CFE: RUSSIA PRESSES FOR MORE MOVEMENT ON REMAINING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 005269 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/01/2017 TAGS: PREL NATO KCFE PARM RS SUBJECT: CFE: RUSSIA PRESSES FOR MORE MOVEMENT ON REMAINING HURDLES REF: A. BERLIN 1975 ¶B. MOSCOW 5006 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Daniel A. Russell. Reasons 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (C) Summary. The Russian MFA welcomed American initiatives during the October 24 meeting between EUR A/S Fried and Deputy FM Kislyak on the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE)(ref A),as very constructive and positive, and were looking forward to continuing the talks in Geneva next week. The Russians noted that they are waiting for additional elaboration on the U.S.'s proposals to overcome remaining hurdles, particularly with respect to the flank regime and provisional application of CFE. Regarding the Istanbul Commitments, the MFA considers the issue is moving in a positive direction, but is skeptical that the Moldovans and Transnistrians will agree to a conference. The GOR continues to assert the need for Georgian permission for Russia's presence at Gadauta once the base is transferred to Georgia. Stressing that Russia's December 12 planned suspension date of the Treaty is quickly approaching, the MFA says there needs to be agreement on the principal issues, and confirmation of that agreement by all parties to CFE in order to "suspend the suspension." End Summary. ¶2. (C) In a meeting October 30, Sergey Federyakov, Counselor in MFA DVBR, told us there had been "some movement forward" in resolving the dispute over CFE but noted there were still significant obstacles to overcome. He said Antonov and he would attend the informal session in Paris on November 5-6 and then travel to Geneva to meet with Fried again. Federyakov said it was still "too early to tell" about suspension of the Russian suspension of the CFE Treaty. He hoped the suspension of CFE would not last long. We reiterated that a Russian suspension of the Treaty would likely receive a very negative reaction in other signatory countries. Flank Regime -------------- ¶3. (C) Federyakov repeated familiar Russian arguments that the flank regime was both a political and a military issue. The flank regime "really irritates Putin," he said, stressing that Russia was the only country that could not deploy its forces wherever it wanted on its own territory. On the military side, he noted that, while Russia had no intention of deploying additional forces to its Northern flank, it would like to be able to put some more troops in the South due to the tensions in the Russian Caucasus, particularly Dagestan and Ingushetia. He added that Russia was still keeping its promises about "military restraint." ¶4. (C) In response to our noting that eliminating the flank regime only for Russia and not for the other members of the Adapted CFE Treaty was unworkable, Federyakov said that if there were no flank regime at all, there should be additional confidence- and security-building and transparency measures, including assurances that no member would put forces in the flank area. He had no suggestions as to the form such assurances should take. Provisional Application of CFE -------------- ¶5. (C) Federyakov repeated the GOR's call for provisional application of A/CFE, but noted that the USG's willingness to explore possibilities for pre-ratification political commitments was a sign of the USG's serious intent to reach a deal. He said it was time to talk about the future entry of the Baltic States into A/CFE, including time for them to elaborate their ideas and levels of forces. Substantial Combat Forces -------------- ¶6. (C) Federyakov said the definition of Substantial Combat Forces was "not a big problem." It required additional discussion, but he noted Russia and the CIS needed to take the first steps. Istanbul Commitments -------------- ¶7. (C) On Moldova, Federyakov told us that the question of the mandate and modalities for the Russian peacekeeping MOSCOW 00005269 002 OF 002 forces remained the key issues. He said the MFA was still getting reactions from other Russian agencies on the U.S. idea to keep Russian peacekeepers in place, add civilian observers, and do periodic (he thought quarterly) inspections of the stockpiles. ¶8. (C) Federyakov reiterated the GOR's dislike of the Marshall Center as a venue for a conference on Transnistria. While expressing skepticism that both sides would be willing to come together, he said, when pressed, that if the Moldovans and Transnistrians agreed to a conference, Russia would likely support it. ¶9. (C) On Georgia, Federyakov said there would need to be an understanding on how to document the transfer of Gadauta base to Georgia and something that reflected permission from Georgia for Russia to use the base. Since it would be used as a logistics base for Russian peacekeepers, Russia would need a legitimate basis for stationing its peacekeepers there. Russell