LEVADA CENTER ANALYSIS OF PUTIN'S PULL

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 005750

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/15/2017
TAGS: PGOV PHUM SOCI RS
SUBJECT: LEVADA CENTER ANALYSIS OF PUTIN'S PULL


Classified By: Political M/C Alice G. Wells. Reason: 1.4 (d)

Summary
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1. (C) In polls leading up to the December 2 elections, the
Levada Center brought to light some hidden characteristics of
the Russian electorate. Based on the Center's data, it was
clear that Putin's popularity transcended party affiliation
spreading even to the Communist Party (KPRF) and the
traditional liberal- democratic parties Yabloko and Union of
Right Forces (SPS). According to Leonid Sedov, the Russian
electorate poorly understands the roles of parties and the
Duma. Instead, they are swayed by a desire for stability and
economic growth which they believe will come from Putin's
Plan, even though the electorate does not understand what the
plan entails. The data show that the electorate wants a
strong role for the state in all facets of life, which helps
explain the marginalization and diminution of the
liberal-democratic parties. The strong support for Putin
among voters of all political parties helps put the results
of the election in context. End summary.

Leonid Sedov, the Godfather of Russian Public Opinion
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2. (C) Leonid Sedov, a senior analyst at the Levada Center,
has analyzed public opinion polls since the late 1970s when
he began working with the late Yuriy Levada. He helped
Levada set up the All-Russian Center for the Study of Public
Opinion (VTsIOM) in 1988. After the fall of the USSR, the
center continued producing public opinion research although
it relied on private contracts for funding. In 2003, the
Russian government took over VTsIOM, which VTsIOM employees
left with Levada to form a new center. Sedov insisted that
the Levada Center does not work with the Presidential
Administration and that the Kremlin has not interfered in the
surveys conducted or results published by the Levada Center.

The Duma Elections
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3. (C) In the run-up to the December 2 elections, Sedov said
that voters saw the Communist Party (KPRF) as the only viable
opposition party to YR. Smaller parties such as Yabloko,
SPS, or the Agrarian Party could not hope to make it into the
Duma.

Duma: A Mystery to Most Russians
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4. (C) According to Sedov, polling has showed that the
Russian electorate only dimly understands the role of the
Duma and that of political parties. The electorate does not
follow the voting patterns of Duma deputies, nor do
non-governmental organizations. The fact that there was no
public outcry following the decision to change from a mixed
single-mandate/proportional representation voting system to a
proportional system was a symptom of this poor understanding.
The electorate on December 2 scarcely understood whom they
were voting for or to whom they could turn to as their
elected representative. Voters saw the election as a vote
for or against Putin.

Putin Has a Plan, No One Has Seen It
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5. (C) Although the voters had no idea what Putin's Plan
was, they approve of Putin and they believe him (and United
Russia) when he says he has one. In a Levada Center poll of
1600 respondents, fully 65 percent believed there was a
specific plan, and almost 60 percent believed that the plan
would make Russia strong, wealthy, and well-off. Only six
percent said they could explain what the plan was, however,
and half had heard no details of the plan.


6. (C) More important than the specifics of the Putin plan
was stability and economic growth which those surveyed
attributed to Putin. The electorate also approved of
Russia's greater international influence. Although the media
have been hampered by the Kremlin, voters paradoxically
believe freedom of expression has improved under Putin.


7. (C) Sedov was surprised that Putin had not been taken to
task for the failings of the government by either the voters
or political elites. In particular, he saw corruption as
dominating Russian life. However, the electorate viewed
Putin as having tried to curtail the rampant bureaucracy that
causes it. They did not judge Putin guilty of contributing
to the problem. Similarly, the problem of inflation has begun
to occupy ordinary Russians' lives, partly from fear of a
repeat of the early 1990's and partly from slow increases in
real wages. However, the electorate had not connected the
problem to Putin. Rather the voters again saw the bureaucracy
as the main culprit.

Russians Want Greater State Involvement
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8. (C) According to a Levada Center poll conduced October
19-23, a majority of Russians support a greater government
role in the economy. Only 26 percent indicated they would
vote for a party that proposed less state involvement in the
economy, and 38 percent would vote against it. Almost
two-thirds would vote for a party that proposed a greater
role in the economy and government regulation of
market-oriented reforms. Two-thirds would vote for the
re-establishment of the social protections and pensions that
existed prior to perestroika. More than half would vote for
a party that advocated strengthening law and order, even at
the expense of democratic freedoms.

The Revolution Eats Its Young
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9. (C) Sedov prepared a separate report on SPS and Yabloko
for internet distribution. Because most who work in the
Levada Center support these smaller, liberal-democratic
parties, information demonstrating their dire circumstances
was not published during the campaign. According to this
report, both SPS and Yabloko are on the verge of
disappearing. Since January, neither party polled above four
percent in the Levada Center national polls, which revealed
that the Russian electorate did not consider Yabloko or SPS a
credible opposition to the Kremlin and the president. While
66 percent of respondents believed in the need for a serious
opposition party, only 30 percent viewed Yabloko as that
opposition, and fewer, 18 percent, consider SPS to be a
credible opposition. (From the same polls, 20 percent of the
population discounted the need for an opposition.) Forty-two
percent of respondents viewed KPRF as an opposition party.


10. (C) Levada center polls showed also that many voters
view Yabloko as a party of cultural elites and oligarchs and
less a party of the general electorate (i.e., workers, the
army etc.). Only three percent of all respondents indicated
Yabloko was a party of the poor, the common people and the
workers. Of Yabloko voters, 56 percent view the party as
serving the interests of common Russians. SPS voters held
the strong view that Yabloko serves mainly the cultural elite
and the intelligentsia.


11. (C) Questions about SPS provided analogous results. The
average voter believes SPS is a party of oligarchs,
businessmen, and to a lesser extent, the middle class. On
the other hand, SPS voters portrayed their party as the party
of the middle class and working people. The Yabloko
electorate in the polls generally characterized SPS as a
party of oligarchs and the middle class.

Everyone Is For Putin
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12. (U) When asked in a November 9-13 if the country was
heading in the right direction, 63 percent of KPRF voters
answered "no," while 74 percent of YR voters answered "yes."
SR, SPS and Yabloko voters largely agreed with the
Communists. As might be expected, 98 percent of YR voters
approved President Putin's policies. Interestingly 59
percent of Communists did as well. Support for Putin was
overwhelming among the voters for all other parties: 81
percent among LDPR voters, 65 percent for SR voters, and 92
percent for SPS voters. Yabloko voters were more critical,
but still 60 percent registered their approval. Putin's
popularity, in other words, transcends all parties, and
differs only in degrees.


13. (U) In the same poll, respondents were asked if the
interests of the administration and the interests of society
coincide. Although the majority of voters felt not, the
differences among the parties are striking. Among the
Communists, 85 percent do not feel that the interests of two
coincide while among YR voters, 43 percent thought they did,
and 48 percent said they do not. For SR, SPS, and Yabloko,
the majority believed there was a difference in interests,
although not to the same extent as the Communists. Although
the answers to this one question should not be exaggerated,
they indicate a strong feeling among Russians that the
state's interests differ from society's.

Comment
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14. (C) Sedov's analysis of Levada Center data suggest that
while the Kremlin sought to manufacture a specific outcome,
that outcome (overwhelming support for United Russia) would
have come about in any case. Levada Center analyses show the
Russian electorate's desire for a paternalistic government
(whether for cultural reasons or in reaction to the chaos of
the 1990s) expresses itself as a preference for a strong
central government under Putin and United Russia.
BURNS