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IdentifierCreatedClassificationOrigin
07MOSCOW754 2007-02-21 13:03:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow
Cable title:  

IRAN: SANCTIONS DECREE SUBJECT OF INTERAGENCY

Tags:   PREL PARM KNNP EFIN ETTC KTFN IR RS 
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VZCZCXRO3092
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK
DE RUEHMO #0754 0521303
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 211303Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7623
INFO RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
					  C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 000754 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

TREASURY FOR COLLEEN EDDY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/21/2017
TAGS: PREL PARM KNNP EFIN ETTC KTFN IR RS
SUBJECT: IRAN: SANCTIONS DECREE SUBJECT OF INTERAGENCY
DISCUSSIONS

REF: A. STATE 14071


B. STATE 16917

Classified By: Pol/Min Counselor Alice G. Wells. Reasons: 1.4 (b/d).



1. (C) We discussed reftel requests regarding implementation
of UNSCR 1737 (Iran) with Vladimir Safronkov, Chief of the UN
Political Affairs Section in the MFA's International
Organizations Department. Safronkov told us that a draft
presidential decree necessary to implement the sanctions
regime was still being discussed in the Russian interagency,
but reassured us that "we're getting closer" to an agreed
text.



2. (C) Safronkov told us that the primary stumbling block
was obtaining interagency agreement on language to implement
proliferation finance measures. The MFA believed that the
President already had sufficient legal authority to implement
UN resolutions, but this legal interpretation had not been
shared by other agencies responsible for implementation,
including the Financial Monitoring Service and Central Bank.
These agencies had insisted on clear legal authority akin to
that provided by laws to combat terrorism finance. On
January 10, President Putin signed into law a bill on special
economic measures that had been passed by the State Duma at
the end of 2006. This law provided the necessary legal basis
to combat proliferation financing. Interagency drafters of
the presidential decrees (on Iran and the DPRK) were now
consulting with State Duma members to ensure compliance with
the legislation's intent.



3. (C) After reviewing the drawn out negotiations in the
Security Council over the text of UNSCR 1737, Safronkov
cautioned that the GOR would use a "strict interpretation" to
determine what was permitted or excluded by the resolution.
He underlined that appeals for implementation based on "the
spirit of the resolution" were not likely to gain much
traction in Moscow. Russia had been very clear about what it
could accept in the resolution text and intended to fully
live up to its obligations to implement those provisions.



4. (C) Comment: While the delays in implementing UNSCR
1737 are disappointing, our MFA interlocutors went out of
their way to insist that Russia was committed to implementing
UNSCR 1737 as soon as it was legally possible to do so. That
said, even in the absence of serious policy differences, the
Russian interagency process can move at a snail's pace. At
the same time, we have seen over the past week increasing
signs of Russian exasperation with Iran's failure to respond
to the "time out" proposal launched by IAEA DG Baradei and
supported by Russia. Visiting Congressman Tom Lantos heard
from both FM Lavrov and Security Council Secretary Ivanov
(septels) that the GOR was frustrated with Iranian
"arrogance." The Russians are claiming publicly that work
cannot be completed on the Bushehr reactor because of delays
in payment, but privately, Ivanov told Lantos that Russia
would condition fuel delivery to Bushehr based on political
considerations.
BURNS