RUSSIA-JAPAN RELATIONSHIP: NOT YET A NEW CHAPTER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 000601 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR EUR/RUS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/06/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON JA RS SUBJECT: RUSSIA-JAPAN RELATIONSHIP: NOT YET A NEW CHAPTER (C-AL7-00069) REF: SECSTATE 9037 Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reasons: 1,4 (B/D). ¶1. (C) Summary. Despite growing economic ties and a newly launched strategic dialogue, improvements in Russian-Japanese bilateral relations will likely continue to move at a glacial pace. The disputed Kurile Islands remain a sticking point; oil-rich and confident Russians see little gain in making concessions to Japan on this politically-charged issue. We doubt that much progress toward real improvement in Russian-Japanese relations is possible in the run-up to presidential elections here in 2008. End summary. FM Aso's Remarks: ""Creative"" -------------- ¶2. (C) During a February 5 meeting with the Ambassador, newly appointed Deputy Foreign Minister for Asia Aleksandr Losyukov reacted to FM Aso's Diet comments in mid-December about dividing the disputed islands based on acreage by politely labeling such ideas as ""creative."" ¶3. (C) The Head of the MFA's Japan Desk Aleksandr Iliyshev dismissed Aso's remarks for the following reasons: -- the MFA does not believe that Japan will change its official position; -- a mathematical formula, no matter how sophisticated, cannot solve a political problem. Iliyshev maintained that the territorial dispute could only be resolved when the relationship reached a certain level of maturity, as witnessed by the Sino-Russian example, where a 2005 territorial settlement had been preceded by years of steadily closer ties. With bilateral relations the way they are now, ""it is difficult to imagine a solution."" Iliyshev believed that the Japanese approach -- resolve the territorial dispute, then everything else, including a peace treaty, would follow -- simply would not work. ¶4. (C) Iliyshev's views on Aso's remarks were shared by Moscow Japan experts and the Japanese Embassy. The latter privately dismissed Aso's remarks, echoing the Japanese Foreign Ministry explanation of the proposal as a mistake. Georgiy Kunadze, a Japan specialist and former Ambassador to South Korea, termed Aso's remark, ""amateurish and offhand,"" not worthy of a serious response. He was simply ""dreaming aloud,"" Kunadze thought. ¶5. (C) Russian officials agreed that increasing economic ties will be the first step to improve the overall bilateral relationship. Japanese trade and investment with Russia, while low compared to other top economies, has steadily increased over the past five years. According to data from Russia's Federal Customs Service, Japan's 2006 two-way trade with Russia, through November, totaled slightly under USD 11 billion, more than twice the level of 2002 trade. For the first three quarter of 2006, Japan invested USD 2.6 million in Russia. Japan's top investment in Russia are in the tobacco industry (JT International) and a partial interest in Sakhalin Energy Company (Mitsui and Mitsubishi). In 2006, Nissan agreed to invest about USD 200 million to manufacture autos near St. Petersburg. The first cars are expected to roll out in October 2008. Strategic Dialogue: Different Agendas -------------- ¶6. (C) Efforts to reinvigorate the relationship beyond the territorial dispute have been slow to gain traction. The idea of a strategic dialogue, first hatched during the November 2005 visit by President Putin to Tokyo, was formalized in November 2006 on the margins of the APEC meeting in Hanoi. Talks are to be held at the DFM level twice a year. The MFA told us that it did not see the meetings as a channel for resolving the territorial issue, but as a confidence building mechanism, covering all areas of the bilateral relationship. The Japanese Embassy offered a different view, arguing that the territorial dispute would be part of the dialogue's ""hidden agenda."" The first meeting in Moscow on January 23-24 yielded little, as the two saw the purpose of the talks differently. Russia had hoped to win Japan's agreement to boost cooperation in Central Asia and in the Russian Far East. The Japanese delegation was, according to the Embassy, impatient with the Russians' lengthy ""philosophizing"" about the ""common interests"" of the two countries. MOSCOW 00000601 002 OF 002 Missed Opportunity? -------------- ¶7. (C) Many Russian experts thought that Japan missed a window of opportunity in the nineties, when Russia desperately needed economic assistance. ""The Japanese refused to give us a helping hand when we were poor and weak,"" Kunadze said, and ""the golden opportunity to resolve the territorial dispute disappeared."" Now that Russia's economy is growing robustly, the chance of concessions from the GOR was slim. Weariness about discussing the issue is prevalent on the Russian side. As Kunadze noted, there had been talk about resolving the dispute either ""now or never"" since the Brezhnev era. He scoffed at the idea that a solution must be found while Putin is President. The Japanese diplomat agreed. If anything, he argued, Putin, boosted by the newfound sense of Russia's power, would be reluctant to give up more than was sketched out in the 1956 Joint Declaration. The GOR claims that the Declaration gives Japan only two small islands: Shikotan and Habomai. ¶8. (C) Specialists at the government-sponsored Russian Institute for Strategic Studies considered the territorial dispute between Russia and Japan ""non-existent."" According to Vladimir Fedotov and Bakhtiyar Mirkasymov, the issue was settled by the 1956 agreement. Fedotov argued that ""resolving"" the issue again should not be a pre-condition for progress on other parts of the bilateral agenda, as Japan had insisted. There are a handful of experts who suggest that all four islands could be returned. Villya Gelbras of Moscow State University saw little value in keeping the islands at the expense of developing a ""normal"" relationship with an important country when the islands were ""not Russia's in the first place."" Gelbras allowed that few in Russia shared his view, however. He warned that emotions runs high on the issue, as it has been endlessly politicized by both governments. ¶9. (C) Kunadze saw nothing to gain in returning all four islands to the Japanese. Russia knows that Japan's strong alliance with the U.S. meant the two countries would never be full-fledged allies, he said. The current, ""stagnant"" relationship works for Russia for the time being, added Kunadze. The economic relationship -- and Japanese investment -- will continue regardless of political differences. ¶10. (C) Comment: We detect no increased interest in resolving the territorial issue among GOR officials or among Moscow's Japan watchers. At the same time, growing economic ties are creating the conditions for better overall relations, and the strategic dialogue should over time provide a forum to move forward on some political issues. However, this process of normalization will continue to move at a glacial pace, and only a breakthrough on the Kuriles will result in dramatic change. BURNS