RUSSIA'S GAS WEAKNESS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 MOSCOW 000875 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR EUR KRAMER AND EUR/RUS/WARLICK DEPT FOR EB/ESC/IEC GALLOGLY AND GARVERICK DOE FOR HARBERT AND EKIMOFF DOC FOR 4231/IEP/EUR/JBROUGHER NSC FOR KLECHESKI E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/21/2017 TAGS: EPET ENRG ECON PREL RS SUBJECT: RUSSIA'S GAS WEAKNESS Classified By: Amb. William J. Burns. Reasons 1.4 (b/d). ¶1. (C) Summary. Owing in part to rapid economic growth but also in large part to poorly managed resources by Gazprom, Russia is facing a gas production crunch. While this problem was recognized early on by analysts, the GOR seems to have only awakened to the dilemma relatively recently. Gazprom has been able to mask its weakness by ramping up production on one giant field, buying increasing amounts of gas from Central Asia and Russian independents, and relying on fairly stable demand growth. But times are changing and neither the company nor the country can afford to be so complacent. That is why we are seeing the GOR pair tariff increases for its Former Soviet Union (FSU) customers with domestic increases, and why they are paying more than lip service to the idea of weaning domestic industry from its gas addiction by boosting coal and nuclear. ¶2. (C) We are also hearing that Gazprom's "national champion" image has taken a hit in some quarters of the government because it does not seem to be able to deliver what it promises. If true, then this shift in sentiment may force Gazprom to do what it should have done before -- develop new fields, and work more like a normal business than it has to date. There are signs that Gazprom is moving in this direction, given its recent decision to begin development of the Yamal Peninsula. However, whether the gas giant has what it takes to meet this challenge is an open question and one that most in Moscow would answer in the negative. The implications of Russia not getting it "right" are huge and avoiding such an outcome is a central preoccupation here. Increasingly, energy policy makers seem to be acting from a position of weakness rather than strength, and are beginning to recognize the need to get their domestic house in order. End Summary. . DEMAND/SUPPLY LOSING BALANCE -------------- . ¶3. (C) As the IEA rightly pointed out this week, economic success and relatively stagnant gas supply have led Russia to a gas balance crisis. Gas demand growth has been moving in lock-step with GDP growth (and accelerated in 2006),led largely by the call on gas from UES, the slowly-privatizing electricity monopoly, for both electricity and heat. Based on 2006 statistics from the Ministry of Industry and Energy and the Russian State Statistical Service, Rosstat, Gazprom produced 556 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas, independent producers such as Novatek 51 bcm, and oil companies about 58 bcm mostly in the form of associated gas. Gazprom also imported 57 bcm from Central Asia, for a total "on hand" supply of 722 bcm. Of this total, approximately 448 bcm went to domestic consumers (of which 160 to UES),56 bcm to FSU customers, 164 bcm to other export markets (Europe including Turkey),and 54 bcm to technical losses and fuel needs internal to the gas system. ¶4. (C) Defending itself publicly, Gazprom claims that it only supplies the gas that is demanded, implying that the company can ramp up production quickly to meet spikes in demand. However, many analysts doubt this, instead believing that Russia has very little excess gas production capacity on hand. In fact, some estimates showed that during last winter's record-breaking cold spell, the system operated at a deficit of at least 4 bcm -- less than 1 percent of supply but enough to result in rolling blackouts, selected industry shutdowns, and several deaths from freezing. When we contacted them almost daily during their repair work after the Georgian gas pipeline explosion, Gazprom made it clear that the system was stretched thin as Ukraine continued to draw large supplies, Europe took all it could, and Gazprom diverted supplies from the Georgian line to Azerbaijan for transshipment to Georgia. Most projections show 2006 as the year Gazprom moved from being a steady injector into gas storage to a steady withdrawer of stored gas. . COMPOUNDING THE PROBLEM -------------- . MOSCOW 00000875 002 OF 004 ¶5. (C) Meanwhile, Putin and Gazprom have been promising Europe and China more gas. Filling the NordStream pipeline will require 28 bcm/y starting in 2010 (growing to up to 55 bcm/y),meeting commitments to China will require another 60-80 bcm/y starting in 2011, and fulfilling agreements with Europe through existing (in some cases expanded) infrastructure will demand another roughly 20 bcm/y by 2010. Continuing economic growth in Russia will press suppliers even more. Brunswick UBS estimates that total domestic demand will rise by about 30 bcm/y by 2010 and by around 10 bcm/y per year after that. All told, UBS and others see the need to come up with something like an additional 220-250 bcm/y by 2015 to cover domestic, FSU, and non-FSU demand. . SMOKE AND MIRRORS -------------- . ¶6. (C) Until recently, Gazprom has been able to meet the marginal call on gas by relying more on gas from independents and Russian oil companies and maxing out Central Asian flows. UBS estimates that Central Asian exports to Russia could grow by 20-50 bcm/y by 2015, although many still doubt such high volumes. Several analysts estimate that the independent producers could grow production by 100 bcm/y or even a bit more by 2015 provided the right incentives, especially pipeline access and higher domestic prices. That still leaves half of future demand growth unmet -- or risk losing market share -- and it is unlikely that Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan are in any position to fill this void. The Central Asian option was always a marginal, nibbling-at-the-edges solution given the size of Russia's gas market, as evidenced by the region's share in Russia's supply figures (57 bcm of 722 bcm in 2006). . FROM HERE, WHERE? -------------- . ¶7. (C) In sum, Gazprom is operating in an environment characterized by increasing domestic demand, stagnating domestic supply (due largely to lack of investment),marginal alternative sources of supply (Central Asia),Gazprom's desire to maximize volumes to its lucrative European market, and increasing volume commitments to old (Europe) and new (China) customers. In the face of this, the GOR is left with two principal options -- develop new gas fields and/or stifle gas demand at home by raising prices and pushing alternative fuels for electric power. . GO GET THE GAS! -------------- . ¶8. (C) The obvious solution to this gas balance problem for a nation that sits on one-third of the world's gas reserves is to invest more in the upstream and invest in efficiency throughout the chain. Gazprom has not done the former (for the most part) and the GOR has not provided incentives for the latter. Since 1999, Gazprom has only added about 30 bcm/y while domestic consumption has grown by almost 50 bcm/y. Gazprom has brought on-stream only one major field since the fall of the Soviet Union, Zapolyarnoye, which is now producing 100 bcm/y. However, Zapolyarnoe little more than offsets the massive declines in Gazprom's "big three" fields -- Urengoy, Yamburg, and Medvezhye -- and is itself at peak production. To address this problem, Putin reportedly temporarily shelved moving forward on Shtokman development in large part because he needed assurances of supply from Gazprom to fulfill his commitments to foreign customers. This has led Gazprom to opt for more familiar territory on the Yamal Peninsula, starting with the huge Bovanenko field. . SPUR SUPPLY, DAMPEN DEMAND -------------- . ¶9. (C) On gas pricing, Gazprom has long complained that insufficient investment resulted from domestic gas prices (2/3 of its gas is sold domestically) that are never allowed to rise faster than inflation, meaning that Gazprom perpetually just breaks even or loses money in the domestic market. Export earnings must be funneled to upkeep, MOSCOW 00000875 003 OF 004 especially in the pipeline network, leaving little for new field development. Critics partly agree with Gazprom's price complaints but argue that Gazprom is simply inherently inefficient. They contend that with higher prices, Gazprom should have begun developing new fields several years ago but instead went on a binge of exotic pursuits, acquisitions, and non-core activities. . ¶10. (C) On January 31, the Russian Cabinet approved a plan to raise gas (and electricity) tariffs to European netback levels (European prices less taxes and transport costs) by ¶2011. The plan also calls for the maximum use of alternative fuels such as nuclear and coal, but this would still mean the need for a minimum of 30 bcm more gas by 2010 and of course even more beyond that if alternatives are slow in coming. It also calls for an ambitious series of corollary actions such as a ten-fold increase in the commissioning of coal-fired plants after 2010 compared with 2006-2010, the rapid decommissioning of gas-fired plants, mothballing rather than dismantling plants to serve as fuel oil-fired emergency back-ups, siting new plants near coal deposits, and constructing massive new high-voltage lines to high-load regions. . BEYOND PRODUCTION AND PRICES -------------- . ¶11. (C) Gazprom's plans to invest in Yamal and the GOR's plan to raise domestic tariffs are good first steps in solving the gas crunch problem. More needs to be done, however. Gazprom will need to cede more pipeline space to independents; be better prepared to invest in more expensive and technologically challenging regions like Yamal, East Siberia, and the offshore; reach an accommodation with operators such as TNK-BP and Rosneft that hold licenses to immense gas reserves; more keenly protect its market capitalization to secure financing, meaning greater attention to corporate governance, accounting, and efficiency -- not strengths of the company; and reduce flaring and "technical losses" throughout the pipeline network. . IMPLICATIONS -------------- . ¶12. (C) One obvious manifestation of this ferment on the Russian gas scene is the decision to raise gas prices to its FSU customers. Russia has decided it cannot afford the luxury anymore of subsidizing these states, and so everyone seems headed for above $200/tcm gas. Regarding Azerbaijan recently, for example, Russia decided it would rather not sell volumes at all than sell them cheap. In that sense, Russia's internal gas problems are already spurring the identification and realization of alternative supplies and transportation routes throughout Eurasia and encouraging countries (Ukraine is a great example) to restructure industry to accommodate more expensive gas supplies. Viewed in this light, both of these trends -- toward market prices and toward diversification -- are welcome outcomes partly resulting from Russia's own problems rather than to its clout. As the Ukrainian situation demonstrated this past year, price rises to the FSU demonstrably reduce demand for gas -- making this policy option a two-fer from the GOR perspective. ¶13. (C) Finally, there should be huge commercial opportunities in this situation for our companies, regardless of whether their Russian counterpart will be one giant state company or a smaller state company and many independents. Energy efficiency needs throughout the economy (but especially in gas and electric power),moving to more remote terrain for gas production, or moving industry towards alternative fuels will drive demand for better technology and project management and will open up a number of upstream opportunities for foreign firms. . COMMENT -------------- . ¶14. (C) Energy diversification and greater efficiency in MOSCOW 00000875 004 OF 004 Eurasia, movement towards market prices, ending subsidies, and ramping up investment for the first time since the Soviet era are all tied (to varying degrees) to the fundamental weakness in Russia's gas market, not its strength. Regardless of Russia's motivation, we should, for our own purposes, look for ways to help all make this inevitable transition as smooth as possible, keeping open the possibility of a more receptive investment environment in coming years. One area for immediate cooperation is in the politically benign but vital area of improving Russia's energy efficiency and helping Russia move to clean coal technologies, a major focus of our own energy policy. ¶15. (C) On the cautionary side, the magnitude of Russia's gas problem is such that failure to "get it right" could make Russian gas a global energy security problem. The fact that the domestic debate is so lively is proof that authorities are aware that their precious European export streams are vulnerable in the end to a gas supply crunch that ultimately threatens the Russian economy. The GOR is looking to avoid the choice of whether to cut exports or domestic supplies by finding enough gas and driving tariffs (and thereby efficiency) up. Looking ahead, and understanding how poorly the machine of government works here, we will have a ringside seat as the imperative to succeed collides with Russia's often ham-fisted approach to energy politics. BURNS