U.S., RUSSIA, AND EUROPEAN COOPERATION: FIRST WE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 005824 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/13/2017 TAGS: PREL KV EU OSCE GG RS SUBJECT: U.S., RUSSIA, AND EUROPEAN COOPERATION: FIRST WE NEED TO REMOVE OBSTACLES Classified By: Political M/C Alice G. Wells for reasons 1.4 (b/d) ¶1. (C) Summary. MFA European Cooperation Director Ryabkov offered only partial reassurance on prospects for cooperation on European issues after a "stormy" round of international meetings, including strong disagreements on Kosovo and the OSCE. The MFA expected similar restrictions to be placed on ODIHR's monitoring of the March presidential elections, which would meet Russia's technical commitments but continue to demonstrate Russia's objections to ODIHR's autonomy. Ryabkov told us the GOR had decided not to link support for the OSCE mission in Afghanistan with dialogue on reforming ODIHR. He reiterated Russian opposition to a Georgian MAP, and expressed alarm at recent GOG comments to "resolve" the situation in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Russia-Poland bilateral relations delivered a breakthrough with agreement to lift the Russian ban on Polish meat, which the MFA hoped could invite new consideration of Poland's veto of PCA negotiations with the EU. End Summary. ODIHR, Elections, and Near-Misses on Afghanistan -------------- --- ¶2. (C) In a December 13 meeting, MFA European Cooperation Director Sergey Ryabkov told us the GOR position on election observers for the March presidential elections would be mirror the Duma elections: Russia would fully and completely honor its international commitments according to Russian legislation. He did not envision any change, especially in the light of developments at the OSCE ministerial, and noted that "everyone stands where everyone stood." He noted that, technically, accrediting one observer would meet Russia's international commitments to accept a "reasonable amount" of monitors, and GOR limits on numbers and duration were to be expected. He told us the GOR had not been in touch with ODIHR Ambassador Strohal regarding the presidential elections, but had been in communication with Finland, the incoming chair of the OSCE. ¶3. (C) Ryabkov stressed that Russian opposition was not focused on the issue of long-term missions but on the principle of OSCE reform; specifically, reform of election monitoring. He said the GOR could not tolerate an organization where decisionmaking and criteria were opaque. Pointing to the U.S. and 20 other delegations who spoke against an OSCE resolution to continue discussions on ODIHR in 2008, Ryabkov said this demonstrated OSCE "malfunctions." We noted the Russia stance was disappointing and sent mixed signals to other members on improving the campaign and election day environment. ¶4. (C) Ryabkov informed us that the GOR had considered establishing a direct link between supporting the OSCE declaration on Afghanistan and ODIHR reform. In the end, however, he said the importance of the OSCE mission to Afghanistan, and a sound and balanced text on the matter, were in the interests of the GOR and demonstrated Russia's willingness to cooperate. Ryabkov said the OSCE crisis was becoming more aggravated by the year. Kosovo -------------- ¶5. (C) Ryabkov reiterated Russian opposition to EU and U.S. attempts to persuade the SYG to use his authority to condone a ESDP mission based on UNSCR 1244. He noted the December 10 PPC meeting had focused almost entirely on Kosovo, and had not just been an exchange of notes, but "rounds" of increasingly emotional arguments. The GOR would continue to press for the one-year extension of OMIK, conditioned on monthly reviews (with the expectation that a UDI would lead to its closure). NATO Enlargement and Georgia -------------- ¶6. (C). Ryabkov characterized the last Lavrov-Bezhuashvili meeting on the margins of the OSCE as "alarming," with Bezhuashvili warning that "this was Russia's last opportunity," and that Saakashvili would "resolve" the situation with Abkhazia and South Ossetia "as he pleases" if reelected. Ryabkov emphasized that NATO's offer of a MAP to Georgia in Bucharest would worsen the already strained, emotion-charged bilateral relations and advised the deferment of the offer. He underscored that a Georgian MAP would not only worsen Russian relations with Georgia (with Saakashvili acting with "impunity," but U.S.-Russian relations as well. Ryabkov rejected the arguments that MAP was an instrument for continued democratic reform and transparency, but took on board the point that both countries should work to lower the MOSCOW 00005824 002 OF 002 rhetoric and avoid miscalculations. Positive Movement in Poland and EU Relations -------------- ¶7. (C) Ryabkov noted that Lavrov and Polish FM Sikorski had a good meeting on the margins of the NATO-Russia Council, and it was a positive sign that Sikorski was engaging personally to improve Russia-Poland bilateral relations. Ryabkov confirmed that at their December 12 meeting, Russian and Polish Ministers of Agriculture made "good progress" in gradually removing limits on the import of Polish goods, particularly meat, milk, and apples. He also noted that Polish PM Tusk had accepted an invitation to visit Moscow at the end of January, preceded by a Deputy Foreign Minister. The GOR hoped that these new dynamics would cast a new light on the Polish veto of new PCA negotiations with the EU. ¶8. (C) Ryabkov said that there was progress in several areas with the EU, including continued discussion on a visa-free travel regime, and "Schengan" flexibility for Russian citizens living near Kaliningrad/EU borders. The EU and Russia have also finalized general terms to include Russia to EU civil response efforts and capacity. He noted that while systematic talks were continuing on WTO accession, overall, there was "trouble" in dealing with the EU on international issues. BURNS