A/S FRIED - DFM KARASIN, DUMA COMMITTEE CHAIR KOKOSHIN DISCUSSIONS ON UKRAINE AND FROZEN CONFLICTS

MD, GG, RS

SUBJECT: A/S FRIED - DFM KARASIN, DUMA COMMITTEE CHAIR

KOKOSHIN DISCUSSIONS ON UKRAINE AND FROZEN CONFLICTS





Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reasons 1,4 (B/D).



1. (C) Summary. On the eve of the October 12 2 2 meeting,

A/S Daniel Fried and DAS David Kramer discussed frozen

conflicts and Ukraine with Deputy Foreign Minister Grigoriy

Karasin. The two sides agreed on the importance of keeping

the communication channel open between the U.S. and Russia

and frequent personal conversations between them, even in the

face of "unpleasant" events. On Ukraine, Karasin expressed

relief at the end of the "first stage of political struggle"

in Ukraine, reiterated GOR efforts to keep a balance among

all political forces in the country, and warned that NATO

membership for Ukraine would seriously damage both

Russia-Ukraine and Russia-West relations. On Georgia,

Karasin listed numerous GOR grievances against Saakashvili

and the U.S. More constructively, he pinned hopes on the

November meeting of the Group of the Friends for Abkhazia,

and affirmed the plans to resume the Joint Control Commission

(JCC) on the South Ossetian conflict in Tbilisi in late

October. Karasin repeated the GOR position on Transnistria:

no internationalization of the Russian peacekeepers before a

political settlement, and advised that less talk of the

Istanbul Commitments would aid a more rapid resolution of the

problem. End summary.



Ukraine

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2. (C) DFM Karasin expressed satisfaction that the "first

stage of the political struggle" in Ukraine was seemingly

ending and said that for Russia, "continuity" was most

important. Since 2005, the GOR had learned to work with

Ukraine, while keeping a good balance among the whole

spectrum of political forces, he added. A/S Fried stressed

U.S. efforts to keep contact with all groups, avoiding a

friends/enemies dichotomy. "A stable Ukraine with a strong

functioning government is what we want," he said. Fried

expressed surprise at the timing of Gazprom's new concerns

about Ukraine's debt, and asked whether Ambassador

Chernomyrdin's public remark about raising energy prices was

as politically motivated as it appeared. Karasin replied

only that the two countries are developing more transparency

as time goes on and avoided an answer about Chernomyrdin's

remark. Karasin warned that Ukraine's NATO membership could

jeopardize Russia-Ukraine and Russia-West relations. Fried

replied that the lack of Ukrainian consensus on the issue of

NATO membership in Ukraine made any discussion of membership

premature.



Georgia

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3. (C) Following A/S Fried's short summary of U.S. concerns

about the increasing tensions over the frozen conflicts in

Georgia, DFM Karasin read a list of GOR grievances:



-- the "unpredictable, dangerous and neurotic" Georgian

internal politics, which resembled the Soviet Union of 1937,

China of the Cultural Revolution, or Turkemenbashi's

Turkmenistan;



-- the Okruashvili arrest, which had been "supported by the

U.S.," citing a statement by DAS Bryza as evidence;



-- two GOR letters to U/S Burns outlining human rights

concerns in Georgia, which had gone unanswered;



-- the Georgian "provocations": the August 6 missile

incident, seizure of two South Ossetian peacekeeping

personnel, a peace March (aborted, Karasin maintained, after

Russia's intervention),and the September 20 shooting

incident;



-- President Saakashvili's unhelpful statements, including

demands for a concrete timeline for the absorption of the

disputed areas and flirtation with military adventurism;



-- Washington's "encouragement" of GOG misbehavior;



-- a "meaningless" October 17 OSCE session on the August 6

incident (at the insistence of the USG and Georgia, though

Russia would be ready to send a team);



-- "the failure of the U.S. expert team to discern the

simple facts" of the August 6 incident;



-- "the Voice of Abkhazia" ("a clone of "Voice of America"),

which Karasin alleged was supported by the U.S.;



-- the absence of a resolution in the disappearance of David



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Sigua;



-- the U.S. refusal to issue a visa for the Abkhazian

"Foreign Minister," despite repeated U.S. promises including

one from DAS Bryza;



-- irritation with the diplomatic campaign in support of

Dmitriy Sanakoyev, who has no support among the South

Ossetian residents; and



-- Saakashvili's silence on Kosovo.



Karasin reiterated GOR support for the November meeting of

the Group of the Friends for Abkhazia and a late October JCC

for South Ossetia. He also thanked Fried for the demarche

conducted in Tbilisi for the release of the two Ossetian

peace keepers and the seven Abkhaz.



4. (C) Fried expressed surprise at GOR interest in the

opposition and human rights situation in Georgia, and

contrasted it with Russia's indifference to human rights

cases in Russia's other neighboring countries. He dismissed

Karasin's comparison of Georgia with the Soviet Union circa

1937: Georgia has accomplished much in a short period, as

demonstrated by its successful economic and social reforms.

He challenged the claim that the U.S. supported the arrest of

Okruashvili. On the August 6 missile incident, the U.S.'s

independent investigation concluded that other nationals were

involved. As to the September 20 shooting, Fried asked, "Why

was a Russian officer leading Abkhaz troops in the area where

they expected problems?" To this, Karasin made no response.



5. (C) Fried stressed that parties to each conflict should

stop trying to score points: Russia should help get them

back on a political track. Fried also stressed the

importance of a stronger OSCE presence in Georgia and the

constructive role Russia could play in that process. Fried

and Karasin agreed that the November meeting for Abkhazia

could promote agreed-upon confidence-building measures and a

pledge on the non-use of force. Fried advised Russia to drop

its occasional threats to recognize Abkhazia, and emphasized

the need for positive movement on Abkhazia before December

10, when the mandate for the Troika negotiators runs out.

Karasin repeated that Kosovo could become a precedent for

Abkhazia, but also repeated that Russia will behave

responsibly there.



6. (C) Fried told DFM Karasin that NATO membership for

Georgia is a long-term process and there will be no offer of

membership at the 2008 Bucharest Summit. On the agenda is

the possibility of offering Georgia a Membership Action Plan.

He stressed that since Russia's stated objective is to avoid

military adventurism, the GOR should stop provoking Georgia

through overflights and military patrols. Fried also

informed Karasin that he plans to visit the South Caucasus

the end of October.



7. (C) Fried said that Russia and the U.S. should support

the agreed confidence building measures developed by the

"Friends" of Georgia group. Karasin agreed that these CBMs

were a good basis for common efforts and could be a focus of

the November meeting.



Transnistria

--------------



8. (C) DFM Karasin reiterated the GOR position: Chisinau and

Tiraspol must make a joint decision on the way ahead. Once

Voronin and Smirnov have come to an agreement, the

international community could get involved. He added that

the GOR was willing to consider internationalization of the

peacekeeping force only after a political settlement is

reached. Karasin warned that to pressure Russia to fulfill

the Istanbul Commitments is counter-productive. Fried

stressed that the U.S. would not apply a rigid interpretation

of the Istanbul Commitments; Russian forces could continue to

stay in a re-configured role. Fried noted that Russia's

decision to "suspend" the CFE Treaty provided new impetus to

solve Transnistrian. An agreement on the

internationalization of the PFK would unlock the impasse on

ratification of the CFE. Karasin replied that something

positive could be expected by the end of the year, without

specifying the details. Fried and Karasin discussed the

possibility of a conference on Transnistria in Garmisch.



Duma

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9. (C) Fried made the same points with Duma CIS Committee

Chairman Andrey Kokoshin, who argued that both Ossetians and



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Abkhazians have become more reasonable. Abkhazian de facto

president Bagapsh now regularly uses the term, "Georgia's

territorial integrity" vis-a-vis Abkhazia and no longer sees

secession as an end goal. But Kokoshin warned that a

unilateral declaration of Kosovo's independence would likely

lead to Russia's recognition of Abkhazia because of Russian

domestic pressure. Kokoshin recommended prolonging Kosovo

negotiations until after the Russian presidential election.

He said that compromise in South Ossetia and in Abkhazia

would be easier if possible NATO membership for Georgia were

taken off the agenda. On Ukrainian political dynamics,

Kokoshin thought the return of Yuliya Timoshenko to the

political foreground created more problems than solutions.

He added that the continuing political turmoil there should

have taught Americans that both factions --orange and blue--

"are crooks."

Burns