CORRECTED COPY: RUSSIA-U.S. MISSILE DEFENSE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 MOSCOW 005106

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/11/2017
TAGS: MARR PARM PREL KNNP IR RS
SUBJECT: CORRECTED COPY: RUSSIA-U.S. MISSILE DEFENSE
NEGOTIATIONS, OCTOBER 10, 2007, PART 2 OF 2: ASSESSING
QABALA, THE IRANIAN THREAT, AND CZECH RADAR CAPABILITIES

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns: Reasons 1.4 (b, d).


1. (S) Septel reports on the U.S. presentation of a Joint
Regional Missile Defense Architecture during missile defense
(MD) talks in Moscow October 10. Following is the U.S. and
Russian delegations' assessment of the MD technical experts'
visit to the Qabala radar on September 18, threat assessment
exchange, and U.S. briefing on the physical characteristics
of the X-band radar system to be deployed in the Czech
Republic.

Qabala: Convergence of Views on Capabilities
--------------


2. (C) Following opening remarks (septel) Acting
Undersecretary Rood turned to General O'Reilly of the Missile
Defense Agency for a report on the September 18 visit to
Qabala. O'Reilly praised the open atmosphere in which the
discussions took place, and the delegation's access. The
technical discussions provided a good understanding of the
radar's capabilities, with Qabala's range extending to
surveillance of long-range ballistic missile tests in Iran,
Pakistan and Western India (with Deputy Foreign Minister
Kislyak interjecting "and Israel"). The U.S. experts
concluded that Qabala would reliably enjoy another 10 years
of operations. Describing its significant power, large
aperture, and 6,000 km range, O'Reilly agreed that Qabala
would provide data on the boosting, staging, and separation
phases of a missile, but underscored that the radar could not
provide the resolution necessary for observation of
countermeasures. O'Reilly identified the need to have a
capability to observe decoys and countermeasures; to further
assess Qabala's reliability, by better understanding its
supply of specialized tubes (with stocks estimated at 10
years); and to view the tracking data, which would confirm
the U.S. team's understanding of how the radar operated.
Rood underscored that the issue of countermeasures drove the
need for an X-band radar in the Czech Republic.


3. (C) Kislyak endorsed the positive assessment of the
radar and said that its service life would depend on Russian
willingness to modernize the facility. Putin had committed
to allocate the resources necessary if a "pattern of
understanding" emerged between Russia and the U.S. Kislyak
underscored that Qabala permitted the tracking of all rocket
and missile tests in its area and, as Putin suggested, could
serve as a "focal point" for cooperation. Kislyak dismissed
concerns over countermeasures, stating that the Russian
proposal was not for interception, but for monitoring.
General Buzhinskiy, MOD Chief of Directorate, International
Treaty, added that the Russian delegation had answered
virtually all of the questions posed by the U.S. Some
technical issues went beyond the competency of the Russian
experts and a few issues involved "super secret" Russian
data, which could not be provided immediately. But most of
the questions had been answered quickly, openly, and frankly.


4. (C) Buzhinskiy agreed that the fate of Qabala's
modernization depended upon a determination of what tasks it
would be assigned. Historically, the facility had tracked
the results of the Scud-C and Shahab-3 missile tests, and was
capable of monitoring the missiles throughout their flight
paths. Buzhinskiy noted that the GOR awaited an algorithm
from the U.S., which the Russian experts had undertaken to
fill out. Qabala was not an anti-ballistic MD system,
however, and Russia did not intend it as a substitute for an
ABM system in the Czech Republic. Qabala, he reiterated, was
"ideologically inconsistent" with the idea of an ABM site.
General O'Reilly concurred with Buzhinskiy's assessment of
the technical capabilities of the Qabala radar.

Threat Assessment: Reviewing Areas of Divergence
-------------- ---


5. (S) Vladimir Venevtsev of the SVR opened the third round
of threat analysis, commenting that it was surprising that
the U.S. and Russia relied upon the same information, but
drew different conclusions regarding the danger posed by
Iran. Russia did not pretend to have all the answers about
the Iranian program, but used careful analysis, theories, and
assumptions to color in the "blank spots" of the Iranian
efforts. Russia's assessment was that the U.S. exaggerated
the state of Iranian R&D, the technical level of its rocket
and missile sectors, and the capabilities of its scientists.
Russia took issue with the U.S. assumption that Iran was
strategically committed to the development of ICBMs, with
Venevtsev concluding that it was not in Iran's doctrine.

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Venevtsev touched on the following areas of disagreement:

-- The level of sophistication of North Korea's ICBM
technology for long range missiles was inflated, as was the
track record of DPRK transfers to Iran, since the Kim Jong-Il
regime had "its own policy, based on its own interests";
-- MTCR and other sanctions regimes meaningfully restricted
Iran's capacity to purchase necessary technology;
-- The U.S. failed to take into account the limits on the
development of the Shahab-3 system, caused by the lack of
test range equipment, with Russia maintaining that the Shahab
was simply the No Dong, but renamed. Venevtsev detailed
other deficiencies of the Shahab-3;
-- Russia did not accept that Iran was pursuing space
vehicle technology and preemptively argued that a future test
launch would not constitute mastery of the technology;
-- Iran did not enjoy technical mastery of the design
process, but upgraded and reverse-engineered others' systems;
its engineers were insufficient in number and not highly
skilled; and, consequently, Iran was still dependent upon
North Korean engines. Iranian gyroscopes and accelerometers
were inaccurate and Iran did not have a production line for
the equipment. Venevtsev displayed a photo with visible
welding joints on an Iranian missile as evidence of the
unreliability of Iranian technology and concluded that
neither Russia nor the U.S. had succeeded in finding evidence
of a more sophisticated missile technology beyond the Scuds.
A lack of construction material, verification equipment, and
opportunities for flight and "stand" tests were a further
limit.
-- Iran lacked solid fuel-propelled mid-range ballistic
missiles, and did not possess the necessary industrial
chemicals to develop them. Venevtsev was dismissive of
Iran's ability to master the complex requirements to launch
missiles with R-27 engines, and in an extended discussion
suggested that the BM-25 might be a heavy multiple rocket
launcher.
Venevtsev concluded that given the weakness of the Iranian
program, the U.S. and Russia had the opportunity to monitor
its development and undertake joint measures over time.


6. (S) Venevtsev resisted answering Rood's query on the
convergences in threat assessments on Iran, stressing that
the U.S. and Russian approaches to interpreting Iranian
actions were fundamentally different, despite a similar set
of facts. Rood disagreed with his assertion of a common fact
set, pointing to the BM-25 as an example of where the U.S.
disagreed with Russian assessments, on the basis of
substantial data indicating Iranian possession of a missile
system.


7. (S) In the first part of the U.S. presentation on threat
assessments, Senior Intelligence Analyst Robert Kozlusky
cleared up issues resulting from misunderstandings in the
July presentation, including semantic differences over how to
define Scud-C's and extended range Scuds; factual differences
over the timing of when the Taepo Dong missile test by North
Korea failed in flight; that the specifications in the
Iranian marketing literature for gyroscopes and
accelerometers were within MTCR criteria; and the labeling of
a slide on ballistic missile-owning countries.


8. (S) Kozlusky then analyzed areas where the U.S. and
Russia diverged in their assessment of Iran, and the
implications for policy making. Kozlusky highlighted the
record of Iranian success over the last 10 years in
developing the Shahab-3, which demonstrated the technical
proficiency of Iranian scientists and their access to
technology to develop more capable systems. These
developments undercut the Russian assumption that Iran would
be constrained by the limits of Scud technology and the bite
of sanctions regimes. Whereas the GOR saw a static system,
the U.S. had evidence of a dynamic procurement process that
was boosted by cooperation with North Korea. Kozlusky said
that while there was agreement over the capability of the
currently deployed Iranian missiles, there were
inconsistencies in Russian presentations on payload and
distance, and the U.S. believed Iran was further along in
development of a Shahab-3M than Russia has assessed. As
well, there were real divergences over what came next, with
the U.S. positing the near-term development of a solid
propellant MRBM, the rudimentary start of a space launch
vehicle program, and the development of a BM-25 that uses
R-27 technology. Rood clarified that the U.S. did not think
Iran was replicating the R-27, but developing a missile based
on R-27 technology.


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9. (S) Venevtsev said that Russia had no evidence of a new
North Korean missile based on R-27 technology, noted that
there had been no such missile paraded in Pyongyang in
September, and insisted that reverse engineering the R-27 was
beyond the technical competence of the North Koreans and
Iranians. Kozlusky clarified that the U.S. was not concerned
about the potential development of a direct copy of the R-27
submarine launched missile, but the use of the R-27 engine on
a North Korean missile and that previous Russian
presentations on the impossibility of launching an R-27
missile from land did not address the use of the R-27 engine
in a land-based system. The U.S. believed that technological
advances were taking place outside of MTCR countries. North
Korea had a proven track record of either transferring or
discussing the possibility of transferring all of its missile
technology to Iran.


10. (S) Kozlusky described how the U.S. expected the Iranian
missile program to develop over the next five years, and what
the U.S. believed the Russians would expect. The U.S.
believed the Iranians would be able to execute a rudimentary
space launch; and would develop engine technology based on
nitrogen-tetroxide/UDMH, if not a flight test itself. The
Russians, the U.S. believed, would expect to see continuing
flight tests of a modified Shahab-3 missile and nothing new.
By 2015, Kozlusky reported, the U.S. believed Iran would be
able to conduct a flight test of an ICBM vehicle if Iran made
a decision to develop one. Iran has demonstrated technology
that would improve the Taepo Dong-type missile. The U.S.
understands Russia believes that while Iran could design a
4,000-km-range missile using IRFNATh/kerosene technologies,
Russia believes MTCR controls would prevent actual
development. The U.S. did not believe MTCR restrictions
would stand in Iran's way. He noted that, despite such
restrictions, Iran had obtained access to better technology,
including in propulsion and guidance systems.


11. (S) In response to Rood's question about what types of
indicators Russia expected to see if Iran was progressing to
longer-range missiles, Venevtsev responded they would expect
to see success in designing and testing a solid propellant
engine; a new assembly system for the entire missile system;
new test and flight test equipment; and successful
development of the stage-separating mechanism; and a flight
test. Venevtsev claimed that the U.S. belief that Russia's
threat assessment was based only on an analysis of the
shortcomings of the Iranian missile system was wrong. He
remarked that the U.S. presentation had included many words
such as "believe," "assume," etc.

Czech Radar Horizon Capabilities: Cannot See Russian Nukes
-------------- --------------


12. (S) General O'Reilly briefed on the capabilities of the
Czech radar. He noted that it was an X-Band radar which
could only see in a straight line, not over the horizon; its
range was approximately 2000 kilometers, its beam size was
point 155 degrees; and it could not search and locate by
itself. The key was that the Czech radar could not bend
radio waves; its minimum elevation was two degrees, the same
as the Qabala radar. Below two degrees, ground clutter would
interfere. Thus, depending on the location of the launch,
the first 245, 450 or 850 kilometers of flight could not be
seen. Therefore, the radar was incapable of seeing a missile
in the boost phase. By the time the radar saw the missile,
it would be too late to launch an interceptor. Rood added
that, given the time necessary to assess a launch and fire an
interceptor once the radar saw a missile, it would be too
late to intercept a missile in midcourse either. In response
to Kislyak's question whether space interceptors could be
used in the boost phase, Rood responded that the
Administration had only requested $10 million from Congress
in this year's budget and that Committees had so far not
funded this small amount. Even with upgrades to the radar,
Gen. O'Reilly continued, an X-band radar in the Czech
Republic would never give the U.S. the capability to
intercept Russia's ICBMs. O'Reilly said it was possible that
interceptors in Great Britain would be able to catch a
Russian ICBM in time, but a radar in the Czech Republic with
interceptors in Poland was too close.


13. (S) Kislyak argued that the U.S. plan was not just to
put interceptors in Poland, but elsewhere as well. Thus, if
the radar could identify the missile in midcourse, then
another interceptor could reach it. He asked if the U.S. was
willing to commit not to build a space-based system.


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14. (S) The two sides agreed to let the technical experts
continue the discussions on the parameters of the system and
the response to Russia's concerns about European-based MD
deployments (discussions were held October 11).


15. (SBU) Acting U/S Rood has cleared this cable.
Burns