raise during your proposed meeting with the Sultan, as well as with Minister Responsible for Defense Affairs Badr Saud al-Busaidi and the COSSAF (LTG Nabahani): ¶A. Meeting with Sultan Qaboos bin Said -- What is your view on Iran's long-term ambitions and strategy in the region? -- What threat does Iran pose to Oman and/or its neighbors? -- What is your opinion of the Iranian leadership? -- What can the region and US do to prevent conflict between Shi,a and Sunni? -- If Iran were to obtain a nuclear weapon, what would be the reaction of Arab states? Of Oman? -- In what way, and under what circumstances, could Oman make further contributions to Iraq's security and stability? -- How do you view the fight against terrorism and extremism as progressing? -- How can we better support the Lebanese government in light of the challenges from Hizballah and Syrian-backed forces? ¶B. Meetings with Defense Minister and COSSAF -- Congratulations on hosting a successful GCC exercise. Are there any particular lessons learned from it? -- What are your most pressing border security concerns? -- Do you foresee any instance in which Iran would pose a security threat to Oman? -- Do you have a strategy or contingency plans to defend against an Iranian threat? -- What kind of threat might Iran, especially if it obtains nuclear weapons capability, pose to other GCC states? -- What is your view of the Iranian military leadership? Who is the most competent? The most political? ¶15. (U) In conclusion, the overall Oman-U.S. military-to-military relationship is solid. The day to day interaction is candid and constructive with a strong spirit of cooperation on both sides. We look to strengthen this already very sound relationship. GRAPPO