PUTIN'S MUNICH SPEECH: ONE WEEK LATER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 000705 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/16/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV RS SUBJECT: PUTIN'S MUNICH SPEECH: ONE WEEK LATER REF: MOSCOW 613 Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reasons: 1.4(B/D). ¶1. (C) Summary: One week after delivery, Putin's Munich speech continues to draw praise among Russian analysts as a direct expression of Moscow's foreign policy views and a needed corrective to Western assumptions which take Russian interests for granted. Among Moscow experts, there was little dissent about either the tone or content of the address, with many arguing that Putin's remarks represented standard positions. Some did caution about reading too much into Putin's message and reiterated that the U.S. and Russia were bound to cooperate in the face of common challenges. While few Russians have criticized Putin for what he said, some did feel that the blunt tone distracted from the message. End Summary. . PUTIN: NO REGRETS -------------- ¶2. (SBU) During a press conference in Amman while on a Middle East swing, Putin defended the tone of his speech by arguing that Russia's Western partners, particularly the U.S., were not listening to Moscow's concerns. Putin claimed that Russia had been listening carefully to its partners and "had been patient and displayed tolerance" but it was clear to him that the West did not understand Russia. To cut through Western "spin," it was necessary to "talk straight and openly." Putin concluded by noting that "(t)he Bible says 'In the beginning there was the Word.' Now we have said our word and hope attitudes toward it will be positive." FM Lavrov, in New Delhi for a meeting with the Chinese and Indian foreign ministers, gave an impassioned defense of his boss' speech, arguing that it was important because it got the West's attention. On substance, Lavrov explained that Russia wanted to act as a responsible member of the international community and work together with others. . ¶3. (U) Two leading figures in Russian foreign policy -- Duma Foreign Affairs Committee Chair Konstantin Kosachev and Federation Council Foreign Affairs Committee Chair Mikhail Margelov -- took a similar tack, although both downplayed speculation that Putin's speech was any indication that Russian foreign policy had changed. Kosachev, who attended the Munich conference, argued that Putin had said nothing new, but what had changed was the tone -- which had been sharpened in order to start a discussion with Moscow's partners. Margelov found talk of a return to the Cold War unwarranted and attributed the tone of the speech to attacks on Russia's credibility and plans to place a ballistic missile defense on Russia's borders. . SUBSTANCE NOT SURPRISING -------------- ¶4. (C) Among the analysts we spoke to, there was little disagreement about the substance of the speech, which most saw as a straightforward, albeit direct summary of Russia's views. Even the relatively liberal Fedor Lukyanov, Editor of "Russia in Global Affairs," told us that no Russian would criticize Putin for what he said, while some might argue that the blunt tone detracted from the message. The Carnegie Center's Nikolay Petrov said that Putin's speech should not come as a surprise to the U.S. since Putin had delivered the same message many times before. Former Putin Chief of Staff Aleksandr Voloshin told the Ambassador that had DPM Medvedev (who wowed a Davos audience with his pro-Western business pitch) appeared in Munich, his speech would have differed from Putin's only in tone, not in content. Some observers concluded that if those in the West were shocked by the speech, it was because they were not listening before. . CARPE DIEM -------------- ¶5. (C) While experts agreed with the substance of the remarks, there was caution about reading broader meaning into it. Arkadiy Dubnov, a columnist at Vremya Novostey who attended the Munich conference, told us that Putin had calculated that there was no particular risk in delivering a strong signal to the U.S.; many of the Europeans in the audience would agree with the content, but lacked the courage and self-assurance to deliver the same message. A commentator in Komosomolskaya Pravda observed that rhetoric aside, Russia and the West were bound to cooperate to face common challenges like terrorism. Mikhail Vinogradov, of the Center for Political Analysis, shared this view, arguing that the strategic partnership between Russia and the U.S. was grounded in shared interests and was not likely to change. Lukyanov told us that the speech was motivated less by broad strategic considerations than by Putin's observation that the MOSCOW 00000705 002 OF 002 U.S. was distracted by Iraq and the EU remained leaderless; this gave him an opportunity to argue that Russia should play a bigger role in the world. . PUTIN ON THE COUCH -------------- ¶6. (C) Few observers saw the remarks as heralding a new direction in Russia's foreign policy, with many arguing that it was more an emotional response to an accumulation of disappointments stretching back to 1991 than a considered judgment about Russia's future course. Vinogradov claimed that while Russia made some tough statements from time to time, there were no political grounds for reexamining Russia's foreign policy course, which was to partner with the U.S. and Europe. Andrey Ryabov of the Gorbachev Foundation thought that observers in the West who saw Putin's speech as the declaration of Cold War II were missing the point. In his view, Putin was proposing an agenda for cooperation, but warning that the lack of respect for Russia's interests would inevitably lead to confrontation. Mikhail Gorbachev himself told the Ambassador much the same thing on February 16, emphasizing that it was crucial for both sides to engage on crucial global issues, like nuclear proliferation. Boris Makarenko of the influential Political Technologies Center argued in the official Rossiyskaya Gazeta that the tone of the speech, if not the content, were motivated by Russia anger over a range of recent U.S. policy statements. ¶7. (C) Center for Political Technologies Director Aleksey Makarkin agreed with his colleague Makarenko that the causes of Putin's outburst were multiple and cumulative:: NATO's flirtation with Georgia, the decision to base anti-missile defenses in Poland and the Czech Republic, the USG reaction to latest developments in the Khodorkovskiy case, and -- the straw that broke the camel's back -- Secretary of Defense Gates' comments as rendered in the Russian media. Makarkin agreed that the last event explained the emotional tenor of Putin's outburst, but the message itself was well-received by many in Russia, he said, because of a widely-shared sense here that the U.S. "owes Russia" for concessions made in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union, and should exercise restraint instead of attempting to press its perceived advantage. BURNS