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07MOSCOW5059 2007-10-18 13:43:00 SECRET Embassy Moscow
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DE RUEHMO #5059/01 2911343
O 181343Z OCT 07
					  S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 MOSCOW 005059 



E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/11/2017

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns: Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

1. (S) Summary. In extensive discussions in Moscow October
10, U.S. and Russian delegations, led by Acting
Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International
Security John Rood and Deputy Foreign Minister Kislyak
discussed the U.S. plans to place a missile defense system
(MD) in Eastern Europe (delegation lists at paras. 24-25).
The U.S. presented its concept for a Joint Regional Missile
Defense Architecture, which would offer Russia the
opportunity to work with the U.S. and participating European
countries on MD from the ground up, would include defense of
the United States, Europe, and Russia west of the Urals, and
would include integrated command and control.

2. (S) Summary continued. The two sides also assessed the
visit to the Qabala radar on September 18, and exchanged
threat assessments, but made little progress in narrowing the
differences. The U.S. briefed on the physical
characteristics of the X-band radar system to be deployed in
the Czech Republic, demonstrating why the radar could not
support interception against Russian ICBMs. The Russian side
reiterated familiar arguments discounting the threat from
Iran, arguing that the system was directed against Russia,
and pressing for suspension of deployment of the Czech radar
and interceptor elements in Poland. At conclusion of the
talks, however, the Russian side did not dismiss the concept
or state that the report to Ministers for the "2 2" meeting
would indicate that no progress had been made. (Qabala, Iran
threat, and Czech Radar Capabilities briefings reported
septel). End summary.

The Presidents' Vision


3. (C) Deputy Foreign Minister Kislyak opened the October
10, 2007, session of "2 2" preparatory negotiations by
referring to the President and Putin's instructions to deepen
cooperation and to identify a way forward on MD cooperation.
Noting the previous sessions in July and September, Kislyak
said that "we can't congratulate ourselves on our great
progress." Kislyak identified the session's tasks as
reviewing the Qabala visit, comparing and evaluating threat
information on Iran, and then assessing where the talks
stood. Rood agreed and stressed the need to prepare for the
2 2 ministerial discussions, noting the unusual opportunity
presented by the joint visit of the Secretary of State and
Secretary of Defense.


4. (C) Rood stressed the potential for bilateral
cooperation. While thanking the Russians for hosting the
visit to Qabala, Rood proposed that it was time to narrow
differences and identify areas of convergence on threat
assessments. He stressed that cooperation should not be held
hostage to such an agreement and that there should be no
preconditions for engagement on MD. Referencing the proposal
to share networked radar and sensor data, which was conveyed
on September 10, Rood pointed to the potential
interoperability of the U.S. and Russian shorter-range mobile
MD systems, such as the S-300, S-400, Patriot PAC-3, and
THAAD; urged the establishment of centers for transmitting
and receiving sensor data; and flagged arrangements for
command and control. The U.S. and Russia could become real
strategic partners, with Russia gaining increased confidence
in the initiative through its engagement. Referring to the
Russian concerns on sites in the Czech Republic and Poland,
Rood said that the placement of the X-band radar and
interceptors was a question of physics and geometry, and not
a matter of foreign policy.

5. (C) Rood turned to General O'Reilly of the Missile
Defense Agency to give the U.S. assessment of the Qabala
radar facility and the capabilities of the X-band radar, and
to Senior Intelligence Analyst Robert Kozlusky to brief on
the threat from Iran (septel).

Russian Opening: U.S. Plans an "Unfriendly Gesture"



6. (S) Following the technical briefings, Kislyak began the
second session by stating Russia and the U.S. were going in
circles. Russia had not received a response to the July
proposal, which laid out Putin's views of how we could
proceed together. The U.S.'s insistence on continuing its
plans to deploy radars and interceptors in the Czech Republic
and Poland was seen as an "unfriendly gesture" by the GOR.
Russia's proposal was to create a scheme of interaction

MOSCOW 00005059 002 OF 006

together which would not pose a threat to or damage any
party, including Russia. The U.S. system threatens and
damages Russia. He said the U.S.'s double track of
discussions with Russia, while simultaneously continuing with
development of the Polish and Czech sites, was going in the
wrong direction politically. The U.S.'s decisions were not
being influenced by the U.S.-Russian talks. Kislyak noted
that the atmosphere of the meeting was good, but there was no
progress. Putin had told President Bush that the double
track approach was not acceptable. Kislyak said if the
U.S.'s new ideas met Russia's criteria for cooperation,
Russia would want more clarity on the substance of the ideas.

7. (S) Rood responded that the U.S. system was not directed
at Russia, and was not intended as an unfriendly act. U.S.-
Russian relations were not what they were in the past, and
the U.S. does not see Russia as a foe. The U.S. viewed the
discussions more positively. It was significant that this
was the first time, Rood said, that the U.S. and Russia were
having such a detailed exchange of intelligence information.
President Bush was serious about wanting to work out
cooperation on MD with Russia. Rood noted that Russia had
not responded to the U.S. paper he provided to Kislyak on
April 17 in Moscow on missile defense cooperation. While
neither side had responded to each other's proposals in
writing, our discussions in September had taken Russia's
proposal into account and sought to respond to issues raised
therein. The U.S. was prepared to propose a Joint Regional
MD Architecture, which would be a real partnership, entailing
joint command and control, and would take our cooperation
well beyond anything that had been done before. In response
to Russia's concerns, the U.S. was also prepared to show why
the radar in the Czech Republic was physically incapable of
detecting and intercepting Russia's ICBMs, and why the
interceptor site in Poland could not affect Russia's
strategic capability.

"We Know the System is Directed at Russia"


8. (S) General Yuriy Baluyevskiy, Chief of Staff of the
Russian Armed Forces, stated emphatically "We are convinced
everything you are designing is aimed at Russia's retaliatory
nuclear capability. Do not try to convince me this is not
directed at Russia." He said he understood that the intent
of the entire MD system was to intercept all missiles aimed
at the U.S., regardless of their origin. Thus, the system
was directed at Russia. With respect to the threat from
Iran, Baluyevskiy said "we're convinced this belongs to the
sphere of science fiction." Even if there were a threat from
Iran, Russia had offered the use of the Qabala radar station,
and would offer Armavir in the future. Both radars could
detect threats from Iran. He argued that the U.S. and Russia
should "take a break" and invite other countries to develop a
system of monitoring. He contended that, while the U.S. might
be planning today to have only 10 missile interceptors in
Poland, in the future, it could be 110.

9. (S) Rood responded that the U.S. did not feel the need to
have a capability against Russia's strategic nuclear arsenal.
He explained that the physics of the radar and the plan for
only 10 interceptors in Poland could not defeat thousands of
Russian nuclear warheads. He noted that both sides were
drawing political conclusions based on technical differences,
and suggested that the experts try to narrow the technical
differences. He added that, had the U.S. planned a system to
counter Russia, it would not be the system the U.S. was
proposing. This system was based on the threat assessment of
a missile threat from Iran. It would continue to be
developed based on the threat assessments as they occur and
change. Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Eric Edelman
said that the U.S.'s MD system would take many years to
build and would require funding from Congress. The best
guarantee that the system would not be aimed at Russia would
be for Russia to work jointly with us.

A Joint Regional MD Architecture


10. (S) Rood presented the U.S. proposal for Joint Regional
Missile Defense Architecture. He explained that, on April
17, the U.S. had offered cooperation with Russia across the
full spectrum of MD, including on sensors, subsystems,
interoperability of forces, modeling and interpretation. In
September, we had built on Putin's proposal, taking Russia's
questions and concerns into account, and offered to provide
technical data and to develop shared early warning centers.

MOSCOW 00005059 003 OF 006

This new proposal took our cooperation further. The
objective of the proposal was to defend the U.S., Europe and
Russia west of the Urals from a ballistic missile attack.
All participating countries would contribute assets, and each
country's individual capabilities would be used to build the
system step-by-step.

11. (S) O'Reilly, using slides, described the proposed
architecture. A U.S.-Europe-Russia complementary
architecture could be so robust that it would dissuade Iran
from developing missile capabilities and would deter Iran
from launching an attack. The baseline included upgrades to
the early warning radars in Thule and Fylingdales, a European
midcourse X-band radar (EMR) in the Czech Republic (range
approximately 1000 km), ground based interceptors (2-stage)
in Poland, and command and control based in Colorado Springs.
O'Reilly then described the components that would be
available between the U.S. and Russia in 2010-2012, including
both sides' sensors, sensors with interceptors, interceptors,
and command and control. The steps of an integrated
architecture would include:

-- Step 1 - Partial integration of Russian radars, with each
system operating autonomously, but with data sharing between
the systems, including protocols, message sets, coordination,
and better early-warning capability. But it would not enable
each side to fire interceptors sooner;

-- Step 2 - Full integration. The Russians would use U.S.
data to expand the range of its sensors, and the U.S. would
do the same with Russian data. By integrating fire control
systems and deconflicting command and control systems, both
sides would get be able to launch interceptors sooner. This
would also give the Russians significantly greater capability
in depth. Both sides would still have control over their own
forces, but by sharing data and deconflicting, we would
ensure that neither side wasted its resources against the
same threat.

A True Partnership with Russia


12. (S) Rood explained that this was a proposed first take
on an integrated system and, if Russia was interested in
pursuing the concept, the U.S. would welcome Russia's views
on how to change it. He added that the proposal was
significant because it provided integrated command and
control, something the U.S. had never offered before. And it
enabled Russia to get in at the beginning of the development
of a MD system, and to affect that development. Russia often
complained about being given plans already decided; this was
Russia's opportunity to work with the U.S. from the ground
floor up.

13. (S) Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian
Affairs Daniel Fried said that the U.S.'s offer was
unprecedented in the history of U.S.-Russian or U.S.-Soviet
relations. The U.S. was not proposing two parallel systems,
closely linked, but an open offer for joint cooperation, and
joint command and control. In September, Russia had asked:
1) how do we know the system is not directed at Russia, and
2) how do we know it will not be developed in the future to
be used against Russia. In response to the first question,
the U.S. side had shown in its briefing the physics that
demonstrated the impossibility that the system could be used
against Russia. As to the second question, the U.S. proposal
offered Russia the ability to participate in the development
of the system, which would allow Russia to ensure that it
would not be developed in a way that it could be used against

Familiar Russian Objections


14. (S) The Russian side raised familiar arguments.
Baluyevskiy immediately asked how much such a system would
cost Russia. He asked for a feasibility study on the costs.
He asked if the Europeans knew the U.S. proposed to cover
Russia west of the Urals. He asked who would take decisions
on the use of the interceptors. He asked if the U.S. and
Russia would coordinate actions if Iran were to launch a
missile. The U.S. was trying to minimize threats by
proposing a regional ABM system against a threat that did not
exist, and ignoring other options, including destruction of a
missile on the launch pad. Putin had proposed that the U.S.
and Russia jointly assess the threat from the South, and use
the existing radars in Qabala and Armavir. All interested

MOSCOW 00005059 004 OF 006

countries could participate in the decisions. Why did the
U.S. need to rush ahead with deployment of a system in Poland
and the Czech Republic?

15. (S) Kislyak, echoing Baluyevskiy, contended that the
U.S. was proposing to unite all the participants against
Iran, but Russia has not agreed that Iran poses a threat.
The U.S. proposal amounted to an alliance against Iran. He
asked if it was directed only against Iran, or designed to
protect against all other risks. He asked if command and
control decisions would continue to be taken in Colorado
Springs. He said that, contrary to the statement that the
best guarantee that the system would not be aimed at Russia
would be for Russia to sit at the table, the U.S. was still
going ahead with deployments in Poland and the Czech
Republic, whether Russia liked it or not. Would the U.S. be
prepared to discuss with other NATO members a system that was
not based in Poland and the Czech Republic? Kislyak said,
despite Russia's repeated statements that basing a system in
those two countries was of major concern to Russia, the U.S.
and NATO continued to pursue deployment there. Russia's
proposal for a different architecture, not based in Poland
and the Czech Republic, had been discarded. Even if Russia
accepted Rood's offer to provide its views on how the
architecture could be changed, he doubted that the U.S. would
agree on architecture that did not include Poland and the
Czech Republic.

16. (S) Kislyak responded that Russia had suggested
development of a MD system to NATO years ago, based on the
U.S., NATO, and Russia, each having its own capability, but
working together to determine what needed to be done. The
U.S. was proposing a system aimed at Iran. While Russia
acknowledged Iran posed a proliferation risk, Iran did not
pose a threat. Iranians were "peculiar people with peculiar
views, but they were reasonable and capable of not
entertaining the idea of war against the U.S. or Europe."
The U.S. was moving quickly as if a threat existed. Russia
proposes a different concept: A system that offers
protection from all risks. The U.S. and Russia should build
a monitoring system together, based on the radars that
already exist in Qabala and Armavir. If risks develop, then
the U.S. and Russia can take action jointly. The U.S.
proposal to place the system in Poland and the Czech Republic
does not meet these criteria. All Russian experts agree:
The U.S. is building a global system, but for the first time
it is located near to Russia.

If Russia Agrees to the Concept, We Can Discuss Details



17. (S) In response to the questions about cost and command
and control, Rood said we did not have detailed cost
estimates yet, but if Russia agreed to the concept, we could
discuss costs. He asked if there was a certain cost or
command and control option that would make the overall
concept interesting to Russia. While these questions of cost
and command and control were important, they could be handled
by experts if we could agree to go forward with the concept.
O'Reilly noted that the proposal was based, as much as
possible, on existing capabilities, and was not intended to
go beyond the current U.S. MD budget. Edelman said that
while the original provisional decision had been made to
place command and control in Colorado Springs, if we were to
develop the integrated system the U.S. is proposing, the
question would be revisited.

18. (S) Edelman noted that Putin, in his letter to President
Bush after the meeting in Kennebunkport, had acknowledged
that the U.S. and Russia shared the view that there was an
emerging threat from Iran. Nothing would get the Iranians'
attention more than the U.S. and Russia working together,
just as we were in the UN over Iran's nuclear program. This
would be an important strategic shift in how we deal with

19. (S) Rood explained that the U.S.'s concerns about the
Russian proposal was that it only encompassed joint threat
monitoring, not full MD architecture. And Russia was only
prepared to discuss this further if we agreed to suspend
deployment in Poland and the Czech Republic. There were
layers of conditions in Russia's proposal. The U.S.
proposal, by contrast, invited Russia to join at the
beginning of development of MD architecture. Fried added
that deployments in Poland and the Czech Republic were
elements of this architecture, and Russia, if it joined,
would have a say in how those deployments developed. Edelman

MOSCOW 00005059 005 OF 006

reiterated the U.S. offer for Russia to send a team to
Kwajalein to see the radar system which will be put in the
Czech Republic.

20. (S) Kislyak questioned whether the U.S. would cease MD
deployments if a diplomatic solution was found to eliminate
the threat from Iran, saying that he considered it doubtful.

U.S.: "We Are Not Adversaries"


21. (S) Rood underscored that Russia's position seemed to be
based on the idea that the U.S. and Russia were adversaries,
and our nuclear weapons were aimed at each other. The U.S.
would prefer to see MD as a joint cooperative effort, from
the ground up, to address the threats against us both. Fried
noted that President Putin had opened up the possibility of
far-reaching cooperation when he offered the use of the
Qabala radar station, and the U.S. is very serious about
wanting to develop such cooperation.

Russia Will Consider Proposal


22. (S) Kislyak said "whether we like it or not, thank you
for your proposal." He said the GOR would need to study it.
He reiterated that the proposal was being offered on the
backdrop of a program that concerns Russia. Whether to
deconflict the two was up to the U.S. He said he did not
know if there would be much zeal to work on the U.S.'s
proposal while the U.S. continued to do something Russia did
not like. He said "are you ready to suspend the program my
President has told you does not serve Russia's security
interests? I am concerned this conflict is standing in the
way of us working together." He said he did not understand
why the U.S. was in such a rush to deploy in eastern Europe.

23. (S) Rood responded that he hoped our areas of
disagreement could be lessened. The U.S. hoped to finish the
deployment to Poland and the Czech Republic in six years,
which was not a short time, given the intelligence assessment
of the threat from Iran. All the U.S. was hearing from the
Russian side was if we stopped negotiations with Poland and
the Czech Republic, if we forgo space based systems, if we
adhered to Russian's conditions, Russia might be willing to
continue the discussions we are having now. The U.S. had not
heard a commitment from the Russian side to engage in a joint
MD architecture. Was Russia willing to do so?



24. (SBU) U.S: Acting Undersecretary of State for Arms
Control and International Security John Rood (Head of
delegation), Ambassador Burns, Undersecretary of Defense for
Policy Eric Edelman Assistant Secretary for European and
Eurasian Affairs Daniel Fried, Major General Patrick
O'Reilly, Deputy Director, Missile Defense Agency, EUR DAS
David Kramer, DASD Brian Green, NSC Senior Director Mary
Warlick, T Senior Advisor James Timbie, T Chief of Staff Hugh
Amundson, Paul Iarrobino, Deputy, Missile Defense Policy
Office, EUR/PRA Director Anita Friedt, Col. Jon Chicky, OSD,
Col. Chris King, Military Asst., Scott Roenicke, JCS J5,
Daniel Lally, MDA, Mark King, OSD, Richard Trout, Regional
Expert, Robert Kozlusky, Senior Intelligence Analyst, William
Shobert, MD Del Exec. Secretary, Interpreters, Embassy

25. (SBU) Russia: Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Kislyak
(Head of delegation), General Yuriy Baluyevskiy, Chief of
Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, Igor Neverov, Director,
MFA North America Department, Vladimir Venevtsev, SVR, Viktor
Golovkin, SVR, General Yevgeniy Buzhinskiy, MOD Chief of
Directorate, International Treaty, Yevgeniy Ilyin, MOD
International Treaty Directorate, Oleg Burmistrov, Deputy
Director, MFA, North America Department, Sergey Koshelev,
Deputy Director, MFA Department on Security and Disarmament
(DVBR), Vasiliy Boryak, MFA DVBR, Aleksey Ivanov, MFA North
America Department, Aleksandr Khomenko, MFA North America
Department, Yelena Loboda, MFA North America Department.



26. (S) While staying on message, the Russian side seemed to
want to be able to report to Ministers for the 2 2 that the
issue was at an impasse. By the end of the meeting and the

MOSCOW 00005059 006 OF 006

presentation on joint regional MD architecture, it appeared
that they could no longer do so.

26. (U) Acting U/S Rood has cleared this cable.