A/S FRIED - DFM KARASIN, DUMA COMMITTEE CHAIR KOKOSHIN DISCUSSIONS ON UKRAINE AND FROZEN CONFLICTS

MD, GG, RS
SUBJECT: A/S FRIED - DFM KARASIN, DUMA COMMITTEE CHAIR
KOKOSHIN DISCUSSIONS ON UKRAINE AND FROZEN CONFLICTS


Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reasons 1,4 (B/D).

1. (C) Summary. On the eve of the October 12 2 2 meeting,
A/S Daniel Fried and DAS David Kramer discussed frozen
conflicts and Ukraine with Deputy Foreign Minister Grigoriy
Karasin. The two sides agreed on the importance of keeping
the communication channel open between the U.S. and Russia
and frequent personal conversations between them, even in the
face of "unpleasant" events. On Ukraine, Karasin expressed
relief at the end of the "first stage of political struggle"
in Ukraine, reiterated GOR efforts to keep a balance among
all political forces in the country, and warned that NATO
membership for Ukraine would seriously damage both
Russia-Ukraine and Russia-West relations. On Georgia,
Karasin listed numerous GOR grievances against Saakashvili
and the U.S. More constructively, he pinned hopes on the
November meeting of the Group of the Friends for Abkhazia,
and affirmed the plans to resume the Joint Control Commission
(JCC) on the South Ossetian conflict in Tbilisi in late
October. Karasin repeated the GOR position on Transnistria:
no internationalization of the Russian peacekeepers before a
political settlement, and advised that less talk of the
Istanbul Commitments would aid a more rapid resolution of the
problem. End summary.

Ukraine
--------------

2. (C) DFM Karasin expressed satisfaction that the "first
stage of the political struggle" in Ukraine was seemingly
ending and said that for Russia, "continuity" was most
important. Since 2005, the GOR had learned to work with
Ukraine, while keeping a good balance among the whole
spectrum of political forces, he added. A/S Fried stressed
U.S. efforts to keep contact with all groups, avoiding a
friends/enemies dichotomy. "A stable Ukraine with a strong
functioning government is what we want," he said. Fried
expressed surprise at the timing of Gazprom's new concerns
about Ukraine's debt, and asked whether Ambassador
Chernomyrdin's public remark about raising energy prices was
as politically motivated as it appeared. Karasin replied
only that the two countries are developing more transparency
as time goes on and avoided an answer about Chernomyrdin's
remark. Karasin warned that Ukraine's NATO membership could
jeopardize Russia-Ukraine and Russia-West relations. Fried
replied that the lack of Ukrainian consensus on the issue of
NATO membership in Ukraine made any discussion of membership
premature.

Georgia
--------------

3. (C) Following A/S Fried's short summary of U.S. concerns
about the increasing tensions over the frozen conflicts in
Georgia, DFM Karasin read a list of GOR grievances:

-- the "unpredictable, dangerous and neurotic" Georgian
internal politics, which resembled the Soviet Union of 1937,
China of the Cultural Revolution, or Turkemenbashi's
Turkmenistan;

-- the Okruashvili arrest, which had been "supported by the
U.S.," citing a statement by DAS Bryza as evidence;

-- two GOR letters to U/S Burns outlining human rights
concerns in Georgia, which had gone unanswered;

-- the Georgian "provocations": the August 6 missile
incident, seizure of two South Ossetian peacekeeping
personnel, a peace March (aborted, Karasin maintained, after
Russia's intervention),and the September 20 shooting
incident;

-- President Saakashvili's unhelpful statements, including
demands for a concrete timeline for the absorption of the
disputed areas and flirtation with military adventurism;

-- Washington's "encouragement" of GOG misbehavior;

-- a "meaningless" October 17 OSCE session on the August 6
incident (at the insistence of the USG and Georgia, though
Russia would be ready to send a team);

-- "the failure of the U.S. expert team to discern the
simple facts" of the August 6 incident;

-- "the Voice of Abkhazia" ("a clone of "Voice of America"),
which Karasin alleged was supported by the U.S.;

-- the absence of a resolution in the disappearance of David

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Sigua;

-- the U.S. refusal to issue a visa for the Abkhazian
"Foreign Minister," despite repeated U.S. promises including
one from DAS Bryza;

-- irritation with the diplomatic campaign in support of
Dmitriy Sanakoyev, who has no support among the South
Ossetian residents; and

-- Saakashvili's silence on Kosovo.

Karasin reiterated GOR support for the November meeting of
the Group of the Friends for Abkhazia and a late October JCC
for South Ossetia. He also thanked Fried for the demarche
conducted in Tbilisi for the release of the two Ossetian
peace keepers and the seven Abkhaz.

4. (C) Fried expressed surprise at GOR interest in the
opposition and human rights situation in Georgia, and
contrasted it with Russia's indifference to human rights
cases in Russia's other neighboring countries. He dismissed
Karasin's comparison of Georgia with the Soviet Union circa
1937: Georgia has accomplished much in a short period, as
demonstrated by its successful economic and social reforms.
He challenged the claim that the U.S. supported the arrest of
Okruashvili. On the August 6 missile incident, the U.S.'s
independent investigation concluded that other nationals were
involved. As to the September 20 shooting, Fried asked, "Why
was a Russian officer leading Abkhaz troops in the area where
they expected problems?" To this, Karasin made no response.

5. (C) Fried stressed that parties to each conflict should
stop trying to score points: Russia should help get them
back on a political track. Fried also stressed the
importance of a stronger OSCE presence in Georgia and the
constructive role Russia could play in that process. Fried
and Karasin agreed that the November meeting for Abkhazia
could promote agreed-upon confidence-building measures and a
pledge on the non-use of force. Fried advised Russia to drop
its occasional threats to recognize Abkhazia, and emphasized
the need for positive movement on Abkhazia before December
10, when the mandate for the Troika negotiators runs out.
Karasin repeated that Kosovo could become a precedent for
Abkhazia, but also repeated that Russia will behave
responsibly there.

6. (C) Fried told DFM Karasin that NATO membership for
Georgia is a long-term process and there will be no offer of
membership at the 2008 Bucharest Summit. On the agenda is
the possibility of offering Georgia a Membership Action Plan.
He stressed that since Russia's stated objective is to avoid
military adventurism, the GOR should stop provoking Georgia
through overflights and military patrols. Fried also
informed Karasin that he plans to visit the South Caucasus
the end of October.

7. (C) Fried said that Russia and the U.S. should support
the agreed confidence building measures developed by the
"Friends" of Georgia group. Karasin agreed that these CBMs
were a good basis for common efforts and could be a focus of
the November meeting.

Transnistria
--------------

8. (C) DFM Karasin reiterated the GOR position: Chisinau and
Tiraspol must make a joint decision on the way ahead. Once
Voronin and Smirnov have come to an agreement, the
international community could get involved. He added that
the GOR was willing to consider internationalization of the
peacekeeping force only after a political settlement is
reached. Karasin warned that to pressure Russia to fulfill
the Istanbul Commitments is counter-productive. Fried
stressed that the U.S. would not apply a rigid interpretation
of the Istanbul Commitments; Russian forces could continue to
stay in a re-configured role. Fried noted that Russia's
decision to "suspend" the CFE Treaty provided new impetus to
solve Transnistrian. An agreement on the
internationalization of the PFK would unlock the impasse on
ratification of the CFE. Karasin replied that something
positive could be expected by the end of the year, without
specifying the details. Fried and Karasin discussed the
possibility of a conference on Transnistria in Garmisch.

Duma
--------------

9. (C) Fried made the same points with Duma CIS Committee
Chairman Andrey Kokoshin, who argued that both Ossetians and

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Abkhazians have become more reasonable. Abkhazian de facto
president Bagapsh now regularly uses the term, "Georgia's
territorial integrity" vis-a-vis Abkhazia and no longer sees
secession as an end goal. But Kokoshin warned that a
unilateral declaration of Kosovo's independence would likely
lead to Russia's recognition of Abkhazia because of Russian
domestic pressure. Kokoshin recommended prolonging Kosovo
negotiations until after the Russian presidential election.
He said that compromise in South Ossetia and in Abkhazia
would be easier if possible NATO membership for Georgia were
taken off the agenda. On Ukrainian political dynamics,
Kokoshin thought the return of Yuliya Timoshenko to the
political foreground created more problems than solutions.
He added that the continuing political turmoil there should
have taught Americans that both factions --orange and blue--
"are crooks."
Burns