RUSSIA: INTERPRETING PUTIN'S DUMA VICTORY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 005596 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/28/2107 TAGS: PGOV PINR SOCI KDEM RS SUBJECT: RUSSIA: INTERPRETING PUTIN'S DUMA VICTORY Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns: 1.4 (b, d). ¶1. (C) Summary: The significance of the December 2 Duma elections is the magnitude -- and not the fact -- of Putin's win and how he can use this "vote of confidence" to dictate presidential succession. Having been transformed into a referendum on Putin, the parliamentary elections are a step backward in Russia's evolution and a reaffirmation of personality over political institutions. Reversing efforts to engineer an acceptable opposition party, Putin tied his political afterlife to the success of the ruling party. While Putin's win will be real, reflecting both the complacency of the public and the paucity of the opposition, the size of his majority will be inflated by the blatant use of administrative resources, domination of television, and black p.r. against opposition politicians. Observers will assess the quality of the Putin victory by voter turnout, whether United Russia secures a constitutional majority, and the magnitude of the Communist Party's second place finish. Kremlin sensitivities over appearing to be "another Kazakhstan" may help two pro-Putin opposition parties also limp across the threshold. Putin's victory will provide an institutional patina to his selection of an heir presumptive, but doesn't alter the fundamental fact of life that Putin the man, and not the party leader, controls this political transition. End Summary A Referendum, Not an Election -------------- ¶2. (C) The December 2 Duma elections are not about a new parliament, but about Putin and the quantitative mandate that he seeks in order to legitimize his continued influence over the Russian body politic after he steps down from the presidency in May 2008. The outcome is largely foreordained and backed up by professional polling data: a lopsided win by the ruling United Russia party and a second place finish by the Communist Party, with one or two pro-Putin "opposition" parties perhaps limping across the seven percent threshold. The magnitude -- and not the fact -- of the United Russia win will be the story, and the plotline is dominated by the question of how successful Putin will be in transferring his sky-high popularity ratings to a lackluster political party, which he himself has derided as "not great, but the best we have." ¶3. (C) In terms of democratic political development, this election is retrograde: a step away from the development of coherent political parties. The storyline could have been different. Until Putin's surprise decision in early October to lead United Russia into the polls, this election was about the emergence of the Kremlin-blessed Just Russia opposition party, whose message of social justice could have challenged the Communists' lock on the left-leaning electorate; for a brief few months, we saw in our travel to regional capitals the beginnings of elite competition between Just Russia and United Russia. During this interregnum, United Russia moderates spoke optimistically about building credible and more European-looking political parties, and Kremlin spin-meisters even saw room for a liberal party in the Duma mix, with the more compliant Union of Right Forces reaching what it thought was a firm deal with the Kremlin for its share of administrative resources. Dominated by Putin, but Marred by Violations -------------- ¶4. (C) When Putin changed his mind, and linked his future political fate with United Russia, official encouragement of political competition, as well as any tolerance towards liberal parties critical of the Putin, evaporated. A mini-cult of personality campaign quickly took off, embarrassing to the liberal Russian elite, but apparently popular (or at least palatable) among the masses. Part Madison Avenue (slick television ads, a U.S.-styled convention replete with shimmying girl bands and film idols) and part Communist-era nostalgia (milkmaids, Communist youth camp songs, public paeans and "spontaneous" demonstrations in support of the great leader),Putin's campaign literally dominates the landscape -- with the "Putin's Plan -- Russia's Victory" campaign poster omnipresent throughout Russia's eleven time zones. ¶5. (C) No one here, not even the fiercest critic of the Kremlin, believes that Putin -- or his designated political vehicle, United Russia -- faces any credible threat from any pole on the political spectrum. Public complacency and a craving for "normalcy" reign, fed by eight years of uninterrupted economic growth, full coffers, and the pride associated with Russia's reemergence as a major global player. The Kremlin has been able to ignore the biting liberal critique of Putin's democratic retrenchment, rising MOSCOW 00005596 002 OF 003 corruption, and state corporatism, because liberal politicians have spent their time devouring each other, fighting ideological battles from the 1990's, flirting with compacts with Putin, and resolutely refusing to unite behind one party. As one independent editor put it to us: "the liberals have no instinct for survival." On the other end of the spectrum, the Communists remain locked in the past, with party leader Zyuganov taking no steps to modernize his message or to expand his vote bank beyond the cohort of loyal pensioners. During the past eight years, Zyuganov has delivered the Communist vote on almost every legislative issue of importance to Putin and Putin has returned the favor by rarely criticizing Zyuganov directly. ¶6. (C) However, while Putin's win will reflect the legitimate choice of Russia's voters, the size of his majority will not. As in 2003, the Duma campaign has been distinguished by the blatant use of administrative resources, the ruling party's domination of the state-controlled television, and the use of "black p.r." against opposition candidates, as well as covert restrictions placed on their ability to campaign (e.g., the frequent cancellation of conference halls due to last-minute "repairs" or "electricity outages"). Credible reports, including those gathered during our regional travel, indicate that governors (65 of whom head United Russia regional party lists),mayors and others in the official food chain are under pressure to deliver 70 percent of the voters to United Russia, with the ethnic republics anxious to overfulfill the plan. (Chechen President Kadyrov has boasted publicly that Putin will receive 100 percent of his republic's votes.) In this mix, even the criticism of the statistically imperceptible Other Russia opposition movement led by Garry Kasparov, who does not have a political party to challenge Putin, proved intolerable. Interpreting the Duma Returns -------------- ¶7. (C) Because Putin's United Russia is presumed to garner a majority of votes, the definition of winning has shifted. The following factors will determine how local pundits measure the Kremlin's success: -- Voter Turnout: Anything below the 2003 turnout of 55.75 percent will be considered an embarrassment, and a tepid endorsement of Putin's intent to play a significant role in Russia's political future. Not surprisingly, university rectors, bureaucrats, and state directors have been exhorted to get out the United Russia vote. In some localized instances, United Russia supporters may have ordered state workers to show up at the office on Sunday with an absentee ballot in hand (over three times as many absentee ballots have been issued, compared to 2003); meanwhile, the range of positive inducements around polling places such as free food and entertainment has grown to include free gynecological checkups (sic) and psychiatric counseling. -- Constitutional Majority: Despite United Russia denials, the Kremlin wants a constitutional majority (67 percent), which necessitates at least a 60 percent win. (Note: Since most parties won't cross the seven percent threshold, their percentage of the vote will be distributed to the winners on a proportional basis.) This is substantially higher than the 37.57 percent won by United Russia in 2003. Putin and his circle have assiduously attempted to lower expectations, with a simple majority painted as a winning outcome. Putin reportedly told Prodi that United Russia would get 55 percent of the vote, with the Communists scoring 12 percent, and both LDPR and Just Russia securing around the seven percent minimum. Privately, the Kremlin drumbeat is for 70 percent. -- Communists' Tally: If the Communists poll more than 14 percent, most analysts here will read the higher than expected turnout as a protest vote against Putin, with liberals casting their ballot with the only party that can reliably be expected to cross the seven percent threshold. (There has been much liberal commentary over how to vote against Putin, without inadvertently giving support to United Russia. Because of the seven percent threshold, these commentaries argue that a vote for one of the minor liberal parties ends up benefiting Putin, since United Russia will receive a proportional share of the votes "wasted" on parties that don't enter the Duma.) -- Number of Victorious Parties: Whether the pro-Putin "opposition" LDPR and Just Russia secure their minimum seven percent also will reflect Kremlin sensitivities over not appearing to be "another Kazakhstan." According to polling data, both parties are hovering within statistical reach (LDPR at 6 percent; Just Russia at 4 percent). Whether the Kremlin can walk (promote Putin) and chew gum (provide some dollops of electoral support to LDPR and Just Russia) at the MOSCOW 00005596 003 OF 003 same time remains a question mark. LDPR's Zhirinovskiy is a superb if odious campaigner, whose foul-mouthed and outrageous antics often attract a nationalist or youth vote. His three-minute campaign speech, which immediately followed Putin's much ballyhooed November 28 pep talk to the nation, is read here as Kremlin support for LDPR aspirations. (Zhirinovskiy's "opposition" spiel centered entirely on his support for Putin's policies.) Election Results: Implications for Succession -------------- ¶8. (C) The Duma outcome sets the stage for Putin's designation of a presidential successor, whose nomination can come no later than December 23 (and most expect will happen more quickly, with the convening of a United Russia party conference). The presumption has always been that Putin would "anoint" a successor, and polls have consistently supported that a majority of Russians would vote for whomever he designated. However, the Duma elections will add legitimacy to Putin's centrality in the process and provide an institutional veneer. While our best guess is that PM Zubkov and First Deputy Prime Ministers Medvedev and Ivanov remain the front-runners, the greater Putin's mandate, conceivably the greater the possibility that he could select a dark horse candidate as his heir presumptive. Comment -------------- ¶9. (C) Derided as irrelevant only two months ago, the Duma elections have become an important stepping stone in the succession process, but the central fact of Russian political life remains the same. Putin remains the arbiter of Russia's political transition. BURNS