THE SILOVIKI AND PUTIN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 005066



SIPDIS



SIPDIS



E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/17/2017

TAGS: PGOV, PINR, KDEM, SOCI, RS

SUBJECT: THE SILOVIKI AND PUTIN



REF: MOSCOW 4906



Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reasons: 1.4 (b,d).



Summary

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1. (C) Federal Narcotics Service (FNS) Chief Cherkesov's

October 9 article in the national daily Kommersant lifted the

veil on long-simmering rivalries in Putin's inner circle,

catalyzed much media comment, and fulfilled the predictions

of those who thought that elite interests would collide in a

more visible way as the President's term in office drew to an

end. Observers here agree that the proximate cause of

Cherkesov's article was Putin's failure to respond to the

arrest of several of his FSKN colleagues, but there is little

sense of whether the in-fighting will remain visible or

disappear from view. Observers think it very unlikely that

Putin will lose control of elite rivalries, but as always

it's hard to determine how much the President is instigating

and managing conflicts in order to maintain a divided,

weakened inner circle, and how much he is refereeing a sport

that has rules of its own. End summary.



Cherkesov Article Energizes

Kremlin Watchers

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2. (C) As has been widely reported, long-simmering rivalries

in Putin's inner circle surfaced dramatically on October 9 in

a newspaper article by head of the Federal Narcotics

Service's (FSKN) Chairman Viktor Cherkesov. Cherkesov

complained, in the national daily newspaper Kommersant, about

those siloviki who had become businessmen instead of soldiers

for the state and he lifted the lid on the power struggle

among the Kremlin-centered elite. He also credited the

intelligence agencies for having steered Russia through the

difficult 1990s, and argued that circumstances dictate that

they remain at the wheel for the foreseeable future.



3. (C) Cherkesov's decision to go public was not

unprecedented --in a December 2004 Komsomolskaya Pravda

article he had described the siloviki as a bulwark against

chaos-- but the timing of his October 9 editorial, which was

published following the dramatic detention of four of his

subordinates and in the middle of Russia's delicate

succession process, prompted a flood of media and think tank

commentary.



4. (C) Most commentators chose to view Cherkesov's article

through the lens of his ongoing conflict with Presidential

Administration Deputy Sechin and FSB Chief Patrushev. They

saw the arrest that preceded its publication as revenge for

the FSKN Chief's role in the "Three Whales" furniture stores

and Chinese goods corruption probes, as well as the ouster,

in summer 2006, of then-Prosecutor General Ustinov, all of

which undercut the FSB. Some also collaterally believed that

the arrests were intended to trim the sails of Cherkesov, who

they guessed would either be appointed to the vacant post of

Secretary of the Security Council, put in charge of a



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consolidated, multi-ministry criminal investigative agency to

be created after the new year, or replace Patrushev at the

FSB.



5. (C) Commentators noted that one of the key players in the

detention of four of Cherkesov's subordinates was the

recently-established Investigative Committee, which was in

part created, they believe, to circumscribe the authority of

the Cherkesov-friendly Prosecutor General Yuriy Chayka, whose

office previously was responsible for both criminal

investigations, indictments, and prosecutions (reftel).



6. (C) Against the background of that struggle, Cherkesov's

Kommersant piece was seen as an appeal to Putin and a

challenge to his opponents. The Investigative Committee saw

it as an attack, and immediately issued a statement that it

would "continue fighting corruption" wherever it was found.

Chayka's office has gone to court in an effort to neutralize

the Committee's campaign by arguing that there are no grounds

for continuing to detain close Cherkesov colleague Aleksandr

Bulbov. A hearing is scheduled on October 31.



Putin's Faction Management

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7. (C) It had been long predicted that Kremlin clan rivalries

would heat up as the succession date approached. In the

absence of political institutions, the glue of the system

created by Putin is his personalized power and the loyalty of

those he has appointed to key positions. Putin has attempted

to preserve that power by keeping those jockeying for

continued influence off balance. His strategy has been to



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further reduce the transparency of the process, continue to

appoint Petersburgers of proven loyalty to key positions,

make liberal use of the element of surprise, and indicate,

more and more unmistakably, that he will be a force to

contend with for the foreseeable future.



8. (C) Although Putin appears to be succeeding in his efforts

to preserve the delicate balance of interests among the

competing elites, the Cherkesov article suggests that the

system is nevertheless under strain, and it is no longer

clear whether Putin is managing or refereeing the transition.

In the Cherkesov case, there appears to be evidence to

support both interpretations. Russian Newsweek journalist

Mikhail Fishman reported that Putin had stage-managed

Cherkesov's efforts in the "Three Whales" case to weaken

Sechin and Patrushev. Per Fishman, Putin had called aide

Viktor Ivanov into the key "Three Whales" meeting with

Cherkesov, then arranged to have Sechin "run into" Cherkesov

and Ivanov as they were leaving Putin's office, allowing

Sechin, through Ivanov, to connect the dots.



9. (C) On the other hand, there have been signs that Putin is

not as omniscient as Fishman suggests. There have been

persistent press reports that two FSB generals dismissed last

year by Putin in connection with the Cherkesov-fostered

Chinese goods scandal have remained at their desks, in open

defiance of the President's orders. Putin has made no known

attempt to discipline Patrushev or the generals for their

behavior. On the contrary, Putin was reported to have

visited FSB headquarters the evening before Cherkesov's

article appeared.



10. (C) Analyst Olga Kryshtanovskaya termed Cherkesov's

article "damaging to Putin," as it offers to the public

evidence of a rift in the President's team, official

confirmation that Russia is not a law-governed state, and

proof that a war for resources is under way. Syndicated

columnist Yuliya Latynina, on the other hand, saw in the

article evidence only that Putin was fostering fighting among

the Kremlin factions in order to weaken them. Boris

Makarenko of the Center for Political Technology was one of

many who judged the affair too murky to analyze accurately,

but agreed that there appeared to be clashes. Makarenko

seconded Kryshtanovskaya's suggestion that it was the

publicity, not the fact of the dispute that damaged Putin the

most. Yabloko Chairman Yavlinskiy thought that the article

probably made Putin "uneasy" but did not represent a threat

to stability.



11. (C) Some trace an upsurge in fighting among the siloviki

to Putin's appointment of Zubkov as Prime Minister. As former

Chairman of the Committee on Financial Monitoring with a

reputation for integrity, harshness, and unswerving loyalty

to Putin, Zubkov is ideally positioned to begin a purge under

the guise of an anti-corruption campaign. The prospect of a

housecleaning may have made the elites nervous. On the other

hand, one of the reasons Putin may have chosen Zubkov, a man

not associated with any of the Kremlin factions, was in order

not to disturb the delicate balance among the competing clans.



Comment

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12. (C) Observers expected that in-fighting of the kind seen

over the last week would become more visible as Putin's term

of office wound down. The failure to create institutions able

to regulate the transition process has painted the President

into a corner and frustrated, so far, his efforts to create a

system of governance that could survive his departure. One

commentator likened succession to transferring a spider web

from the branch of one tree to another. Putin seems to have

realized the impossibility of that task and has resigned

himself to the delicate job of transitioning constitutionally

to a new position while at times restraining, at times

encouraging, the worst impulses of the fractious clans who

surround him.

Burns