GERMAN POLITICAL DIRECTOR IN MOSCOW: IRAN, MD, AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 005039

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/11/2017
TAGS: PREL PARM PGOV GM AF EU IR RS
SUBJECT: GERMAN POLITICAL DIRECTOR IN MOSCOW: IRAN, MD, AND
CFE DOMINATE

REF: MOSCOW 4929

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns for reasons 1.4 (b/d).


1. (C) Summary: German Political Director Stanzel's October
9 visit to Moscow touched on most major international issues,
including Iran, missile defense, and CFE. During his meeting
with Stanzel, DFM Kislyak reaffirmed Russia's interest in
maintaining a united front with the EC 3 on Iran. Kislyak
called for openness regarding new Iranian proposals, but
acknowledged that such proposals could be a stalling tactic.
While Putin's October 16 trip to Tehran aimed to reinforce
the importance of Iran's compliance, Kislyak told Stanzel
that an arms embargo against Iran is a Russian redline. GOR
officials reiterated Russia's familiar positions on MD, CFE,
and Kosovo, expressing doubt that a compromise could be
reached on any of these thorny issues. DFM Titov also
expressed concern that the EU did not intend to take the
upcoming EU-Russia Summit seriously. MFA officials were
upbeat about Russia's counternarcotics efforts in Central
Asia and renewed military assistance to Afghanistan. End
summary.


2. (C) German Embassy officials gave us a readout on
Political Director Volker Stanzel's October 9 visit to
Moscow, which included meetings with Deputy Foreign Ministers
Kislyak and Titov, Duma Sub-Committe for EU-Russia Relations
Chairman Klimov, and several think tanks. The discussions
touched on Iran, CFE, Kosovo, and missile defense, but also
looking to the October 26 EU-Russia Summit. Russia
reiterated many familiar positions, which the German Embassy
attributed to Russian officials not wanting to steal the
thunder from the upcoming visits of French President Sarkozy,
the 2 2, and Putin's travel to Wiesbaden.

Iran and Missile Defense
--------------


3. (C) DFM Kislyak told Stanzel that the GOR was satisfied
with the foreign ministers' meeting in New York, and saw a
"window of opportunity" to solve ongoing questions with Iran.
The GOR agreed that a united EC 3 approach was vital.
Kislyak said Russia was in favor of the EC 3 developing a
common strategy in preparation of a new proposal from Iran,
which he pointed out the Ahmadinejad regime could use as an
excuse for delaying implementation of its responsibilities.
However, Kislyak stressed that any Iranian proposal should
not be rejected out of hand, that EU High Representative
Solana's mandate should be flexible enough to react to new
proposals, and that the EC 3 should be a forum to find
"creative" solutions to the problem. Kislyak said that"if
Iran implements the UNSC resolutions, it should be treated
like any other country," but questioned whether that would be
acceptable to the United States.


4. (C) According to German diplomats, Kislyak told Stanzel
that the GOR firmly believes that Iran only wants the
"technical possibility" of having an atomic arsenal, but not
the actual weapons. Kislyak emphasized that Putin will
forcefully remind the Iranians that they must fulfill
outstanding UNSC resolutions and IAEA obligations during his
October 16 trip to Tehran. German diplomats repeated that
Kislyak told Stanzel that an arms embargo against Iran
remained a Russian redline.


5. (C) Kislyak told Stanzel that Iran's current weapons
program was not enough of a threat to warrant the U.S.
missile defense plan. Kislyak said that Putin wanted a
"strategic partnership" where all interested parties could
have input in decisions, whereas the U.S. approach denied
even those countries hosting MD sites a say in their use.
Stanzel told Kislyak that the U.S. would come to NATO for
discussions about missile defense after Czech and Polish
negotiations were finished, but Kislyak replied that would be
"too late" and at that point it would be too hard to back
away.

CFE
---


6. (C) Although Kislyak thanked the Germans for their recent
initiative to host a seminar on CFE, German diplomats told us
the GOR core position had not changed. According to Kislyak,
the GOR was "not optimistic" that a common position could be
found before December. The GOR found recent NATO troop
deployments in new NATO countries "threatening" and Kislyak
stated Russia did not understand their purpose. He also told
Stanzel that "some NATO countries" were happy for the
opportunity to disregard CFE because it provided transparency
into their activities. He reaffirmed that the GOR did not

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want to "drop" CFE, but sought to prompt ratification.

Kosovo
--------------


7. (C) According to German contacts, DFM Titov told Stanzel
that neither the Serbs nor the Kosovars were truly interested
in the troika negotiations, and predicted they would be "no
further along in December than they were in July." Titov
noted ominously that if the U.S. and EU proceed unilaterally,
Putin will "take serious interest" in split nations, pointing
to the specific example of North and South Ossetia. He did
not clarify what such interest might entail.

Afghanistan
--------------


8. (C) Kislyak noted that narcotics trafficking was a
growing issue in Afghanistan. He told Stanzel that Russia is
working with Central Asian countries because Afghanistan's
neighbors "are not able to help secure borders" and needed
support. He also noted that Iran is "very helpful" on this
issue.


9. (C) Regarding recently announced military aid to
Afghanistan (reftel),the GOR clarified to German diplomats
that it has three priorities: to assess the Karzai
government's military needs, to determine how these weapons
would be used, and to create end-use verification mechanisms.
The GOR stressed to German diplomats that although it might
ask CSTO for use of storage facilities, the aid would be
primarily bilateral.


EU-Russia Summit
--------------


10. (C) Titov said the EU-Russia Summit was very important
to Russia, but expressed concern that the EU would not take
the upcoming summit seriously because of its proximity to
Russian elections. German diplomats told us that Titov
appealed to Stanzel not to write the meeting off before it
took place.
Burns