RUSSIAN DFM KISLYAK: IRAN, MD, CFE, BILATERAL,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 005387 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/14/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV PARM MARR EAIR KCRM KJUS RS SUBJECT: RUSSIAN DFM KISLYAK: IRAN, MD, CFE, BILATERAL, ISRAEL VISIT MOSCOW 00005387 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns: 1.4 (b, d). ¶1. (C) Summary : In a November 14 meeting (other topics septel),DFM Kislyak told the Ambassador that the postponed Solana-Jalili dialogue, potential Chinese FM visit to Tehran, and imminent IAEA report may have prompted Chinese cancellation of the November 19 P5 1 meeting. Kislyak expected little progress on the IAEA plan, and suggested internal disagreements within the Iranian leadership. On missile defense, he stressed a growing "credibility gap" between proposals raised during the 2 2 meetings and subsequent U.S. statements, and said Russia would focus on three key elements when evaluating the final U.S. paper. While reaffirming that Russia sought solutions in the CFE negotiations, Kislyak flagged growing differences on Moldova, Georgia and flank restrictions. The Ambassador briefed Kislyak on DOJ/State meetings on implementation of the European Convention on Prisoner Transfer and flagged dates for discussions on state flights, with Kislyak committing to an MFA "backup" (but not necessarily leadership) in the GOR delegation. Kislyak welcomed the proposed economic dialogue led by U/S Jeffery, and reiterated his doubts about U.S. willingness to proceed on 123. Kislyak will be in Jerusalem November 16, in follow-on discussions to PM Olmert's October Moscow talks. End Summary Iran, PRC Postponement of P5 1, IAEA -------------- ¶2. (C) In a November 14 meeting with the Ambassador, Deputy Foreign Minister Kislyak said that he had "no clue" why the Chinese abruptly postponed the scheduled November 19 meeting of the P5 1 in Brussels. Kislyak discounted lingering unhappiness over the Dalai Lama visit to Washington D.C., and noted the official reason conveyed to both the French hosts and the Russians was that the new Chinese Political Director was required to travel elsewhere in the region. Since the PRC had submitted its comments on the UK draft paper, the GOR had no reason to expect a postponement. The Ambassador noted Washington's concern over the Chinese decision and encouraged the GOR to keep the PRC focused on the P5 1 track. ¶3. (C) Kislyak speculated that the Chinese were waiting for the results of the next Solana-Larijani-Jalili meeting, which was supposed to have taken place in early November. (Kislyak added that the GOR played a helpful role in pushing Jalili to finally "answer the phone" when Solana called to reschedule. Although DFM Vaidi subsequently confirmed a meeting during the third week of November, Kislyak underscored that Iranians appeared locked in internal debates over next steps.) Kislyak also pointed to corroborated reports that the Chinese FM planned to visit Tehran; while the Russians had expected the visit to occur November 9 or November 12, Kislyak did not rule out a postponement. Kislyak concluded that the outstanding Solana dialogue, the potential Chinese FM visit, and the imminent IAEA report may have driven the Chinese delay. While France had "toyed" with the idea of inviting an alternate Chinese MFA official (equivalent to MFA Director for Disarmament Antonov),which Russia could accept, the GOR would reject a session with only the Chinese Ambassador in attendance. "We need a meeting with meat." ¶4. (C) Kislyak predicted that the IAEA report would contain a mix of good and bad. While the Iranians had provided some additional information, El Baradei had not given Russia any reason to believe that Iran had satisfied outstanding IAEA concerns. MD Paper: Credibility Gap -------------- ¶5. (C) The Ambassador stressed that the missile defense paper outlining the proposals raised during the October 2 2 would be forthcoming shortly. Kislyak underscored the need to have the paper 10 days in advance of the November 26 Washington session, arguing that "we need something to discuss." Kislyak volunteered that he was not encouraged by the statements from senior U.S. officials, which appeared to walk back or repudiate undertakings made in Moscow. The MFA kept track of the evolving public posture of the U.S., Kislyak commented, and was struck by the inconsistencies between statements made in Moscow, versus Prague. Kislyak commented that the GOR had given up trying to characterize the U.S. proposals for others, given the mixed signals since the departure of the Secretary and Gates. The Ambassador responded that the GOR knew what it heard, and it should expect the paper to correspond with the Moscow discussions. The GOR should not jump to conclusions before it sees the paper. ¶6. (C) Kislyak stressed that the Russians would be looking MOSCOW 00005387 002.2 OF 003 for three elements raised during the course of the 2 2 and discussed with Ltg Obering: deferral of the stationing of missiles in the ground until the Iranian threat became a reality; a decision to not activate the radar until necessary; and the presence of Russian military at the sites in the Czech Republic and Poland. Citing statements made by USDP Edelman in Prague over the prospective site visits by the GOR, Kislyak concluded that "this is quite a different version" of the Rice-Gates proposal. The Ambassador again urged Kislyak not to jump to conclusions. CFE: Growing Differences -------------- ¶7. (C) Kislyak noted that the U.S. was late in delivering a CFE paper, which would be the basis for the DAS Kramer discussion with MFA Director Antonov on November 16. Commenting on the negotiating process, Kislyak said "we are not sitting idly by, but do not understand where we are moving." The Ambassador pushed back, underscoring the serious effort and high-level attention invested in addressing Russian concerns. While there were legal limits on some issues, such as the provisional application of the A/CFE, the U.S. delegation had shown creativity in trying to outline a resolution of existing disputes. Kislyak backtracked a little, stressing that MFA Director Antonov likewise was under instructions to find solutions, not to create roadblocks in the discussions. ¶8. (C) Kislyak insisted that all parties needed to work harder to overcome the widening differences on Moldova and Georgia. Kislyak highlighted confusion over the civilian observer presence in Moldova, terming the U.S. proposal for 500 OSCE personnel "mindboggling." While Russia was prepared to find a mutually acceptable formula, it would oppose efforts to solve Transnistria through the CFE. "This is unrealistic and we won't do it." If the plan was to use 500 OSCE monitors to oversee 200 Russian peacekeepers, demilitarize the area, and then replace Russian forces, "don't waste our time." Kislyak reiterated longstanding Russian complaints over the Moldovan transit regime, which complicated the local environment. On Georgia, Kislyak said that Russia believed Saakashvili was considering ratification of CFE, but would not accept the presence of the Russian logistic and supply unit Abkhazia, which was a GOG "obligation." While acknowledging the Ambassador's point that Tbilisi was preoccupied with other issues, Kislyak insisted that more had to be done, and more quickly, if a standoff were to be avoided. ¶9. (C) On flanks, Kislyak stressed that Russia had received no commitment at all to eliminate the restrictions on Russian forces. "You have shown us some carrots, but don't let us chew." Kislyak underscored that Russia would not act on the basis of Western promises of a better future regime. The Ambassador commented that it was the GOR that had created artificial time lines and urged Russia to postpone its decision to suspend on December 12. Kislyak stressed that the political decision to suspend had already been made and Putin was committed to carrying through if Russian red-lines were not addressed. The Ambassador reiterated that flank restrictions were not an issue for the U.S. to resolve; they were a core element of the Treaty, and the primary attraction for many participating states. Kislyak said Russia found those arguments unconvincing, with some countries hiding behind Turkey. Russia did not threaten Turkey, and the ratio of assets was overwhelmingly in the GOT's favor. Bilateral: Kuznetsov, Jeffery Visit, State Flights, 123 -------------- -------------- ¶10. (C) The Ambassador briefed Kislyak on the visiting DOJ/State team's discussions with their Russian counterparts on the implementation of the European Convention on Prison Transfer, and its possible application to convicted Russian diplomat Kuznetsov. The Ambassador emphasized that despite Kuznetsov's appeal, the U.S. would begin processing the paperwork for a potential request to transfer Kuznetsov under the Convention, which would save time in the event that Kuznetsov's appeal was unsuccessful. While no promises could be made about the outcome of a transfer request, the U.S. team was able to brief on the technical requirements of the Convention. ¶11. (C) On the issue of state flights, the Ambassador flagged an imminent invitation to the GOR from Ambassador McDonald, to hold negotiations in Washington during the end of November or first week of December. The Ambassador stressed that Ambassador McDonald was the lead on this issue in the U.S. interagency, and urged Kislyak to provide a MFA counterpart to head the Russian delegation. Kislyak MOSCOW 00005387 003.2 OF 003 undertook to speak to the navigation services, but stressed that the Federal Aviation and Navigation Agency was "very practical" and, in any event, there would be MFA "backup" to the Russian delegation. The Ambassador underscored that the U.S. viewed the issue in political, not technical, terms. ¶12. (C) Kislyak confirmed First Deputy Prime Minister Denisov's interest in an economic dialogue with U/S Rubin Jeffery, and said the only difficulty would be scheduling. The GOR hoped the Jeffery-Denisov channel would allow for a broad strategic discussion of economic issues. The Ambassador said the U.S. understood the time constraint facing Denisov, and that the first round was deliberately proposed for Moscow in order to facilitate the discussion. ¶13. (C) Welcoming the finalization of the Plutonium Disposition Joint Statement, Kislyak questioned the Ambassador on the status of the 123. Kislyak asked sarcastically, "should I break out the champagne?" The Ambassador said there was no reason for Kislyak to be cynical. While the document remained at the White House and outstanding concerns remained over one issue (septel),the administration was committed to moving forward on cooperation in civilian nuclear energy with Russia and viewed it as a strategic interest. Kislyak noted his pessimistic personal assessment, based on mounting reports that the Lantos bill had become the litmus test for cooperation with Russia. Jerusalem Bound -------------- ¶14. (SBU) Kislyak noted that he would be in Israel for political director-level discussions on November 17, following on PM Olmert's productive October 17 visit to Moscow. (Kislyak, no athlete himself, took evident pleasure in having scored a VIP seat for the Russian-Israel soccer match. While a self-professed novice to the game, he appeared gripped by the geopolitics of Russia's possible advancement in the FIFA cup.) BURNS