IN IRKUTSK NATIONAL POLITICS OVERSHADOW LOCAL

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 005381 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV KDEM SOCI RS SUBJECT: IN IRKUTSK NATIONAL POLITICS OVERSHADOW LOCAL MOSCOW 00005381 001.2 OF 003 -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (SBU) A recent trip to Irkutsk oblast found a region not immune to the ebb and flow of Russian national politics. While the pro-Putin United Russia Party (YR) has a distinct advantage over also-rans For a Just Russia (SR) and the Communist Party (KPRF) in this region, the endemic corruption within the YR and the failure of local leadership to deal with local problems could provide an opening for expressions of opposing views come the State Duma election on December 2. End Summary. -------------- The Local Landscape -------------- ¶2. (SBU) In a trip to Irkutsk and Angarsk October 1-5, we found a staunchly independent oblast that nonetheless was still dominated by the United Russia (YR). Galina Solkina and Yelena Veselkova of Teleinform, an Irkutsk-based news and information agency, described regional politics as controlled from outside and free of vigorous public debate. They noted that a free press does not exist in Irkutsk oblast, and they found that no print or broadcast media would criticize or contradict the current power structure. The current governor, Aleksandr Tishanin, a Putin appointee, exemplified the current political process. Tishanin was not directly elected but rather selected by Putin from outside Irkutsk Oblast. Solkina suggested that he was brought in to control the independent-minded electorate. ¶3. (SBU) During our meetings we often heard of the unique state of politics in Siberia as if there existed a "wild east" mentality. Solkina and Veselkova said that in previous elections, United Russia did not receive as much support from the local electorate as it did from the European oblasts. However, in national polling data released September 18 by the Foundation for Public Opinion (FOM),political leanings in Irkutsk Oblast did not differ significantly from the national trends. The minor differences, which fall within the margin of statistical error, lead us to question the perception of a political culture distinct from the rest of the country. -------------- Politics in the Best Chicago Tradition -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Like the rest of Russia, Irkutsk has not been free of corruption. Solkina told us that the local YR has become a haven for corrupt politicians. The current mayor of Irkutsk, Vladimir Yakubovskiy, second on the local YR party list, would be grateful for a Duma seat for the immunity from prosecution it provides. According to Solkina, after December, he either goes into the Duma or prison. The local prosecutor's office has amassed a substantial case against him for abuse of his office. Solkina also suggested that most likely, his departure from the city would be welcomed by the public as well because of his strangle hold on the housing market. In Irkutsk, only construction firms approved by Yakubovksiy can get land for housing development, and of course those firms pay for such favorable treatment. This tight, controlled market in new construction only adds to the exceedingly high costs of housing in the oblast. (Note: Solkina and Veselkova said that housing prices in Irkutsk were the fourth highest in Russia. End note.) ¶5. (SBU) Solkina pointed out that two previous YR mayors from Irkutsk Oblast are now serving time in prison because of their criminal behavior. Viktor Doroshek, the mayor from Nizhniy Ulimskiy Rayon, and Vasliy Saikov the mayor from Sludyanskiy Rayon, were both arrested earlier this year for murder and attempted murder. Solkina suggested that YR has become a haven for the unscrupulous, noting that more than 70 mayors appeared on the regional party lists for the December Duma elections. ¶6. (SBU) According to the regional leader of the Communist Party, Sergey Levchenko, election fraud was the only reason for YR's significant gains in previous elections. ¶7. (U) Recent press reports have demonstrated how vulnerable YR could be in the oblast. According to national and local press reports, on October 19, deputy governor Sergey Voronov was arrested for embezzlement of public funds in the amount of RUR 42 million (about USD 1.6 million). YR expelled him from the party on November 9. Earlier in October, the head of public roads in Irkutsk Oblast, Viktor Bushuyev, was also arrested in connection with the same crime. -------------- MOSCOW 00005381 002.2 OF 003 United Russia, Large and in Charge -------------- ¶8. (SBU) YR controls the oblast legislative assembly, the governorship, and the mayor's office in almost all cities in the oblast. The party list for the December 2 State Duma elections will be led by the governor Aleksander Tishanin, current State Duma deputy Vitaliy Shuba (elected from a single mandate district),and Irkutsk mayor Vladimir Yakubovskiy. Our contacts in the city believe the governor will not actually enter the Duma. Putin appointed him to his post in September 2005, and his position as governor is more lucrative than a Duma seat. Rather he will function as the "locomotive" of the list, gathering votes through name recognition. The fate of Yakubovskiy was still uncertain. Although under investigation for corruption, he also might find his job as mayor more financially rewarding. If Yakubovskiy stayed, Governor Tishanin would likely want to push him out to bring in his own man to this important job. ¶9. (SBU) In Angarsk, a city of 247,000 people about 40 minutes drive from Irkutsk, YR kept a stronghold on the local levers of power. (Note: Angarsk was the site of the July 21 attack on an ecological camp protesting the uranium refinement facility there.) We met with several high placed local elected officials who proved both competent and devoted to YR. Andrey Kozlov, the mayor of the Angarsk, described a paternalistic YR that takes over where the people leave off. According to him, the fall of the Soviet Union left few social structures to create leaders, foster civic culture, and to function within a democracy. In response YR, not the government or other institutions, would foster the birth of such organizations that would lead to a Western-style civic culture. -------------- For A Just Russia Thinks It Too Has Prospects -------------- ¶10. (SBU) A meeting with Dmitriy Rasumov, chair of the regional SR, was colored by Putin's recent decision to be the only name on the national party list for United Russia. When we met with him, Rasumov had not had time to process the meaning of this dramatic and unexpected move and what it meant for SR as the other party of Putin. He maintained his loyalty to the president although he acknowledged that YR's share of the vote would naturally increase. He originally expected that YR would garner 45 percent of the local vote but after the announcement expected it to get upwards of 60 percent. None of the gain would come at the expense of SR. Speaking without the benefit of polling data, he claimed that SR, as a left-wing party, would derive most of its vote from the current undecideds. YR, as a right-wing party would increase its vote at the expense of other parties. ¶11. (SBU) In explaining Putin's decision, Rasumov turned the focus of discussion to stability, something Putin has striven for during his presidency. In a resigned way, he almost agreed with Putin's decision as the only serious way of guaranteeing the continuation of Putin's policies. If Putin had chosen to throw his support behind SR, the national political situation would destabilize. Rasumov characterized the stability of Putin's policies as the fulfillment of government obligations while destabilization would mean default, inflation and unpaid social payments. ¶12. (SBU) Rasumov described SR as the left-wing, pro-Putin option that would appeal to the natural left leanings of the Russian electorate. He characterized YR as the party of capitalists and bureaucrats while SR fit into the typical European social- democrat party model. He mentioned specifically the issues of housing, pensions and education. He placed much blame for YR's inadequacies at the feet of bureaucrats who hold sway in that party. SR would combat the bureaucracy that permeates YR's plans and programs. However, he was unable to clearly articulate why United Russia was so much more popular than SR given that the two parties back the same leader (Putin). -------------- KPRF, the New Brand of Democracy -------------- ¶13. (SBU) The regional leader of the Communist Party in Irkutsk, Sergey Levchenko, described a vibrant and democratic party clearly focused on the economic development of the region. He highlighted the democratic structure of the party and its social concerns, two characteristics not shared by the other parties. Levchenko said that the KPRF was evidently the only party to include local candidates selected by the rank-and-file on party lists. SR and YR both selected candidates from other regions for inclusion on the lists, ostensibly to guarantee Duma seats to MOSCOW 00005381 003.2 OF 003 party loyalists. Also, KPRF would be the only party to guarantee that all candidates on its list would serve in the Duma if elected. According to Levchenko, YR's lists included several "locomotives" who would attract votes but not ultimately serve and several "parachutists" who appear on the local lists but have in fact no connection to the oblast. ¶14. (SBU) Levchenko described a Communist Party platform focused on drug abuse, use of natural resources, unemployment, and housing. Official statistics on unemployment underestimated the actual problem. To address the high cost of housing, YR's plans focused on the availability of credit for purchasing a home. Levchenko noted that this plan in effect would increase the amount of money available to purchase housing but not increase the housing itself. Levchenko dismissed the current administration's efforts to fight ddrug abuse as incompetent or completely ineffective. -------------- Politics Should Be Local -------------- ¶15. (SBU) Solkina and Veselovka asserted that the oblast ought to be wealthy given its oil resources in the north. However, the allocation of contracts and licenses has been strictly controlled by the central government. They also pointed out that the construction companies building oil pipelines tend to bring in workers from outside the oblast thus not contributing significantly to the local economy. The heavy machinery used in the construction of oil and gas pipelines destroys the local roads which must be repaired by local governments. Unfortunately, all taxes from oil and gas go to the federal government. Thus the energy industries make significant demands on the local governments yet do not contribute significantly to the tax base. ¶16. (SBU) This complaint about oil companies' negative impact was supported by Yelena Kovalenko, the mayor of Tayshet, a small town in Western Irkutsk Oblast. According to the new plans for local self-government recently put in place in Russia, Tayshet has assumed responsibility for maintenance of the roads. However, the laws that created such governing structures did not necessarily provide the appropriate tax revenues. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶17. (SBU) Irkutsk seems like the rest of Russia. Its support of United Russia was strong and the party had a strong hold on the levers or power. SR was struggling, and the Communists were able to count on a strong but comparatively small base of support. Corruption, a perennial issue, does not appear to hinder YR although many contacts noted its significance in people's lives. BURNS