GOR VIEWS ON NO-RESULT JCC ON SOUTH OSSETIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 005223 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/31/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV GG RS SUBJECT: GOR VIEWS ON NO-RESULT JCC ON SOUTH OSSETIA REF: TBILISI 2683 Classified By: Political M/C Alice G. Wells. Reasons 1.4(b/d). ¶1. (C) Summary. The GOR's Special Envoy on the South Ossetian conflict expressed disappointment with the October 23-24 Joint Control Commission (JCC) meeting in Tbilisi. He attributed the failure to the two parties' widely different views and reluctance to fully engage. The GOR Envoy advised that efforts should resume when there is more political will to resolve the problem and cautioned against GOG unilateral action. The Russian Envoy praised the new Head of the OSCE Mission in Tbilisi for her understanding of the situation and willingness to be a dedicated mediator. End summary. JCC -- Futile Exercise? -------------- ¶2. (C) The GOR's Special Envoy on the South Ossetian conflict Yuriy Popov told us on October 30 that the October 23-24 JCC failed because of the maximalist positions that both the Georgian and South Ossetian sides brought to the table. Instead of demonstrating readiness to solve the many problems that exist, both sides came with no-compromise proposals, leading the talks to an impasse. ¶3. (C) Popov said that he had a strong suspicion that the GOG strategy was designed to make the JCC look ineffective. The Georgian State Minister for Conflict Resolution Davit Bakradze left the meeting immediately after the opening, leaving his deputy Dimitri Manjavidze to chair. In Popov's view, Bakradze's departure highlighted Georgia's skepticism on the JCC even before real negotiations started. Popov said the October 23-24 JCC, which was convened after a one-year-long hiatus, "should have been given full-faith engagement." He asked whether the U.S. knew and endorsed the GOG's "pre-determination" to block any progress at the JCC. Widened Division -------------- ¶4. (C) Popov said that Georgia's key demands included demilitarization of the South Ossetian region and the broadening of control over the Roki tunnel checkpoint on the border with Russia and the breakaway territory, Didi Gupta. The South Ossetian chief negotiator Boris Chochiev demanded the release of the two South Ossetian peacekeepers in Georgian custody, a meeting between Saakashvili and de facto South Ossetian leader Eduard Kokoity, and a non-violence pact. The GOG rejected the South Ossetian demands, stressing that it cannot sign a non-violence pact until the alleged illegal flow of arms through the Roki Tunnel is terminated. ¶5. (C) Popov said that his last-ditch attempt to craft a joint oral statement -- after efforts on a written statement failed -- came to nothing. Popov thought that the two parties needed to signal willingness to work together even though negotiations proved to be fruitless this time. He praised the new OSCE Head of the Mission Terhi Hakala for her solid grasp of the situation and untiring efforts to bring the two parties' views closer. Popov emphasized that since the two parties of the conflict have gone too far, bringing them back would take a step-by-step approach to build confidence first. Lonely Place for Popov? -------------- ¶6. (C) Popov felt that he was mistrusted by both sides: the GOG had no confidence in the GOR as the mediator while South Ossetians thought that he was not completely on their side. According to Popov, Chochiev was particularly unhappy when Popov said that the GOR was willing to accept Dmitriy Sanakoyev as a local political leader. They did not even want to hear Sanakoyev's name pronounced at the session. Grim Prospect -------------- ¶7. (C) Before the JCC, Popov had planned to suggest a JCC in Moscow in December but now he thinks it better to postpone. Popov speculated that the GOG was anxious about the impact of Kosovo on the two breakaway regions while Kosovo throws Russia into an unenviable position between a rock and a hard place. If Russia chooses Abkhazia independence, the North Caucasus will applaud and will want to be next. In the long run, the chain reaction will create an insurmountable problem. On the other hand, if Russia chooses to delink Abkhazia from Kosovo, the North Caucasus will think Russia is "cowardly." Popov emphasized that it is important not to lose face. Whatever Kosovo might bring, Popov feared that autonomy would no longer work for the South Ossetians. MOSCOW 00005223 002 OF 002 Instead, it might have to be a form of federation. Popov warned that Georgia's pre-election behavior may lead to some form of unilateral action in the conflict zone to divert attention from Georgia's internal problem. He asked that the U.S. urge the GOG to avoid the temptation. Comment -------------- ¶8. (C) Popov understands that time is running out on the JCC and there must be movement if it is to stay relevant. Mutual Russian and Georgian admiration for the new OSCE Head of Mission may open up opportunities for re-engagement. Burns