Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07MOSCOW5540
2007-11-27 15:23:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Moscow
Cable title:
PICK YOUR POLL: PUTIN'S PARTY WINS BIG
VZCZCXRO6848 PP RUEHDBU DE RUEHMO #5540/01 3311523 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 271523Z NOV 07 FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5462 INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 005540
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/26/2017
TAGS: PGOV PHUM SOCI RS
SUBJECT: PICK YOUR POLL: PUTIN'S PARTY WINS BIG
Classified By: Political M/C Alice G. Wells. Reason: 1.4 (d)
-------
Summary
-------
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 005540
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/26/2017
TAGS: PGOV PHUM SOCI RS
SUBJECT: PICK YOUR POLL: PUTIN'S PARTY WINS BIG
Classified By: Political M/C Alice G. Wells. Reason: 1.4 (d)
--------------
Summary
--------------
1. (SBU) According to the final public opinion polls
published one week before the December 2 Russian Duma
elections, United Russia (YR) will garner the vast majority
of votes and the Communist Party (KPRF) will easily overcome
the seven percent threshold to entry into the Duma. The
predictions of the three big polling agencies differ on
whether A Just Russia (SR) and The Liberal Democratic Part of
Russia (LDPR) will enter the Duma. The data indicate no
chance for the opposition Yabloko party and the Union of
Right Forces (SPS) to garner enough votes for a place at the
table. Despite questions raised about polling bias in
Russia, the three agencies--using different sampling and
questions--have captured the same trends as well as the same
bottomline: United Russia's overwhelming win. End Summary.
--------------
Polling Sources & Bias
--------------
2. (SBU) Three established and competent firms conduct
routine political and sociological polling within Russia: the
All Russia Institute for Public Opinion (VTsIOM),the Levada
Center, and the Foundation for Public Opinion (FOM). Other
research organizations in Russia could also conduct electoral
polling; however, these organizations do not routinely make
their results public. VTsIOM was established by Yuriy Levada
in 1987 under Gorbachev during perestroika. In 2003, the
Russian government took over VTsIOM and installed a Kremlin
approved director and governing board. Yuriy Levada, who
established the center, left at that time. Most of the
researchers followed him to his new public opinion
organization now known as the Levada Center. Since that time
VTsIOM has been a wholly-owned government enterprise. Andrey
Mukhin of the Center for Political Technology contends that
government ownership has biased VTsIOM in favor of the
Kremlin.
3. (U) In its November 5 issue, The New Times published an
investigation into VTsIOM. While the thrust of the article
was the company's use of off-shore accounts in Cyprus and the
British Virgin Islands, it also accused the organization of
using leading questions to obtain Kremlin-specified results.
For example, the article pointed out that when asking about
the Union of Right Forces (SPS),VTsIOM interviewers asked
respondents if the party was a party of reform and democracy
or a party of rich, antipatriotic oligarchs. Similarly, when
asking about SR, VTsIOM asked the respondents' opinion about
the inclusion of millionaires and criminals on the SR party
list.
4. (C) Some analysts, including Mukhin, maintained that the
data from all three main polling and public opinion
organizations must be taken with a grain of salt and perhaps
a suspension of disbelief. Mukhin told us that each
organization, to one degree or another, is controlled by the
Kremlin. Although the data are reliable -- they will produce
the same results time after time -- they lack validity (the
ability to produce results that represent reality). VTsIOM,
Levada Center, and FOM are under pressure to produce numbers
that conform to Kremlin interests. In a November 15
conversation, Mukhin stated that the polling numbers for
United Russia are basically accurate; however, the numbers
for other parties do not represent how these other parties
will perform during the election. Mukhin reported that valid
and reliable polling for the Duma election exists; however,
the polls are done by private firms for private individuals
or organizations. The results are not for public
consumption. In other words, he felt that neither the media
nor the public can see how well parties other than YR are
doing in the election campaign.
5. (C) In previous conversations Mukhin explained that the
Kremlin has a keen interest in how the public feels. In
order to get accurate information, the Kremlin has its own
polls that provide a more realistic assessment of public
sentiment but are not released to the public. Mukhin
believed that the results of these polls to a large extent
prompted Putin's surprise decision to head United Russia's
party list.
6. (C) Leonid Sedov of the Levada Center provided a
different assessment of the survey organizations in a
November 16 conversation. Sedov worked originally for VTsIOM
but also left to help set up the new Levada Center. He has
been involved in public opinion research for more than 20
years. He contested any notion that the Kremlin has
MOSCOW 00005540 002 OF 003
influence over the results of their surveys.
--------------
A Two-Party Duma?
--------------
7. (U) The numbers produced by each organization follow the
same trends and produce roughly the same results. At a press
conference on November 26, VTsIOM released its latest polling
data and predictions of results showing United Russia (YR)
receiving 62.1 percent of the vote. On November 23, Levada
Center released similar data showing 67 percent of votes for
YR. On November 22, FOM released data indicating 53 percent
of voters would vote for YR. These numbers of course
represent only those who intend to vote. Each organization
conducted the surveys November 17-18.
8. (U) The three organizations have reported numbers that
have been internally consistent from week to week although
they have seldom matched. The trends that each organization
have reported have been roughly consistent. Following the
October 1 announcement that Putin would head the United
Russia party list, YR saw an increase in the polls from each
organization ranging from six to ten percent. Beyond this
single radical change, the polling numbers for each party
have not changed significantly since the start of the
election campaign.
9. (U) Each organization reported that KPRF would receive
the second largest vote come December 2. KPRF would easily
overcome the seven percent barrier to Duma representation;
even if it did not, as runner-up it would enter the Duma
because the Russian Constitution guarantees a minimum two
parties in the Duma. According to VTsIOM, the party would
receive 12.2% of the vote. The Levada Center reported 14
percent for the Communists while FOM estimated their results
at 10 percent.
10. (U) Just Russia (SR) and LDPR are facing an increasingly
tough road ahead in the election campaign. SR, which at one
time polled as high as 15 percent, now faces dismal ratings
in the single digits. FOM reported that SR would receive
from seven to eight percent of the vote, Levada Center
reported four percent, and VTsIOM reported seven percent.
LDPR polled roughly equal to SR in many of the previous
polls. However, the latest polls have shown LDPR in a better
situation. VTsIOM's most recent predictions indicated LDPR
receiving eight percent of the vote while Levada Center
estimated six percent. FOM predicted that LDPR would poll as
well as KPRF or better with 11 percent.
11. (U) The story for all other parties appeared grim. FOM
found that the smaller parties barely registered in the
polls. VTsIOM and Levada Center noted one or two parties
that rated above one percent, but generally parties like the
Union of Right Forces (SPS),Yabloko and the Agrarian Party
polled at around one to two percent (slightly higher than the
previous week when all polled at less than one percent).
Given that each poll had a statistical error of plus or minus
three percent, the three organizations, for the December 2
elections at least, unanimously pronounced these parties dead
on arrival.
--------------
Those Darn Statistics
--------------
12. (C) According to Mukhin and Sedov, Russian polling
agencies use rather complicated strategies which are hinted
at but never fully discussed in the results. Each
organization has divided the Russian Federation into blocks
which may or may not correspond to political boundaries. The
blocks also may or may not be the same from one polling
organization to another. The organizations in turn sampled
from these blocks but not with the same probability. Certain
types of blocks such as small villages might have been
oversampled to adjust for regional variations. The
researchers in each firm sampled respondents from within
these blocks. At each stage, each possible respondent had a
different probability of being sampled. These differing
probabilities must be taken into account when reporting the
results; otherwise the reported results would be biased.
13. (U) Based on the results from FOM, VTsIOM, and Levada
Center, each organization has conducted their polling with
some consistent, built-in bias. In other words, each poll
has produced roughly the same results from one round to the
next with each organization's numbers differing from the
others by approximately the same amount. The trends that
each polling agencies detected was also detected by the other
two. In other words, the differences in data collection
methods have produced results that differ in somewhat
MOSCOW 00005540 003 OF 003
predictable fashion, but that provide overall reliable
results.
14. (SBU) Mark Twain is said to have popularized the quote
from Disraeli saying there are only three kinds of lies:
"Lies, damn lies, and statistics." Each polling agency
provides a rough estimate of statistical error to account for
the problems inherent in any sampling of a population.
However, this estimate is a mathematical estimation that does
not account for the non-mathematical biases in the data
collection methods. Saying that United Russia will receive
62.1 percent of the vote sounds meticulous and scientific,
but the truth is that United Russia will receive anywhere
between 59 percent (very close to some of the lowest
estimates of its performance) and 65 percent if one uses the
standardized error estimates provided. Statistical
interpretations can lie or even just mislead. They lie by
providing a false sense of certainty and exactness, by not
taking into account important procedural factors that can
alter the results, and by analyzing trends and differences
that are statistically undetectable.
15. (SBU) The value of the Russian polling data, then, is in
its ability to provide broad statements about political
opinions and voting behaviors. Following Putin's October 1
announcement that he would head YR's national party list, YR
received a significant increase in support while SR suddenly
found itself unexpectedly struggling. From the big three
polling organizations, YR clearly will get a simple, if not
constitutional, majority (one where it can change the
constitution without the support of another party). Also,
KPRF will be the de facto opposition party in the next Duma.
Both SR and LDPR are still fighting to get over the seven
percent hurdle, but it appears impossible for Yabloko or SPS
to reach that threshold.
--------------
Comment
--------------
16. (SBU) The vastness of Russia, its economic diversity,
and its unique population dispersion create particular
challenges for polling here. Current polling numbers
indicate a potential shift in Russian politics come December
as YR gains an even tighter grip on power, the KPRF becomes
the only viable opposition and the other parties die off in a
mass extinction. What is noteworthy is that the three main
organizations have reported the same general results although
they differed in the details. While the Kremlin might have
interfered in VTsIOM's polls results, or all three polling
organizations may have deliberately used leading questions to
bias respondents' answers, given the context of three
different surveys reporting the same results, it is difficult
to determine if these techniques actually changed the
respondents' answers. The polls could not miss the
exceptional support currently enjoyed by United Russia.
Similarly, the polls could not dismiss KPRF as the second
party. If Kremlin interference in the polls was designed to
mislead the public and opinion makers, then it could only be
done in the margins. If the apparent faith in United Russia
were not real, such a large error could not stay hidden.
BURNS
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/26/2017
TAGS: PGOV PHUM SOCI RS
SUBJECT: PICK YOUR POLL: PUTIN'S PARTY WINS BIG
Classified By: Political M/C Alice G. Wells. Reason: 1.4 (d)
--------------
Summary
--------------
1. (SBU) According to the final public opinion polls
published one week before the December 2 Russian Duma
elections, United Russia (YR) will garner the vast majority
of votes and the Communist Party (KPRF) will easily overcome
the seven percent threshold to entry into the Duma. The
predictions of the three big polling agencies differ on
whether A Just Russia (SR) and The Liberal Democratic Part of
Russia (LDPR) will enter the Duma. The data indicate no
chance for the opposition Yabloko party and the Union of
Right Forces (SPS) to garner enough votes for a place at the
table. Despite questions raised about polling bias in
Russia, the three agencies--using different sampling and
questions--have captured the same trends as well as the same
bottomline: United Russia's overwhelming win. End Summary.
--------------
Polling Sources & Bias
--------------
2. (SBU) Three established and competent firms conduct
routine political and sociological polling within Russia: the
All Russia Institute for Public Opinion (VTsIOM),the Levada
Center, and the Foundation for Public Opinion (FOM). Other
research organizations in Russia could also conduct electoral
polling; however, these organizations do not routinely make
their results public. VTsIOM was established by Yuriy Levada
in 1987 under Gorbachev during perestroika. In 2003, the
Russian government took over VTsIOM and installed a Kremlin
approved director and governing board. Yuriy Levada, who
established the center, left at that time. Most of the
researchers followed him to his new public opinion
organization now known as the Levada Center. Since that time
VTsIOM has been a wholly-owned government enterprise. Andrey
Mukhin of the Center for Political Technology contends that
government ownership has biased VTsIOM in favor of the
Kremlin.
3. (U) In its November 5 issue, The New Times published an
investigation into VTsIOM. While the thrust of the article
was the company's use of off-shore accounts in Cyprus and the
British Virgin Islands, it also accused the organization of
using leading questions to obtain Kremlin-specified results.
For example, the article pointed out that when asking about
the Union of Right Forces (SPS),VTsIOM interviewers asked
respondents if the party was a party of reform and democracy
or a party of rich, antipatriotic oligarchs. Similarly, when
asking about SR, VTsIOM asked the respondents' opinion about
the inclusion of millionaires and criminals on the SR party
list.
4. (C) Some analysts, including Mukhin, maintained that the
data from all three main polling and public opinion
organizations must be taken with a grain of salt and perhaps
a suspension of disbelief. Mukhin told us that each
organization, to one degree or another, is controlled by the
Kremlin. Although the data are reliable -- they will produce
the same results time after time -- they lack validity (the
ability to produce results that represent reality). VTsIOM,
Levada Center, and FOM are under pressure to produce numbers
that conform to Kremlin interests. In a November 15
conversation, Mukhin stated that the polling numbers for
United Russia are basically accurate; however, the numbers
for other parties do not represent how these other parties
will perform during the election. Mukhin reported that valid
and reliable polling for the Duma election exists; however,
the polls are done by private firms for private individuals
or organizations. The results are not for public
consumption. In other words, he felt that neither the media
nor the public can see how well parties other than YR are
doing in the election campaign.
5. (C) In previous conversations Mukhin explained that the
Kremlin has a keen interest in how the public feels. In
order to get accurate information, the Kremlin has its own
polls that provide a more realistic assessment of public
sentiment but are not released to the public. Mukhin
believed that the results of these polls to a large extent
prompted Putin's surprise decision to head United Russia's
party list.
6. (C) Leonid Sedov of the Levada Center provided a
different assessment of the survey organizations in a
November 16 conversation. Sedov worked originally for VTsIOM
but also left to help set up the new Levada Center. He has
been involved in public opinion research for more than 20
years. He contested any notion that the Kremlin has
MOSCOW 00005540 002 OF 003
influence over the results of their surveys.
--------------
A Two-Party Duma?
--------------
7. (U) The numbers produced by each organization follow the
same trends and produce roughly the same results. At a press
conference on November 26, VTsIOM released its latest polling
data and predictions of results showing United Russia (YR)
receiving 62.1 percent of the vote. On November 23, Levada
Center released similar data showing 67 percent of votes for
YR. On November 22, FOM released data indicating 53 percent
of voters would vote for YR. These numbers of course
represent only those who intend to vote. Each organization
conducted the surveys November 17-18.
8. (U) The three organizations have reported numbers that
have been internally consistent from week to week although
they have seldom matched. The trends that each organization
have reported have been roughly consistent. Following the
October 1 announcement that Putin would head the United
Russia party list, YR saw an increase in the polls from each
organization ranging from six to ten percent. Beyond this
single radical change, the polling numbers for each party
have not changed significantly since the start of the
election campaign.
9. (U) Each organization reported that KPRF would receive
the second largest vote come December 2. KPRF would easily
overcome the seven percent barrier to Duma representation;
even if it did not, as runner-up it would enter the Duma
because the Russian Constitution guarantees a minimum two
parties in the Duma. According to VTsIOM, the party would
receive 12.2% of the vote. The Levada Center reported 14
percent for the Communists while FOM estimated their results
at 10 percent.
10. (U) Just Russia (SR) and LDPR are facing an increasingly
tough road ahead in the election campaign. SR, which at one
time polled as high as 15 percent, now faces dismal ratings
in the single digits. FOM reported that SR would receive
from seven to eight percent of the vote, Levada Center
reported four percent, and VTsIOM reported seven percent.
LDPR polled roughly equal to SR in many of the previous
polls. However, the latest polls have shown LDPR in a better
situation. VTsIOM's most recent predictions indicated LDPR
receiving eight percent of the vote while Levada Center
estimated six percent. FOM predicted that LDPR would poll as
well as KPRF or better with 11 percent.
11. (U) The story for all other parties appeared grim. FOM
found that the smaller parties barely registered in the
polls. VTsIOM and Levada Center noted one or two parties
that rated above one percent, but generally parties like the
Union of Right Forces (SPS),Yabloko and the Agrarian Party
polled at around one to two percent (slightly higher than the
previous week when all polled at less than one percent).
Given that each poll had a statistical error of plus or minus
three percent, the three organizations, for the December 2
elections at least, unanimously pronounced these parties dead
on arrival.
--------------
Those Darn Statistics
--------------
12. (C) According to Mukhin and Sedov, Russian polling
agencies use rather complicated strategies which are hinted
at but never fully discussed in the results. Each
organization has divided the Russian Federation into blocks
which may or may not correspond to political boundaries. The
blocks also may or may not be the same from one polling
organization to another. The organizations in turn sampled
from these blocks but not with the same probability. Certain
types of blocks such as small villages might have been
oversampled to adjust for regional variations. The
researchers in each firm sampled respondents from within
these blocks. At each stage, each possible respondent had a
different probability of being sampled. These differing
probabilities must be taken into account when reporting the
results; otherwise the reported results would be biased.
13. (U) Based on the results from FOM, VTsIOM, and Levada
Center, each organization has conducted their polling with
some consistent, built-in bias. In other words, each poll
has produced roughly the same results from one round to the
next with each organization's numbers differing from the
others by approximately the same amount. The trends that
each polling agencies detected was also detected by the other
two. In other words, the differences in data collection
methods have produced results that differ in somewhat
MOSCOW 00005540 003 OF 003
predictable fashion, but that provide overall reliable
results.
14. (SBU) Mark Twain is said to have popularized the quote
from Disraeli saying there are only three kinds of lies:
"Lies, damn lies, and statistics." Each polling agency
provides a rough estimate of statistical error to account for
the problems inherent in any sampling of a population.
However, this estimate is a mathematical estimation that does
not account for the non-mathematical biases in the data
collection methods. Saying that United Russia will receive
62.1 percent of the vote sounds meticulous and scientific,
but the truth is that United Russia will receive anywhere
between 59 percent (very close to some of the lowest
estimates of its performance) and 65 percent if one uses the
standardized error estimates provided. Statistical
interpretations can lie or even just mislead. They lie by
providing a false sense of certainty and exactness, by not
taking into account important procedural factors that can
alter the results, and by analyzing trends and differences
that are statistically undetectable.
15. (SBU) The value of the Russian polling data, then, is in
its ability to provide broad statements about political
opinions and voting behaviors. Following Putin's October 1
announcement that he would head YR's national party list, YR
received a significant increase in support while SR suddenly
found itself unexpectedly struggling. From the big three
polling organizations, YR clearly will get a simple, if not
constitutional, majority (one where it can change the
constitution without the support of another party). Also,
KPRF will be the de facto opposition party in the next Duma.
Both SR and LDPR are still fighting to get over the seven
percent hurdle, but it appears impossible for Yabloko or SPS
to reach that threshold.
--------------
Comment
--------------
16. (SBU) The vastness of Russia, its economic diversity,
and its unique population dispersion create particular
challenges for polling here. Current polling numbers
indicate a potential shift in Russian politics come December
as YR gains an even tighter grip on power, the KPRF becomes
the only viable opposition and the other parties die off in a
mass extinction. What is noteworthy is that the three main
organizations have reported the same general results although
they differed in the details. While the Kremlin might have
interfered in VTsIOM's polls results, or all three polling
organizations may have deliberately used leading questions to
bias respondents' answers, given the context of three
different surveys reporting the same results, it is difficult
to determine if these techniques actually changed the
respondents' answers. The polls could not miss the
exceptional support currently enjoyed by United Russia.
Similarly, the polls could not dismiss KPRF as the second
party. If Kremlin interference in the polls was designed to
mislead the public and opinion makers, then it could only be
done in the margins. If the apparent faith in United Russia
were not real, such a large error could not stay hidden.
BURNS