MEDVEDEV'S CAMPAIGN STRATEGY - PUTIN

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 005782 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/11/2017 TAGS: PGOV PINR RS SUBJECT: MEDVEDEV'S CAMPAIGN STRATEGY - PUTIN Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reason: 1.4 (d). Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Less than a day after Putin came out in support of Dmitriy Medvedev's candidacy for President, Medvedev revealed his campaign strategy: to run on the promise of picking Putin to serve as Premier. Endorsements of a host of regional authorities, as well as representatives of the President's parties United and Just Russia that followed suggest a carefully orchestrated scheme to allow Putin to become his own de facto successor. Now, questions remain whether Putin will accept the offer immediately, or draw out the process and thereby keep the political elite off balance? Could he even decline to become Premier after Medvedev is safely ensconced as President and opt for a less formal -- but still controlling --- role? In any event, this scenario provides Putin with a perfectly constitutional option for maintaining his primacy in the political system and while continuing to play the role of arbiter among the competing clans of Russian politics. End summary. He Warned Us -------------- ¶2. (C) If Putin says yes, it will signal the fulfillment of his October statement that he would consider serving as Premier if United Russia won the Duma elections and if voters chose a capable president with whom he could work. Now that elections to the Duma gave United Russia a constitutional majority and Medvedev - as Putin's candidate - is effectively guaranteed the presidency, both of those stipulations are likely to be met by the time Putin leaves office. Should Putin trade the presidency for the position of prime minister, he will also uphold his promise not to amend the constitution in order to serve a third presidential term. There is no constitutional inhibition to Putin shifting his seat of power. The drawbacks of the Prime Ministry may still weigh on Putin if he drags out his decision. ¶3. (C) The choreography of today's announcement, which included endorsements by United Russia Party Chair Boris Gryzlov and Just Russia Chair Mironov, and others were a sign of careful Kremlin orchestration of Medvedev's offer. ¶4. (C) If Medvedev's gambit comes as a surprise, it is because the Kremlin and Putin himself had expended considerable energy recently in promoting the model of "national leader" - which would allow Putin to influence policy from his heights of popularity, with his legitimacy refreshed by the electoral win of the United Russia party that he led into the December 2 Duma elections. The optics of Putin serving as Premier always struck many as odd: in a Russian constitution weighted disproportionately in favor of the Executive branch, the idea of Putin taking up the "subservient" position of Prime Minister seemed incomprehensible. ¶5. (C) In explaining what has changed that would make the prospect of serving a Medvedev presidency as prime minister appealing to Putin, Kremlin-connected analysts note the following: -- In terms of optics, Putin endorsed Medvedev to serve as the joint presidential candidate of United Russia and three other subservient parties. Medvedev remains little brother, and Putin will oversee his confirmation at the December 17 United Russia party conference. -- Medvedev will run on a platform of implementing "Putin's Plan," and secure his certain victory on the strength of Putin's popularity as head of United Russia. From the outset, Medvedev has obligingly defined his presidency as serving as the guarantor of Putin's policy line, stating on December 11 that "it is necessary to continue the course that was started at the end of the 1990s (under Putin)." "Only with Putin as head of the executive branch, can the new legislature and executive work effectively." -- As leader of United Russia, Putin as prime minister would wield a constitutional majority in parliament that could be used to redistribute the balance of power, should his relationship with Medvedev deteriorate over time. (Putin could, of course, also exert the same influence simply as party leader.) -- Regardless of the constitution, the de facto center of power will shift to Putin. Whether or not Putin seeks to make that political rejiggering de jure can be contemplated at a later date. (Experts also note that in the event Medvedev steps down or is impeached by a Putin-dominated Duma, Putin would automatically become acting President.) Taking the Shine off of the Medvedev Penny -------------- ¶6. (C) Whereas most in the political elite had seen Putin's endorsement of Medvedev as a "triumph" for the economic liberals within the Kremlin over the "siloviki," today's announcement has served to shift the focus back to Putin. Medvedev essentially received less than one day in the political sunshine before receding back into Putin's long shadow. While even harsh critics of the Kremlin, such as SPS Deputy Party Leader Gozman, Republican Party Chairman Vladimir Ryzhkov, and columnist Yuliya Latynina, praised the Medvedev selection as the best possible - for Russia and for the West - the news that Putin may assume an institutionalized role immediately reduced optimism that a Medvedev presidency would inexorably lead to more open and West-friendly policies. Implications for Russian Power Balance -------------- ¶7. (C) The question that was raised even before the possibility of Putin becoming prime minister surfaced was what will the presidency look like on May 3, when Medvedev assumes office. With Putin and Medvedev in the drivers' seats, power will be more disaggregated than it has been to date. Although the system will remain presidential, the presence of a Putin protege and weak successor in the Kremlin will mean that the key decisions will be made by Putin, including foreign policy decisions, which have to date been beyond the responsibility of the prime minister. ¶8. (C) Another dimension of the disagregatation of power is the phenomenon of the accumulation of power in state corporations, with considerable economic influence in the hands of powerful players from Putin's circle -- such as Igor Sechin at Rosneft and Sergey Chermezov at Rosoboroneksport. Medvedev will be first among equals, but will still have to balance competing interests with (at least initially) less authority than Putin had, with Putin himself remaining a critical arbiter from the vantage point of Premier. Reactions: Preemptive Praise for Putin -------------- ¶9. (U) Despite the fact that Putin has yet to accept the new post, the "loyal" elements of the political and business elite clamored to endorse the idea of "castling" him as Premier. First Vice Speaker of the Duma, Oleg Morozov, applauded the idea of Putin as Premier as the final step in creating a "party" government for the entire country, with United Russia controlling the President's office, the government, the legislature, and most regional administrations. Just Russia leader Aleksandr Babakov was among the first to suggest that Putin's selection might trigger a formal redistribution of powers, and made the pitch (popular among Kremlin spin-doctors) that Putin's step (consciously or as a by-product of Russian realpolitik) could result in a strengthening of the party as an institution. (U) Just Russia Chairman Sergey Mironov in endorsing Medvedev's offer described the new configuration as a "pretty good algorithm for a future government." (U) Deputy Chair of the Communist Party Ivan Melnikov linked Medvedev's announcement with United Russia's strategy in the Duma election -- rely on Putin's popularity to attract voters. He commented that Putin's immediate reaction need not be definitive and said it didn't make sense to try and guess the Kremlin's game, much less discuss post-presidential options. (U) Director of the International Institute of Political Analysis Yevgeniy Minchenko saw the offer as an attempt by Medvedev, to use Putin to jumpstart his campaign. Minchenko and Deputy Director of the Institute for Social Systems Dmitriy Badovskiy thought that Putin's continued presence on the political scene would still nervousness during the transition among the elite. What Will Putin Say? -------------- ¶10. (C) As of this writing, Putin has not taken up Medvedev's offer although, at an afternoon session with members of the Board of Directors of the Chamber of Commerce, he spoke of the future government as if he were already Premier. Observers were of varying opinions about what Putin's response might be, with some opting for the President's trademark inclination to continue the suspense, and others assuming that Putin, who is presumably aware of the fatigue among the elite with the continued uncertainty, guessing that Putin will soon say "yes." BURNS