DUMA DEPUTY RYZHKOV ON HIS FUTURE WITHOUT A PARTY,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 004968 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/11/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM PHUM PINR SOCI RS SUBJECT: DUMA DEPUTY RYZHKOV ON HIS FUTURE WITHOUT A PARTY, KOSOVO, NATO EXPANSION, PUTIN Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reason: 1.4 (d). Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Outgoing Duma Deputy Vladimir Ryzhkov told the Ambassador October 7 that he, unusually for him, backed the GOR's resistance to independence for Kosovo and further NATO expansion, which he termed "real" foreign policy problems. The dispute over anti-missile defenses was for Ryzhkov a "virtual" problem, that could be resolved by finding a face-saving offer acceptable to Putin. Ryzhkov saw in Putin's recent declared interest in becoming Prime Minister the continuation of a process that could bring greater instability to Russia. He worried that the President's surprise decision to head the pro-Kremlin United Russia party list could be a step toward producing a new Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Ryzhkov, whose Republican Party had not been registered, and who had not found a place on any of the contending parties' lists outlined no firm plans for his life after his Duma term ends with the December 2 elections. End summary. Kosovo: Status Quo Preferable -------------- ¶2. (C) A vivacious Vladimir Ryzhkov amplified for the Ambassador on October 7 comments that he had made recently in the media on Kosovo. Ryzhkov, unusually, agreed with Putin and the Russian government that the time was not right for Kosovo's independence. An independent Kosovo posed threats for Europe --narcotics and weapons-- that would only increase with independence and could best be managed if the enclave remained part of Serbia. The only compromise Ryzhkov could envision was a division of Kosovo into its Serb and ethnic Albania parts. That outcome, or the status quo, were preferable in his view to independence for Kosovo. NATO: Further Expansion Dangerous -------------- ¶3. (C) Ryzhkov also joined the GOR in arguing for a moratorium on further NATO expansion. He believed that for Ukraine, NATO membership was an "abstract question" that likely could be managed. Georgia, on the other hand, was pressuring NATO for early admission. Folding it into the alliance would never be acceptable to the GOR, Ryzhkov thought, or to Russian opinion makers who, present difficulties notwithstanding, thought of Georgia as well within Russia's sphere of influence. Ryzhkov added that the possibility of Putin, "who has a long memory," remaining at or near the top of the Russian government for the next sixteen years, also argued against the decision, which could have an irreversible effect on Russia's relationship with the West. Anti-Missile Defense: A "Virtual" Problem -------------- ¶4. (C) The dispute over an anti-missile defense, unlike Kosovo and NATO was, for Ryzhkov, a "virtual" problem. He noted that he had just returned from a conference in Stockholm attended by Russian experts of all stripes, and all agreed that the current stand-off would be resolved, once a face-saving gesture to Putin had been made. Putin's Decisions: Further Centralization of Power -------------- ¶5. (C) Ryzhkov was very worried about Russia in the wake of Putin's surprise announcement that he would head the pro-Kremlin United Russia's party list and, possibly, exchange the presidency for the premiership. The Russian government as currently structured offers no effective counterbalance to Putin. Ryzhkov had told a journalist for the Chinese newspaper "Youth of China" recently that the PRC's politburo acted as a counterweight to its leader, while in Russia all decisions are made by one person with few checks and balances. The West, Ryzhkov thought, should have "no illusions about the possible development of Russian democracy" as it prepares to deal with Putin's continued grasp on power. ¶6. (C) Recent decisions, according to Ryzhkov had continued the process of creating a "new Communist Party of the Soviet Union" in Russia. The GOR's ministries, governors, and many of its mayors were integrated into a power vertical, and the Putin regime was beginning to resemble that of Mubarak's in Egypt. Should Putin remain in power, either as President, Premier, or in some other capacity following the expiration MOSCOW 00004968 002 OF 003 of his term, the world, Ryzhkov said, would see for the first time, one-man state with a permanent place in the UN Security Council, and the international community would have to cope with a serious rival that was less predictable than China. ¶7. (C) Ryzhkov guessed that Putin was banking that United Russia would control 65 - 70 percent of the seats in the Duma with the December 2 Duma elections. He thought that Putin would use the majority to claim a popular mandate to remain active in politics, and become either Prime Minister or in control of United Russia's expected constitutional majority as Chairman of the Duma. Duma Elections: No More Than Three Parties Will Win Seven Percent -------------- ¶8. (C) Putin's decision to top the United Russia party list made it difficult to imagine more than three parties in the Duma after the December elections, Ryzhkov thought. He observed that Kremlin-linked commentators Vyacheslav Nikonov and Gleb Pavlovskiy have begun describing the elections as a plebiscite on Putin. United Russia would win 60 - 70 percent of the votes, followed by the Communist Party and, perhaps, a third party. Later in his conversation with the Ambassador, Ryzhkov worried that Putin's link with United Russia could cause regional elites to throw too many administrative resources to United Russia, which could produce a 90 percent plurality and a one-party system. ¶9. (C) Ryzhkov brushed aside Garri Kasparov's Other Russia. "It's fallen apart," he said, and traced the problems to personal rivalries between Kasparov and ex-Prime Minister Kasyanov. Each now was running for President, and neither had a chance, even if the system were fair. Kasyanov is corrupt and linked with the Yeltsin years, while Kasparov is "not a Russian," and not a politician. ¶10. (C) Ryzhkov held out similar slim hopes for the Union of Right Forces (SPS) and Yabloko parties. "Neither have a chance to be in the Duma," he said flatly. His Republican Party of Russia, which has been denied registration and lost its appeal to the Russian Supreme Court, will have its case heard by the European Court of Human Rights in January or February 2008. Ryzhkov expected the ECHR to back his party and fine the GOR. Zubkov, Medvedev, Ivanov in Trouble with Putin? -------------- 11 (C) Ryzhkov, who can be an acute, but not privileged, observer of Putin and the Kremlin, thought that Prime Minister Zubkov had wanted to removed Finance Minister Kudrin from power in the most recent government re-shuffle. Putin had retaliated by making Kudrin one of the GOR's five deputy prime ministers. Ryzhkov thought that Putin had similarly reined in First Deputy Prime Minister Medvedev for his Davos speech and First Deputy Prime Minister Ivanov for speaking too frequently about foreign policy matters. Ryzhkov's Future -------------- ¶12. (C) Asked by the Ambassador about his plans when his Duma tenure ends with the December elections, Ryzhkov became unusually tentative. He thought he might enter the private sector, but offered no concrete ideas. His body language confirmed the comments of others who have described Ryzhkov, who has been in the Duma since age 26, as adrift without a future in politics. His last shot at national office failed when SPS godfather Anatoliy Chubais was unable to win Kremlin approval to include Ryzhkov in its list. (In a separate meeting, septel, SPS Chairman Belykh told Ambassador that his party had decided against Ryzhkov because his name did nothing to broaden the appeal of the party and because Ryzhkov had insisted that other Republican party members be included on the SPS lists.) Comment -------------- ¶13. (C) Should Ryzhkov not manage to find an outlet for his considerable energy and political acumen after his Duma term ends in December, Russia will have lost precisely the kind of person necessary for a truly broad-based and productive national conversation about what path the country should take as it adjusts to its new wealth and status on the international stage. Many observers predicted that the Duma would become even less interesting with the elimination of MOSCOW 00004968 003 OF 003 the provision for electing individual-mandate deputies. Ryzhkov's departure --he was elected on an individual mandate from Altai region-- will be a case in point. Burns