DFM KARASIN ON GEORGIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 005402 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/15/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL GG RS SUBJECT: DFM KARASIN ON GEORGIA REF: MOSCOW 5371 Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns for reasons 1.4 (b/d). ¶1. (C) On November 15, Ambassador outlined to Deputy Foreign Minister Karasin both the public and private messages delivered to Saakashvilli and other Georgian officials by DAS Bryza during his November 11-14 trip to Tbilisi. The Ambassador noted that Bryza conveyed to the GOG the Secretary's firm message that the state of emergency must be SIPDIS lifted and that all TV broadcasts (especially Imedi TV) must be resumed if the GOG is to restore faith in Georgia's democratic reforms and retain U.S. support. Karasin expressed appreciation for U.S. efforts to end the current crisis in Georgia as well as our regular communication on the matter with the GOR (reftel). ¶2. (C) Karasin noted that on November 14 he had seen Abkhaz foreign minister Shamba, who appeared relatively "relaxed" about the situation in Abkhazia. Karasin told the Ambassador he was more worried about the possibility of rising tensions in South Ossetia. He said the GOR understood Saakashvilli was "nervous" about his political mistakes in Tbilisi and might seek to "ratchet up" tension in South Ossetia to distract Georgians' attention from their domestic troubles. Karasin emphasized that any increase in tensions on the Georgian side would be a "big mistake" and urged the U.S. to remain "vigilant." The Ambassador took Karasin's concern on board, but underscored U.S. expectations that the GOR would use its influence to restrain the South Ossetians and Abkhazians from attempting to use the current crisis to their advantage. ¶3. (C) The Ambassador noted Saakashvilli's concerns of a buildup of Russian troops and equipment in Abkhazia. Karasin insisted that these claims were untrue and that a UN observers' report had corroborated the limited number of Russian troops in the region. Ambassador nevertheless re-emphasized the importance of Russian restraint. ¶4. (U) Following the GOR announcement on November 13 that it withdrew the last Russian troops from its base in Batumi, a Russian Defense Ministry official noted in the press that there were no more Russian military bases in Georgia. (Note: The GOR does not consider the Gudauta facility a Russian military installation. End note.) BURNS