THE SILOVIKI AND PUTIN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 005066

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/17/2017
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, KDEM, SOCI, RS
SUBJECT: THE SILOVIKI AND PUTIN

REF: MOSCOW 4906

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reasons: 1.4 (b,d).

Summary
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1. (C) Federal Narcotics Service (FNS) Chief Cherkesov's
October 9 article in the national daily Kommersant lifted the
veil on long-simmering rivalries in Putin's inner circle,
catalyzed much media comment, and fulfilled the predictions
of those who thought that elite interests would collide in a
more visible way as the President's term in office drew to an
end. Observers here agree that the proximate cause of
Cherkesov's article was Putin's failure to respond to the
arrest of several of his FSKN colleagues, but there is little
sense of whether the in-fighting will remain visible or
disappear from view. Observers think it very unlikely that
Putin will lose control of elite rivalries, but as always
it's hard to determine how much the President is instigating
and managing conflicts in order to maintain a divided,
weakened inner circle, and how much he is refereeing a sport
that has rules of its own. End summary.

Cherkesov Article Energizes
Kremlin Watchers
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2. (C) As has been widely reported, long-simmering rivalries
in Putin's inner circle surfaced dramatically on October 9 in
a newspaper article by head of the Federal Narcotics
Service's (FSKN) Chairman Viktor Cherkesov. Cherkesov
complained, in the national daily newspaper Kommersant, about
those siloviki who had become businessmen instead of soldiers
for the state and he lifted the lid on the power struggle
among the Kremlin-centered elite. He also credited the
intelligence agencies for having steered Russia through the
difficult 1990s, and argued that circumstances dictate that
they remain at the wheel for the foreseeable future.

3. (C) Cherkesov's decision to go public was not
unprecedented --in a December 2004 Komsomolskaya Pravda
article he had described the siloviki as a bulwark against
chaos-- but the timing of his October 9 editorial, which was
published following the dramatic detention of four of his
subordinates and in the middle of Russia's delicate
succession process, prompted a flood of media and think tank
commentary.

4. (C) Most commentators chose to view Cherkesov's article
through the lens of his ongoing conflict with Presidential
Administration Deputy Sechin and FSB Chief Patrushev. They
saw the arrest that preceded its publication as revenge for
the FSKN Chief's role in the "Three Whales" furniture stores
and Chinese goods corruption probes, as well as the ouster,
in summer 2006, of then-Prosecutor General Ustinov, all of
which undercut the FSB. Some also collaterally believed that
the arrests were intended to trim the sails of Cherkesov, who
they guessed would either be appointed to the vacant post of
Secretary of the Security Council, put in charge of a

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consolidated, multi-ministry criminal investigative agency to
be created after the new year, or replace Patrushev at the
FSB.

5. (C) Commentators noted that one of the key players in the
detention of four of Cherkesov's subordinates was the
recently-established Investigative Committee, which was in
part created, they believe, to circumscribe the authority of
the Cherkesov-friendly Prosecutor General Yuriy Chayka, whose
office previously was responsible for both criminal
investigations, indictments, and prosecutions (reftel).

6. (C) Against the background of that struggle, Cherkesov's
Kommersant piece was seen as an appeal to Putin and a
challenge to his opponents. The Investigative Committee saw
it as an attack, and immediately issued a statement that it
would "continue fighting corruption" wherever it was found.
Chayka's office has gone to court in an effort to neutralize
the Committee's campaign by arguing that there are no grounds
for continuing to detain close Cherkesov colleague Aleksandr
Bulbov. A hearing is scheduled on October 31.

Putin's Faction Management
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7. (C) It had been long predicted that Kremlin clan rivalries
would heat up as the succession date approached. In the
absence of political institutions, the glue of the system
created by Putin is his personalized power and the loyalty of
those he has appointed to key positions. Putin has attempted
to preserve that power by keeping those jockeying for
continued influence off balance. His strategy has been to

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further reduce the transparency of the process, continue to
appoint Petersburgers of proven loyalty to key positions,
make liberal use of the element of surprise, and indicate,
more and more unmistakably, that he will be a force to
contend with for the foreseeable future.

8. (C) Although Putin appears to be succeeding in his efforts
to preserve the delicate balance of interests among the
competing elites, the Cherkesov article suggests that the
system is nevertheless under strain, and it is no longer
clear whether Putin is managing or refereeing the transition.
In the Cherkesov case, there appears to be evidence to
support both interpretations. Russian Newsweek journalist
Mikhail Fishman reported that Putin had stage-managed
Cherkesov's efforts in the "Three Whales" case to weaken
Sechin and Patrushev. Per Fishman, Putin had called aide
Viktor Ivanov into the key "Three Whales" meeting with
Cherkesov, then arranged to have Sechin "run into" Cherkesov
and Ivanov as they were leaving Putin's office, allowing
Sechin, through Ivanov, to connect the dots.

9. (C) On the other hand, there have been signs that Putin is
not as omniscient as Fishman suggests. There have been
persistent press reports that two FSB generals dismissed last
year by Putin in connection with the Cherkesov-fostered
Chinese goods scandal have remained at their desks, in open
defiance of the President's orders. Putin has made no known
attempt to discipline Patrushev or the generals for their
behavior. On the contrary, Putin was reported to have
visited FSB headquarters the evening before Cherkesov's
article appeared.

10. (C) Analyst Olga Kryshtanovskaya termed Cherkesov's
article "damaging to Putin," as it offers to the public
evidence of a rift in the President's team, official
confirmation that Russia is not a law-governed state, and
proof that a war for resources is under way. Syndicated
columnist Yuliya Latynina, on the other hand, saw in the
article evidence only that Putin was fostering fighting among
the Kremlin factions in order to weaken them. Boris
Makarenko of the Center for Political Technology was one of
many who judged the affair too murky to analyze accurately,
but agreed that there appeared to be clashes. Makarenko
seconded Kryshtanovskaya's suggestion that it was the
publicity, not the fact of the dispute that damaged Putin the
most. Yabloko Chairman Yavlinskiy thought that the article
probably made Putin "uneasy" but did not represent a threat
to stability.

11. (C) Some trace an upsurge in fighting among the siloviki
to Putin's appointment of Zubkov as Prime Minister. As former
Chairman of the Committee on Financial Monitoring with a
reputation for integrity, harshness, and unswerving loyalty
to Putin, Zubkov is ideally positioned to begin a purge under
the guise of an anti-corruption campaign. The prospect of a
housecleaning may have made the elites nervous. On the other
hand, one of the reasons Putin may have chosen Zubkov, a man
not associated with any of the Kremlin factions, was in order
not to disturb the delicate balance among the competing clans.

Comment
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12. (C) Observers expected that in-fighting of the kind seen
over the last week would become more visible as Putin's term
of office wound down. The failure to create institutions able
to regulate the transition process has painted the President
into a corner and frustrated, so far, his efforts to create a
system of governance that could survive his departure. One
commentator likened succession to transferring a spider web
from the branch of one tree to another. Putin seems to have
realized the impossibility of that task and has resigned
himself to the delicate job of transitioning constitutionally
to a new position while at times restraining, at times
encouraging, the worst impulses of the fractious clans who
surround him.
Burns