Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07MOSCOW5800
2007-12-13 13:58:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Moscow
Cable title:  

THE MEASURE OF THE MAN - "WHO IS MR. MEDVEDEV?"

Tags:  RS PINR PGOV 
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VZCZCXYZ0013
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #5800/01 3471358
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 131358Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5832
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 005800 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/13/2017
TAGS: RS PINR PGOV
SUBJECT: THE MEASURE OF THE MAN - "WHO IS MR. MEDVEDEV?"

REF: MOSCOW 2135

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reason: 1.4(d)

Summary
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C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 005800 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/13/2017 TAGS: RS PINR PGOV SUBJECT: THE MEASURE OF THE MAN - "WHO IS MR. MEDVEDEV?" REF: MOSCOW 2135 Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reason: 1.4(d) Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Despite his prominence as First Deputy Premier, Gazprom Board Chair, and earlier as Head of the Presidential Administration, Medvedev remains only somewhat less an enigma than his mentor Putin was when the latter was picked as Yeltsin's successor eight years ago. In the near unanimous approval earlier this week of Putin's anointing him as candidate for President, no one has seriously questioned Medvedev's character or suitability for the top Kremlin seat. Conventional wisdom, confirmed by conversations with his interlocutors, presents a capable conscientious manager, able to deliver on what he promises. However, like Putin in 1999, Medvedev has lived largely in the bureaucratic shadow of others, serving as the perennial deputy or assistant, generally to "big brother" Putin. His announcement on December 10 that he plans to ask Putin to serve as Premier suggests he is already preparing (at least initially) for a "back-seat" role as the third President of Russia. End Summary. The Un-Putin? -------------- ¶2. (C) Medvedev appears not to have Putin's ambition or "hard" edge, possibly because he has less to prove. Whereas Putin grew up in a working class family living in a communal apartment, Medvedev's roots are in St. Petersburg's academic community. His father taught at the Leningrad Technological Institute and his mother worked as a philologist at the Herzen Pedagogical Institute. Putin learned judo to fight neighborhood toughs; Medvedev lifted weights and focused his energies on Western "heavy metal" music, then considered "subversive." (He maintains an impressive collection of Deep Purple albums and attended a concert by the band's aging rockers with fellow Deputy Premier Sergey Ivanov.) Medvedev also succeeded in winning the hand of Svetlana, the girl his contemporaries considered "the prettiest in the school." The two were married in 1989 and they have a son Ilya, who was born in 1995. ¶3. (SBU) Unlike Putin, for whom higher learning appears a means to an end, Medvedev could easily have forged an academic career if he hadn't been pulled into the orbit of his professor of civil law, Anatoliy Sobchak, who headed the local city council. Medvedev earned an advanced degree in law
in 1990 from Leningrad (now St. Petersburg) State University, where he served as a law professor from 1990-1999. Former students have publicly praised him as a "super intellectual" and a "strict but fair" instructor. Vitaliy Ivanenko, Vice Dean of the St. Petersburg Law School, told us that Medvedev was an outstanding student who specialized in Roman law. Ivanenko noted that during Medvedev's tenure as professor, he authored several chapters of the faculty's definitive textbook "Civil Law," which has sold 1.5 million copies in over 6 printings since 1995 and is used across the country. ¶4. (SBU) Born in September 1965, Medvedev never had a "Soviet" career nor did he participate in the "wild capitalism" of the late Gorbachev era, when the young reformers and oligarchs of the Yeltsin years cut their teeth on Komsomol business projects or trading ventures. Instead, his early adulthood experiences were those of the post-Soviet depression and the dislocations that accompanied it. Because of his excellent ties to powerful players -- first to St. Petersburg mayor Sobchak and then to Sochak's deputy, Putin -- Medvedev was lucky to avoid much of the suffering that affected the rest of his generation. However, his experiences likely have shaped his commitment to resolving social issues, and may explain his determination to see through Putin's National Projects. Medvedev has mentioned on several occasions to Ambassador that he traveled widely in Russia on legal business in the 1990's and understands first-hand how difficult it was during that period for people to make ends meet, especially in the regions. ¶5. (SBU) From 1993-1999, Medvedev entered the business world in St. Petersburg, co-founding the Sibtrust and Baltflot Consulting company. In 1994, he was appointed Director of the board for a subsidiary of Ilim Pulp, Russia's largest paper and corrugated manufacturer, and served as the legal adviser to the parent company. According to press reports, when he found out that his partners were taking unscrupulous actions with the company, Medvedev left Ilim. Soon after his departure, the state started an investigation of the company. From Bureaucrat to Politician -------------- ¶6. (C) Having impressed then Leningrad city council head Sobchak as a student, in 1990 he became an adviser to the Mayor's Committee for Foreign Relations, where he made the acquaintance with Putin that would change his life. The two became close colleagues, with Medvedev serving as Putin's personal lawyer. When Putin was appointed Premier in 1999, Medvedev followed him to Moscow to serve in the Presidential Administration (PA). Despite his inexperience, Putin selected Medvedev to run his 2000 presidential campaign and, from all indications, was pleased with his work. When Putin fired PA Head Aleksandr Voloshin in 2003, Medvedev was elevated to fill the vacancy. Noted Russian political observer Liliya Shevtsova told us that Medvedev had proved himself a disciplined, non-stop work machine, who liked to get to the bottom of technical issues. At the same time, she says he gained the reputation as a petty, jealous, and sometimes unscrupulous player in the rough-and-tumble world of Kremlin politics. ¶7. (C) In 2005, Putin appointed Medvedev First Deputy Premier in a move that many saw as a first step in preparing Medvedev for the Presidency. Commentators note he has "trimmed down," changed his haberdasher, and has "learned how to tie a tie properly." Others point to a marked improvement in his oratory, citing a strong speech given at the Davos summit earlier this year. He has consistently delivered on those tasks requested of him, working within the system to achieve his goals. For example, Medvedev played a key role in ensuring that Part IV of the Civil Code was amended to allow the conclusion of a bilateral WTO agreement to go forward. At the same time, he expressed frustration at what he claimed were the ever-shifting goalposts related to Jackson-Vanik graduation, and criticized the U.S. for politicizing WTO accession (reftel). ¶8. (C) The lynch-pin of Medvedev's tenure as Deputy Premier was his responsibility for overseeing the National Projects in healthcare, housing, education and agriculture, which was allocated more than $13 billion in funding in 2006-2007 (though how much has been spent is an open question). While incremental steps have been made, among them higher salaries for public sector workers, improved delivery of medical services and increasing internet connectivity of schools, overall progress has been disappointing. Acknowledging as much, Medvedev told the Secretary on October 14 that he had not fully understood the magnitude of these problems, nor the difficulty of getting federal bureaucrats and regional leaders to tackle them effectively. The priority projects elevated Medvedev's public profile, and much of the air time he received in 2007 were ribbon-cutting ceremonies related to these projects. Gazprom's Political Patron -------------- ¶9. (C) Medvedev's record as chairman of the Gazprom board of directors (from 2000-2001 and from 2002-present) is less clear. As Aleksandr Burganskiy, head of research at Renaissance Capital, puts it, "nobody in the investment community has met with him. As we understand it, Medvedev has little to do with the day-to-day management of Gazprom, which is run by the Management Committee, headed by Aleksey Miller. Instead, as Burganskiy describes it, Medvedev has primarily provided political support and oversight of the company. Vladimir Konovalov, Executive Director of the Petroleum Advisory Forum (the leading association of western oil companies),said Medvedev "doesn't have much to do with the business end" of the company. Other contacts indicate that he is more technically capable, knowledgeable, and interested that his title suggests. Whatever role he had played, Medvedev's lengthy tenure at Gazprom's helm suggests that Putin is pleased with his work there. Everyone with whom we spoke about Medvedev and Gazprom believes his promotion will be good for the company. His selection was widely praised by investment analysts as "good for the economy." Playing the Kremlin Game -------------- ¶10. (C) Our interlocutors suggest that Medvedev's skills in inter-clan rivalries have also improved. Andrey Soldatov, one of Moscow's top analysts on the Russian security services, saw Medvedev as allied with the "invalids" of the siloviki -- those organs like Viktor Cherkesev's Federal Drug Control Agency and Viktor Zolotov's Presidential Protective Service -- in the increasing tense maneuvering among the Kremlin elite. In a December 5 meeting, Ekho Moskvy Editor Aleksey Venediktov speculated that Medvedev had directed the publication of the "Shvartsman interview" (in which hitherto unknown Russian businessman Oleg Shvartsman alleged that he was involved a scheme with PA head Igor Sechin to re-privatize assets) in the Gazprom-controlled Kommersant newspaper as a shot across the bow of Medvedev's siloviki rivals. Venediktov argued that the article had done real damage; although Shvartsman only reconfirmed what everyone believed about corruption and politically motivated re-privatization, public attention to the sordid details was embarrassing. ¶11. (C) Many in Moscow saw a victory for the liberal camp in Putin's blessing of Medvedev as presidential candidate, considering the appointment of a "real" successor as a rebuff to the Sechin camp's promotion of a "third term" for Putin as the only way to protect their influence. Nezavisimaya Gazeta owner Konstantin Remchukov told Embassy on December 10 that Medvedev's appointment was the "triumph of liberals." Remchukov was pleased that the country would be led by a young, Western-friendly, lawyer. Moreover, Medvedev's focus on national projects gave the editor confidence that Medvedev had an excellent tutorial on the challenges facing Russia in demography, infrastructure, and economic diversification. Likewise, Moskovskiy Komsomolets (MK) editor Pavel Gusev told us that Medvedev was the liberals' best hope. Having earlier stared down Sergey Ivanov, who as Defense Minister pressured MK to stop its reports on military hazing, Gusev was cautiously optimistic that a more liberal press policy could emerge under Medvedev. Liberal at Home, a Liberal Abroad? -------------- ¶12. (C) One clear lacuna in Medvedev's political resume is his lack of involvement in or even commentary on foreign policy. Medvedev has generally refused to get involved in those issues, which he views as an unwelcome distraction from the National Projects. Lacking firm evidence, analysts here tend to assume that his "liberal" approach to domestic issues signals a tendency toward improved relations with the West. Many seized upon Medvedev's speech at the Davos economic forum last January and his comments to the international media afterward as a rejection of the more isolationist "sovereign democracy" promoted by PA ideologue Vladislav Surkov. (When asked, Medvedev then said that he sought for Russia a democracy without "unnecessary additional definitions" built on the principles of a market economy, the rule of law, and the accountability of the authorities.") No matter how "liberal" Medvedev's views might be, there is little reason to anticipate that his diplomacy will differ significantly from that of his mentor, especially during the initial start of his potential presidency. Comment -------------- ¶13. (C) "Just Russia" Duma deputy Oksana Dmitrieva privately summed up the elite's reaction to Medvedev's appointment -- "He's not the worst candidate out there" and possibly the best one for Western interests. That said, there is little reason to expect a Medvedev presidency (which most here see as a foregone conclusion) to follow a very different trajectory that that of the current regime. Despite the remarkable differences between the two men, Medvedev's "bureaucratic liberalism" echoes that of Putin's first administration. There is little evidence to suggest that Medvedev's ideas about democracy vary far from Putin's. If Putin follows through with the "castling" move to the Premiership, Medvedev's role is likely to follow the pattern of capable assistant that he has come to know well. BURNS

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