NAVIGATING A MESS: EADS OFFICIALS ON GALILEO

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 MUNICH 000412 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE FOR EUR EUR/AGS, EUR/ERA AND EB/IFD/OMA PASS TO USTR MOWREY E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ECON TSPA EAIR ETRD PGOV EINV PREL EUN FR GM SUBJECT: NAVIGATING A MESS: EADS OFFICIALS ON GALILEO SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED. NOT FOR INTERNET DISTRIBUTION. REFS: A) Paris 2634, B) Frankfurt 3043, C) 06 Munich 715 -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (SBU) Senior EADS-Astrium officials told ConGen Munich the recent collapse of the Galileo consortium of private firms resulted as much from squabbling between EU states over apportionment of contracts as a failure to find a workable economic model. They described the current economic model as a "macroeconomic" one, in which the EU funding will create jobs and end-user applications that will boost member nation economies. Additionally, Galileo would be able to charge for enhanced services beyond the basic free signal. Our contacts said China, no longer a participant in Galileo, appears to be rapidly and successfully developing its own positioning, navigation, and timing technology. The officials said that rather than being concerned about Galileo's potential use by enemy forces, the U.S. should view Galileo as a complement to GPS's capabilities for our own forces. Our interlocutors were confident the political will exists in the EU to field Galileo satellites despite the numerous obstacles, perhaps as early as 2012. End Summary. -------------- GALILEO -- CURRENT STATE OF PLAY -------------- ¶2. (SBU) ConGen Munich Pol/Econ Officer and Economic Specialist met on July 9 with Hanspeter Kuhlen, EADS-Astrium's Galileo Program Director and Thomas Mayer, the firm's Chief of Business Development for Galileo. Astrium is the "space" division of EADS (European Aeronautic Defense & Space),offering equipment and services for launchers, manned spaceflight, civil and military satellites and ground systems. EADS-Astrium has a central role in the design and development of Galileo, the proposed European counterpart to the Pentagon's Global Positioning System (GPS). Conceived almost a decade ago as a partnership between the European Commission, the European Space Agency (ESA) and the private sector, the project was intended to provide navigational, telecom and transport services, with the operational phase originally expected to begin in early ¶2008. ¶3. (U) EADS-Astrium was a member of a consortium of eight private firms that has since dropped out of Galileo's Public-Private-Partnership (PPP) financing mechanism. The consortium was to have paid two-thirds of the costs of the program, with the EU taxpayers covering the remaining third. The consortium included EADS, Alcatel-Lucent (France),Thales (France), Finmeccanica (Italy),AENA (Spain),Hispasat (Spain),Inmarsat (UK), and TeleOp (Germany). The consortium would have gained long-term concession rights to operate Galileo with a share of the profit. Contract negotiations which should have led to the deployment and operation of Galileo's network of 30 satellites stalled this year, with the consortium demanding that the public sector guarantee its commercial risks. The EU transport ministers decided to suspend the PPP after the consortium firms failed to develop an organizational structure by May 10. Reportedly, firms were not even able to agree on a common representative. The transport ministers from the 27 EU governments then failed to agree June 8 on a plan to salvage Galileo, postponing until the fall a decision on how to come up with the 2.4 billion Euros needed to keep the project afloat. As a result of the delays so far, deployment has been pushed back to 2012 or later. -------------- POLITICAL INTERFERENCE - IN THE EU??? -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Kuhlen did not hesitate to blame massive political interference from EU governments for the consortium's demise. He noted Spain, in particular, had been a problem because it insisted on receiving 25 percent of Galileo's contracts. Madrid had argued that as two of eight firms in the consortium were Spanish, they should also receive 25 percent of the work, even though the Spanish government's financial contribution to the program was half that, according to the Astrium officials. They said, in contrast, the German government's financial contribution is 20 percent of the program - the largest within the EU. ¶5. (SBU) Kuhlen joked that Galileo "should have 27 control MUNICH 00000412 002 OF 004 centers," one in each EU member state, so that politicians could have their own ribbon cutting ceremonies and tell voters their country was in charge. Mayer offered an example to illustrate the point. The German space agency was operating a satellite earth station dish in Weilheim, Bavaria. Even though the equipment was perfectly suited for Galileo, a second dish had to be built in Belgium to satisfy political demands. Our contacts confided that while risk apportioning between the public and the private sectors had played a role in the collapse of the consortium, in their view, it was less of a factor than the intra-EU squabble over apportioning of contracts. -------------- NORTH-SOUTH DIVIDE -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Kuhlen noted that while the southern European partners such as Spain, France and Italy were pushing Galileo with the intent to win a disproportionate share of contracts, the northern European states appeared to lack the enthusiasm to match their funding. He continued that Germany and the UK contributed nearly half of Galileo's financial support to date, and thus had the most to lose from its failure -- particularly the UK, which produced the bulk of the critical electronic "payload" aboard the satellites. Nevertheless, London was fixated on "value for money," rather than the less tangible returns of the program, such as prestige and macroeconomic benefits. Our contacts underscored France's desire to be at the center of Galileo. Implying that French dominance of key decision-making posts impacting Galileo gave the French an advantage over other EU states, Kuhlen noted that "[EU Transport Commissioner] Barrot is very close to ESA DG Dordain." Offering a compliment of sorts to the French, Kuhlen added that France's embracing of grand ideas like Galileo was probably necessary, as the Germans would be too worried about potential pitfalls to propose such a major undertaking. -------------- -- "WHY BUY PEPSI WHEN YOU CAN GET COKE FOR FREE?" -------------- -- ¶7. (SBU) When asked about the apparent lack of a viable economic model for Galileo, our interlocutors conceded that firms found it hard to find a viable business model, given that the GPS signal was free. Kuhlen quoted the line: "Why buy Pepsi when you can get Coke for free?" Then, making an argument we had not heard from EADS officials in the past, he said the economic model should not be looked at purely in terms of profit generation, but rather in a macroeconomic context. He cited a 2001 Pricewaterhouse Coopers study that showed Galileo would produce a benefit to cost ratio of 4.6 to one for European economies, given job creation, tax revenue, and the incentive for the private sector to provide end-user products and services such as personal navigation systems. Kuhlen added frankly that another reason for keeping the project afloat was that if the EU were to remain a player in space and high technology, it could not simply cede satellite navigation to the U.S., Russia and China. ¶8. (SBU) Our sources insisted that basic Galileo signals would remain free, but offered that there could be fees for enhanced services used by civil aviation, truck fleets, taxis, etc. An example would be in the "safety of life" area. For instance, rescue services in a mountainous area would need very precise coordinate and elevation information to determine whether a car accident took place on a bridge crossing a valley, or on a road below the bridge on the floor of the valley -- a simple grid coordinate would be insufficient. When asked if the EU might attempt to recoup Galileo's costs by requiring the use of fee-based services within the EU (i.e., for intra-EU aviation),Kuhlen said this could be a logical step, but Mayer noted that it would most likely be prohibited by an agreement with the U.S. that prevents charging for basic GPS signals. -------------- NEXT STEPS -------------- ¶9. (U) Given the collapse of the PPP, European Transport Commissioner Jacques Barrot has called for full public funding of Galileo, to the tune of nine billion Euros over the next several years. While Barrot continues to serve as a cheerleader for Galileo, his EU colleagues appear more reticent. German Transport Minister Wolfgang Tiefensee has said he supports the program in MUNICH 00000412 003 OF 004 principle, but conceded that a complete failure of Galileo was possible if financing could not be found. Former British Transport Minister Stephen Ladyman said he welcomed indications that the project "would have to be ended if it is not affordable." Reportedly, Denmark and the Netherlands are also unenthusiastic about the supporting the project. ¶10. (SBU) While our Astrium contacts indicated frustration with the current state of uncertainty over Galileo's future, they said they expect Galileo will continue as a purely public project under the authority of the Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) Supervisory Authority, or "GSA." In contrast to its forerunner organization, the "Joint Undertaking," GSA is exclusively an EU entity operating under the supervision of the Directorate-General Energy and Transport of the EU commission without the participation of third states such as China. While program management would be with GSA, the ESA in Paris would be the contracting agent. Our contacts were confident that ESA would take account of the work already done and the know-how thus far accumulated when handing out contracts to industry. Under this scenario, deployment could, in the best case, begin by the end of 2012 -- four years behind schedule. -------------- CHINA -------------- ¶11. (SBU) Originally a part of Galileo as a member of the "Joint Undertaking," China has since dropped out and developed its own satellite navigation system called "Compass." Our contacts insisted that China was not given access to any sensitive technologies on the project -- mostly "passive" components, such as the construction of an orbiting laser reflector. Mayer said China had attempted to purchase "Rubidium" atomic clocks, a key component of satellite navigation systems, from EADS for Compass. EADS refused to sell the clocks, so China went directly to Switzerland and acquired them from "Temex Time." ¶12. (SBU) Our contacts said China appeared to be doing very well with Compass. They related how the Chinese delegations had aggressively lobbied for participation in Galileo and technological transfer. Mayer recalled that when the Chinese first started working with EADS, they were very secretive about even the existence of Compass, and its forerunner "Beidou." Our contacts said they have been impressed with the recent advances of Chinese space technology, including the testing of a killer satellite in orbit, and the increasing sophistication of the Chinese delegations they deal with. -------------- MILITARY USE -------------- ¶13. (SBU) Military use of Galileo has always been on the table. According to the European Commission's own website: "Galileo will underpin the common European defense policy that the Member States have decided to establish." On May 16, EU Transport Commissioner Barrot told the press: "You cannot exclude a user because he is military. It will be civilian controlled...but there will be military users." When asked about the potential military dimensions of Galileo, Kuhlen referred to the obstacle of the UK's instance that Galileo was exclusively a civilian project and its fierce opposition to any use for military purposes. In any case, he explained, Galileo signals were not really tailored for pure military purposes such as missile guidance, although the EU had adopted a similar architecture to GPS, aiming to provide a series of "open access" signals intended for civilian use with the addition of separate encrypted signals similar to GPS' more precise military "M-code." ¶14. (SBU) Kuhlen said U.S. concerns Galileo could be used by an enemy military or terrorists to guide weapons against U.S. targets were overstated. Galileo (presumably in consultation with the U.S.) would be able to be selectively turned off or made less precise in the event of a security threat. Indeed, he argued, Galileo would effectively augment GPS for the Pentagon by doubling the number of navigation satellites available to U.S. forces, allowing for enhanced precision, particularly in areas where it is presently difficult to receive a GPS signal alone. -------------- WILL IT BE BUILT? MUNICH 00000412 004 OF 004 -------------- ¶15. (SBU) Our contacts said that despite the many obstacles facing Galileo, including funding and political turf battles, the political will exists to complete the project. They added that members of the European Parliament backed Galileo across party affiliations. The EU could not afford to leave this field to the U.S., China, and Russia. Having said that, they agreed many important questions will have to be answered before work on Galileo can begin in earnest, making the day when end-users will actually be able to navigate by Galileo anyone's guess. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶16. (SBU) We were struck by the shift in the portrayal of Galileo as a profit-making business model to one that provides "macroeconomic" benefits -- a description that could be given to most any government program. We left our meeting with EADS-Astrium officials with a similar impression as that which followed our meeting with EADS officials a year ago in the midst of the Airbus crisis (REF C). EADS and its various divisions have a tremendous amount of technical capability -- capability frequently frustrated by the multi-state environment in which EADS operates. Just as member state influence over EADS/Airbus resulted in a convoluted manufacturing system spread across Europe and the questionable decision to build the A380 superjumbo to the detriment of the potentially much more lucrative A350 program, EADS-Astrium is a company whipsawed by bickering among its EU state clients. We have no doubt that the EU will manage to cobble together the necessary funds and apportion contracts across various states in such as way that Galileo will indeed be built. But the ultimate cost, both to the EU taxpayers, and arguably in terms of European "prestige," will be very high. ¶17. (U) This report was coordinated with Embassy Berlin. ¶18. (U) Previous reporting from Munich is available on our SIPRNET website at www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/munich/ . NELSON