KOSOVO: DFM TITOV DETAILS PRINCIPLED DIFFERENCES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 MOSCOW 000627 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/13/2027 TAGS: PREL PGOV RS SUBJECT: KOSOVO: DFM TITOV DETAILS PRINCIPLED DIFFERENCES TO SPECIAL ENVOY WISNER; POSSIBLE BARGAIN? Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns: 1.4 (b, d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Deputy Foreign Minister Titov told Special Envoy Wisner on February 8 that Russia's differences with the U.S. over Kosovo were strategic, not simply tactical, but should not color the broader bilateral relationship. Russia's vote at the UN would be predicated on whether Belgrade accepted the Ahtisaari proposal, which Titov argued was biased and driven by an artificial timeline. Titov denied Russian interest in a "swap" for Kosovo, but reiterated Russian concern over Kosovo's potential impact on the frozen conflicts. The Deputy Foreign Minister characterized the prospect of violence in the event of a veto or delay as Kosovar Albanian blackmail and decried the international community's retreat from standards before status. ¶2. (C) Russian Special Envoy Botsan-Karchenko separately floated two proposals to bridge divisions within the Contact Group: the first, a UNSC resolution endorsing of the Ahtisaari plan's technical annexes, with independence postponed indefinitely; the second, a UNSC resolution endorsement of the Ahtisaari proposal, absent Kosovo membership in international organizations, and contingent on the United States and EU withholding recognition for a period of time. Privately, Botsan-Karchenko suggested that the February 23 Vienna Contact Group meeting focus on fallback options, and proposed that he and the Balkan Group representatives be included in UNSCR drafting exercises. Our problem with Russia over Kosovo is real. End Summary Making the Case for US-GOR Unity on Kosovo -------------- ¶3. (C) In a February 8 dinner meeting with Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Titov and GOR Special Envoy on Kosovo Aleksandr Botsan-Karchenko, Special Envoy Wisner made the case for Russian support of the Ahtisaari plan. Wisner noted the importance of beginning and ending the Contact Group process united; underscored the significance of a Kosovo settlement to Western interests and European stability; stressed the bipartisan consensus in Washington on bringing the process to its conclusion; and reiterated the negative consequences to U.S.-GOR bilateral relations of a falling out over Kosovo. It was incumbent upon the U.S. and Russia as great powers to demonstrate a capacity to resolve crises, in a sensible manner. ¶4. (C) Wisner reviewed the reactions of the parties to the Ahtisaari proposal: the Kosovar Albanians, while recognizing the plan was favorable to their point of view, understood the limits to their maneuvering on issues related to the Macedonian border, as well as on the size and shape of a security force; Serbs in Kosovo were divided between those who supported Belgrade, sought to redraw the Northern border, or feared the possible extinction of the community and its institutions, with the Orthodox Church similarly divided. Despite Belgrade's agreement to engage and to secure parliament's endorsement of a negotiating team, there was no Serbian agreement on the plan and no coherent Serbian position. Pending Belgrade's confirmation, it was possible for Ahtisaari to meet the parties in Vienna as late as February 23. Wisner stressed that Ahtisaari was flexible enough to accommodate this delay to the timeline, but that a solution could not be postponed indefinitely. ¶5. (C) While tactics could be adjusted, Wisner reaffirmed that the U.S. strategy was to shift debate to the Security Council after Ahtisaari's discussion with the parties concluded. There was no artificial deadline, as long as the discussions were substantive and constructive, but the U.S. expected to take up the resolution in March. The U.S. and Europe could not serve as Kosovo's policemen forever and the fact remained that there was no compromise at hand: the Kosovars refused to return to Serbian rule, even symbolically; Serbia refused to accept what it viewed as forsaking Serbia's national patrimony. Delay would mean an eruption in hostilities, a rush to the Security Council, and an outcome that would inevitably make it more difficult to protect Serbian institutions and cultural ties to Kosovo. The United States seeks Russia's support for a future UNSCR in order to solve Kosovo in a manner that best protected the interests of the Serb population and produced lasting stability. Ahtisaari Plan Biased and Preordained -------------- ¶6. (C) Titov agreed that it was important to find common ground, but argued that Ahtisaari had embarked down the wrong path from the very beginning, wedded to a predetermined MOSCOW 00000627 002 OF 004 outcome. A compromise required bridging differences, but Ahtisaari had listened only to the Kosovar Albanians. His failure to be creative, to examine alternate models (e.g., a confederation along the lines of Serbia-Montenegro, or Bosnia) was a repudiation of UNSCR 1244's endorsement of Serbian territorial integrity. Resolution 1244 was designed to redress the sins of Milosevic: to remove Serbian troops, and to return Albanian IDP's and refugees; the resolution was not designed to secure Kosovo's independence. Today, Milosevic was gone, and Serbian democracy restored. Why was Ahtisaari punishing the Serbs? ¶7. (C) Noting his personal respect for Ahtisaari, Titov questioned the establishment of an artificial timeline based on the Special Representative's family priorities. This had contributed to unrealistic expectations among the Kosovars. Holding only one summit meeting, and providing only one month for "so-called" negotiations of the plan, were further indications of Ahtisaari's lack of seriousness. When the Contact Group discussed Ahtisaari's plan in fall 2006, he had promised a fresh draft, but when the proposal was presented it contained no new ideas. ¶8. (C) Wisner responded that the process had started nine years ago, and not with last year's formation of the Contact Group. Since 1999, it had become crystal clear that there was no conceivable way to get the Serbs and Albanians to agree. The Ahtisaari compromise was focused on the standards that the Kosovars would have to uphold towards the Serb population. There simply was no bridge to a negotiated final status agreement. Whether Ahtisaari held one or a hundred meetings, the two parties were not prepared to agree. Instead, what could be negotiated were protections for the minority population and cultural sites, and agreement to generous decentralization. Even then, Serbian willingness to participate in the discussions had been marginal. It was up to the international community to forge what the parties were unable to negotiate among themselves. The process had not been rushed. The U.S. had originally sought an agreement by September 2006, but the process was prolonged in order to allow Serbia to gain footing through new elections. ¶9. (C) Titov said it was wrong to see the Russians as Serbia's proxy. The GOR had reached out to PM Ceku. The U.S. had wrongly assumed that the Serbians would become more flexible and had counted on there being significant differences between the President and Prime Minister, but not even Tadic could endorse the loss of Kosovo. Russia had tried to stress at the outset of the Contact Group that sweeteners such as Partnership for Peace, EU membership (albeit 15-20 years down the road) or NATO would not make the loss of Kosovo palatable. Kosovo: A Question of Precedent -------------- ¶10. (C) Titov reviewed GOR arguments on the danger of a Kosovo precedent. Emphasizing Russia's "responsible approach" to international issues, Titov argued it was dangerous to impose independence. No solution was acceptable to Russia that was intolerable to Belgrade. Titov stressed that this was Putin's message to Chancellor Merkel. While Putin had clarified to her that there was no Russian promise to Serbia to veto the resolution, he made clear that any UNSCR had to be acceptable to Belgrade. If Serbia could live with the Ahtisaari plan, induced by promises of European integration and membership in NATO, so could the Russians. However, if the Ahtisaari plan "did not coincide with Serbia's long-lasting interests," it was incumbent for Belgrade to speak up and it would receive Russia's support. ¶11. (C) Titov reiterated that Russian objections were principled, and were not motivated by a desire to secure a particular outcome in the frozen conflicts. There were clear parallels between Kosovo and Abkhazia. However, "we are not talking about trading Kosovo for another issue," Titov said carefully. Titov complained that legal arguments promised by Ahtisaari explaining Kosovo's unique status had not materialized. Whether the international community agreed or not, the leaderships of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria believed Kosovo was directly relevant. These disputed territories enjoyed many of the same governmental attributes as UN-supervised Kosovo, including foreign ministers, and had developed foreign economic relations. Unlike Kosovars, who were not threatened by Serbia militarily, the residents of Abkhazia and South Ossetia faced an existential threat from Georgia. ¶12. (C) Wisner noted that the issue of precedent was not a matter of talking points, but of international will. Bangladesh was a case of international recognition, despite MOSCOW 00000627 003 OF 004 the objections of Pakistan. However, in the case of Kosovo, the EU, United States and Russia, working together, can ensure that its independence is not interpreted as a precedent. We understand that Kosovo has implications for the frozen conflicts, but that is different than establishing a precedent. UNSCR 1244 was a unique intervention that cannot be applied to Chechnya or territories under dispute. There are ways to creatively draft a resolution to address Russian concerns, but it is not possible to postpone a resolution indefinitely. What was the value of a six month or twelve month time-out? There was no bridge that could span the divide in Serbian and Albanian aspirations. Prospect of Violence: Albanian Blackmail -------------- ¶13. (C) Titov argued that threats of violence constituted "blackmail" by the Kosovar Albanians. Kosovo, he argued, had failed to meet democratic standards and its independence would be destabilizing for the region. The international community had caved to Kosovar Albanian demands and changed the rules of the game: first, it was standards then status; then standards and status; and, now, status before standards. By lowering the bar, the international community had stoked unrealistic expectations for independence. In turn, the Kosovar Albanians would "not pay attention to borders" with Albania, Macedonia, and Montenegro. ¶14. (C) Wisner disputed Titov's description of Kosovo, noting that it was better endowed to take on statehood than many other newly emergent states. While its situation was not enviable, it had the prospects and tools to build a different future. The absence of any permanent resolution to the conflict was the factor crippling Kosovo's development. If the Ahtisaari plan was vetoed, the moderate center in Kosovo would not hold. Hostilities would break out, pushing the parties back into the Security Council, but without a plan for the protection of minorities and church properties. Will Russia Veto? -------------- ¶15. (C) Titov declined to answer whether Russia would veto. In some areas of US-Russian relations (e.g., Iran),he noted, there were differences over tactics. With Kosovo, however, "there are now clear differences" over strategy. He emphasized Russian support for continued dialogue, and flagged that the EU was not as united as it sometimes maintained. Russia rejected artificial timelines, and believed that compromise was possible. To Wisner's exasperated "are you kidding," Titov maintained that a solution somewhere between autonomy and independence could be found and repeated that a compromise could not be imposed on a party. Later, Botsan-Karchenko reiterated that vetoing the resolution was not Russia's objective, and that all options remained on the table. Russia would follow Belgrade's lead, but (quoting Putin) "would not be more Serbian than the Serbs." Does Russia Want to Bargain? -------------- ¶16. (C) Following Titov's departure for the airport, Botsan-Karchenko played good cop to the deputy foreign minister's hard-line exposition of GOR views and explored whether, "principled differences notwithstanding," it might be possible to narrow the gap between Russian and Contact Group views. The serious differences over the general principles adopted in the Ahtisaari report, he argued, didn't need to stand in the way of negotiations. ¶17. (C) Option One: The first trial balloon involved a phased approach: the parties would negotiate the technical annexes (on minority rights, protection of church properties, and decentralization); the Security Council would then pass a resolution endorsing the annexes and the establishment of the successor international civilian mission to UNMIK; implementation would follow, but the "core issues," including independence and political status would be left open until a compromise could be struck between Pristina and Belgrade. Botsan-Karchenko argued that implementation of the annexes would build confidence among the Serbs that the Kosovar Albanians were prepared to honor their commitments. He recognized the difficulty of getting the Kosovars to walk back from independence, but averred that they would listen to Washington, and speculated that in eighteen months or two years Serbian attitudes could evolve and a compromise could be reached. ¶18. (C) Wisner noted the Kosovar reaction to Option One would be extremely negative, and pressed Botsan-Karchenko to MOSCOW 00000627 004 OF 004 explain what would prompt Serbian attitudes to change. Botsan-Karchenko referred vaguely to the prospect of EU integration, but backed down upon closer questioning. When Wisner pressed whether the GOR would commit to moving forward within a proscribed period of time, regardless of Serbian attitudes, Botsan-Karchenko demurred. Wisner criticized the proposal as too little, too late -- "two minutes to midnight" -- with no endgame. As the Serbian leaders had made clear, they were not motivated by the prospect of European integration, but were driven by their vision of Serbian nationalism. The Russian option would change none of the calculus that produced the current stalemate. The Contact Group would not tell the Kosovar Albanians that their compromises, designed to facilitate independence, were now being pocketed. Option one left the parties trapped in the same box. ¶19. (C) Option Two: Botsan-Karchenko, noting these were "personal views," then explored a resolution that adopted the Ahtisaari plan, minus provisions for Kosovo's membership in international organizations, and with the proviso that the U.S. and Europe would not immediately recognize Kosovo, but would wait a prescribed period of time to ensure that the technical annexes were implemented in good faith. Botsan-Karchenko stressed that the concepts of international recognition and membership in international organizations were crucial for Russia. In each of the fall 2006 Contact Group meetings, the GOR had pushed Ahtisaari to be flexible on these points, to no avail. "International membership is a critical element of sovereignty," he repeated, stressing that if membership in international organizations was removed from the plan, "our discussions could be easier and more productive in the coming weeks." Asked to clarify, Botsan-Karchenko said the GOR was concerned specifically about UN membership, with Wisner underscoring that World Bank support was a critical element for the development of Kosovo statehood. ¶20. (C) Wisner responded that he did not understand the GOR fixation with membership in international organizations. If Kosovo was a member of the UN, nothing would change. If Kosovo were denied membership in the UN, it would be a grievance nursed by the Albanians and lorded over by the Serbs, which would only lead to bad blood, disputes, and a poisoning of the atmosphere. Instead of moving towards normalization, the two parties would "wound and insult" one another. The Serbians could claim victory in a small battle, but still lose the war. Pristina and Belgrade needed to accept each other on their own merits. Two Private Requests -------------- ¶21. (C) Drawing Wisner aside at the conclusion of the discussion, Botsan-Karchenko made two requests. First, he suggested that Ahtisaari use the February 23 Vienna meeting with the Contact Group members to discuss fallback options, recognizing that the parties did not want a rupture in the Security Council. Second, he suggested that the Balkan group representatives and himself be brought into the drafting in New York of any resolution (implicitly suggesting that GOR PermRep Churkin would be a less sympathetic interlocutor). ¶22. (C) EUR/SCE cleared this cable. BURNS