RUSSIA EXPELS THREE GEORGIAN DIPLOMATS IN RESPONSE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 005336

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/08/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV GG RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA EXPELS THREE GEORGIAN DIPLOMATS IN RESPONSE
TO GEORGIAN ACTIONS

Classified By: Acting DCM Alice G. Wells. Reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) Summary. On November 8, Russia declared persona non
grata two senior counselors and one counselor in the Georgian
Embassy in Moscow, in a tit-for-tat response to Georgia's
recall of its Ambassador from Moscow and expulsion of three
Russian diplomats. While the MFA issued two harshly critical
statements characterizing Georgian actions as a new hostile
assault on Russia and criticizing the human rights situation
in Tbilisi, Deputy Foreign Minister Yakovenko subsequently
agreed with the Ambassador's message that Saakashvili's
political concessions could create the environment for
de-escalation and a peaceful resolution to the dispute.
According to MFA officials, the GOR intends to raise human
rights conditions in Georgia during the OSCE Ministerial at
the end of the month. Press coverage, most Russian
commentators, and Russian liberal activists were critical of
the GOG's actions. Georgian Deputy Foreign Minister Nikoloz
Vashakidze will meet with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister
Karasin on November 9 in Moscow. There have been no
demonstrators or disturbances at the Georgian Embassy. End
summary.

The GOR Reacts Proportionately
--------------


2. (C) The MFA announced late November 8 that Russia was
declaring persona non grata three Georgian diplomats in an
"analogous" response to the GOG's expulsion of three Russian
diplomats on November 7. Earlier in the day, Georgian
Ambassador Irakli Chubinishvili had predicted to us a
disproportionate response, but Georgian senior counselor
George Zakarashvili confirmed press reports that the GOR
action was limited to expelling two senior counselors and a
counselor.


3. (C) In the immediate aftermath of the GOG's November 7
decision to expel three Russian diplomat, the Ambassador
spoke with DFM Yakovenko and encouraged the GOR to help
de-escalate the situation. The Ambassador emphasized U.S.
efforts in Tbilisi to lower tensions and the serious concerns
about rumors of shooting incidents and other potential
escalation. Yakovenko replied that the GOR was deeply
concerned about the situation and GOG handling of it, and
would respond "with appropriate measures." MFA Director
Kelin argued separately that Georgia seemed intent on
"starting a war again" with Russia, and suggested that
Saakashvili was trying to divert attention from internal
challenges.


4. (U) In advance of its tit-for-tat expulsion of Georgian
diplomats, the MFA posted two statements on its website on
November 8 strongly critical of Georgia. In the first, the
MFA contended that Saakashvili was trying to rationalize the
failure of its social-economic policies, the impoverished
condition of its citizens, its unwillingness to adopt a
constructive course in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, its
authoritarianism, and its contempt for democratic freedoms as
evidenced on the streets of Tbilisi. The statement reported
that the GOR considered Georgian actions a politically
irresponsible provocation and noted that an "adequate
response" would be given. It added that Russia would remain
true to its international peacekeeping obligations in
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and would defend Russian
citizens. It said that Russia would remain a reliable
guarantor of peace and order in the region, in accordance
with UN Security Council resolutions and international law.
The statement concluded by calling on "those who have direct
influence in Tbilisi, to warn the GOG from further
destructive steps, fraught with unanticipated consequences."


5. (U) The second statement described the state of human
rights in Georgia as a "crisis," following the imposition of
emergency rule and forceful dispersion of protesters.
Excessive use of force, the arrests of opposition and human
rights leaders, the closure of independent media outlets, the
beating of foreign correspondents, all constituted gross
violations. The statement called on the UN, OSCE, and PACE
to take action, and argued that GOG actions constituted a
threat to regional stability. The statement tracked comments
made to us by MFA Regional Conflict Division Chief Aleksey
Dvinyanin November 7 that the MFA planned to voice its
concern on Georgia's human rights conditions in Russia's
official statement during the OSCE Ministerial in Madrid
November 29-30.

GOR Will Encourage Peaceful Resolution
--------------


6. (C) Following the GOR announcement of the expulsions,

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the Ambassador spoke again with DFM Yakovenko and underscored
the strong expectation that Russia would encourage a
de-escalation of the situation in Tbilisi and a political
settlement by peaceful means. The Ambassador alerted
Yakovenko to forthcoming GOG announcements to defuse
opposition anger, and stressed the tough U.S. message to GOG
authorities on the need to avoid violence. Yakovenko
acknowledged that the GOG actions would present an
opportunity to resolve the internal disputes by democratic
means, but stressed again the GOR's concern over the state of
human rights. Yakovenko welcomed the Ambassador's assurance
that the U.S. would call for an end to the emergency
situation and a reopening of media outlets. He concluded
that Russia would remain tough in its human rights criticism
of Georgia, but would support the goal of de-escalation and a
peaceful resolution.

Georgian DFM Visit on Track
--------------


7. (C) Prior to departing for Tbilisi (and before their
meeting at the MFA),Georgian Ambassador Irakli Chubinishvili
and DCM Givi Shugarov told us that the GOG expected a
"severe" response from the GOR. There had been no
consultations with the GOR or forewarning prior to
Saakashvili's November 7 speech. They noted that the
Georgian Deputy Foreign Minister would arrive in Moscow that
evening for a previously-scheduled meeting with Russian DFM
Karasin on November 9. The GOR had not canceled the meeting,
and had reconfirmed DFM Karasin's availability.


8. (C) Chubinishvili was resigned to an extended period of
drift in Russian-Georgian relations, which he blamed on
Russia's inability to accept Georgian independence and
democracy, as well as on an election cycle that exacerbated
the political tensions. Whereas two years before, he had had
a good relationship with then-Security Secretary Igor Ivanov,
now relations were channeled through the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs; he had virtually no contact with the Presidential
Administration. He added that there was really no difference
between the GOR and the "so-called democrats," who purported
to love the Georgian people, but hate the Georgian
government. The "democrats" still saw Georgia as part of
Russia. Chubinishvili said his advice to Saakashvili upon
his return to Tbilisi would be to not react, to not
overreact, and to lay low until the election cycle had run
its course and tempers had cooled.

Press, Commentators Mostly Sharply Critical
--------------


9. (C) Over the course of the political crisis in Tbilisi,
Russian primetime news programs have prominently featured
events in Georgia, with many suggesting that the Rose
Revolution was at an end and the Saakashvili government on
the verge of collapse. The November 6 program, "Odnako,"
hosted by radical nationalist Mikhail Leontyev, portrayed
Saakashvili as a "puppet" of the U.S., with Leontyev claiming
that the U.S. had created a totalitarian regime in Georgia,
which the Georgian people "can no longer endure." In the
wake of the November 7 violence, United Russia Speaker
Gryzlov echoed this sentiment, arguing that Saakashvili was
operating on instructions of U.S. "special services."


10. (C) There was palpable disappointment among Russia's
liberal class over the course of events in Tbilisi. Ekho
Moskvy Editor-in-Chief, Aleksey Venediktov, published an open
letter to Saakashvili, endorsed by all Ekho journalists,
expressing "surprise and condemnation" over the Georgian
government's shutting down of the independent Imedi radio and
television stations. The letter stated that "democracy ends
where the authorities shut up journalists' mouths when they
are fulfilling their professional duties." (Note: In
response to this letter, Ambassador Chubinishvili said "what
can you expect of a station that is controlled by Gazprom.")
Grigoriy Yavlinskiy, leader of the Yabloko opposition party,
told Ekho Moskvy that he was saddened by recent developments
in Georgia which did not comply with democratic practice
within the rule of law, but added that he could not say who
was right or wrong.

All's Quiet at the Embassy
--------------


11. (U) No demonstrators had appeared at the Georgian
Embassy, with media reports attributing a stepped-up security
presence to the possibility of protests by the Georgian
Diaspora.
BURNS