Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07MOSCOW5763
2007-12-07 16:05:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Moscow
Cable title:  

RUSSIAN CONDEMNATION OF KOSOVO UDI WIDENS

Tags:  PREL KV RS 
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VZCZCXRO6540
PP RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHMO #5763/01 3411605
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 071605Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5768
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 005763 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/06/2017
TAGS: PREL KV RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN CONDEMNATION OF KOSOVO UDI WIDENS


Classified By: Political M/C Alice G. Wells for reasons 1.4 (b/d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 005763 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/06/2017 TAGS: PREL KV RS SUBJECT: RUSSIAN CONDEMNATION OF KOSOVO UDI WIDENS Classified By: Political M/C Alice G. Wells for reasons 1.4 (b/d). ¶1. (C) Summary. At a December 5 press conference, FM Lavrov criticized "Western partners" for undermining the Troika's efforts to find a negotiated solution by continuing to support Kosovo's "inevitable" independence. Memorial, a Russian human rights organization often critical of the GOR, issued a statement supporting the GOR position. Arguing that a Kosovo precedent was inevitable, Memorial warned of consequences for the frozen conflicts. Ruling party member of the Duma International Relations Committee Zatulin dismissed press reports of Duma Speaker Gryzlov's promise to review Abkhaz and South Ossetian requests for recognition as "distorted," but underscored GOR and public anger over American policy towards Kosovo. Experts tell us that widespread support among ordinary Russians for Serbia's cause does not yet exist in Russia, but warned that a UDI could lead to protests. Zatulin and Memorial capture the broad political support for Putin's insistence on a negotiated solution. End Summary. Lavrov Redraws Red-Line -------------- ¶2. (SBU) At a December 5 press conference, FM Lavrov spoke highly of Serbia's "flexibility" throughout the Troika process, and blamed "Western partners" and their uncritical support for Kosovo's "inevitable" independence for the process's failure. While the Troika worked for a solution, he said, these partners were publicly discussing a "predetermined, contradictory" way forward. He emphasized the GOR will base its decisions on established international law and thatKosovo's final status could only be legitimate through the UNSC. Memorial Chimes In -------------- ¶3. (SBU) On November 28, the human rights NGO Memorial, which is usually critical of the GOR, issued a statement concurring with the need for more negotiations and a longer timeframe, in order to resolve Kosovo's final status. Noting its experience in watching frozen conflicts flash back to life, Memorial expressed serious concern that a unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) for Kosovo would lead to new bloodshed. It noted that arguments over Kosovo's unique status were "absolutely unpersuasive" and a UDI would be considered a major precedent, renewing the hopes of armed opposition in other separatist conflicts and turning frozen conflicts into hot wars. Memorial's statement said that a long, step-by-step dialogue, searching for mutual compromise could eventually bring peaceful coexistence to opposing groups in tense, ethnically mixed areas. Duma Deputy Warns of Precedent -------------- ¶4. (C) In a December 6 meeting, newly re-elected Duma International Relations Committee Deputy Konstantin Zatulin warned that Russia's respect for Georgian territorial integrity was negotiable in the event of a Kosovo UDI. However, despite an impassioned treatise on Abkhazia's legitimate claims to independence, Zatulin dismissed press reports of Gryzlov's promise to consider Abkhaz and South Ossetian requests for recognition as "distorted." The question had been planted by a Georgian journalist, Zatulin maintained, and Gryzlov's generic response had been twisted into something more threatening. While Zatulin said he supported Russian recognition, he stressed that there were no Duma plans to undertake a legislative initiative. Nonetheless, he warned that U.S. support for a UDI and for Saakashvili had alienated the GOR and the Russian public. Experts Divided on Popular Response -------------- ¶5. (C) Dr. Aleksandr Nikitin, Director of the Center for Euro-Atlantic Security, noted that to date there were no popular movements among the Russian people on behalf of Kosovo and no rallies around the cause of "Slavic Brotherhood." For the Russian leadership, however, Kosovo played into their need to show the public that they were respected by and included in the international decision-making process. Dr. Pavel Kandel of the Institute of Europe partially agreed, adding that while ordinary Russians did not yet have a personal interest in Kosovo's final status, if the solution caused violence or clashes against ethnic Serbs, the publicity of these events in Russia could quickly energize large portions of the Russian population. Comment MOSCOW 00005763 002 OF 002 -------------- ¶5. (C) Memorial, which does not hesitate to criticize the Russian government, took an unusually supportive position of the GOR's policy, reflecting the broad social and political consensus in support of Putin's insistence on a negotiated settlement in Kosovo. While Zatulin hails from the nationalist wing of United Russia, he is a mainstream politician, an advisor for Moscow Mayor Luzhkov on Abkhazia, and a reminder of the forces at play who would urge a rash Russian reaction to Kosovo's independence. BURNS

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