SPS CHAIRMAN STAYS OPTIMISTIC ON ELECTIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 004967

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2017
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PINR PREL RS
SUBJECT: SPS CHAIRMAN STAYS OPTIMISTIC ON ELECTIONS

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reason: 1.4 (d).

Summary
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1. (C) In an October 10 conversation with the Ambassador,
Union of Right Forces (SPS) Chairman Nikita Belykh reacted
complacently to the effect President Putin's decision to head
the pro-Kremlin United Russia list might have on his party's
chances to cross the seven-percent threshold into the Duma.
"Our voters are lazy," he said, and Putin's entry into the
race might cause them to work harder. The "second"
pro-Kremlin party, Just Russia, had the most to lose, Belykh
thought. He forecast that regional elites would abandon SR
for United Russia, and with them would go the all-important
administrative resources. SPS would campaign on corruption,
for elected governors and more independent regions. Yabloko
was unlikely to do well in the elections. On the day he met
the Ambassador, Belykh was flying to Krasnoyarsk, then on to
Chita, in search of votes. End summary.

Foreign Policy and the Election:
Not Likely to Matter
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2. (C) Union of Right Forces (SPS) Chairman Nikita Belykh
told Ambassador October 10 that only events in the Baltics,
Georgia, or Ukraine could become significant foreign policy
campaign issues. Belykh acknowledged that Kremlin-fostered
public opposition to USG plans to deploy the elements of an
anti-missile system in Poland and the Czech Republic had
forced President Putin's hand: Putin had to look tough, but
would have to compromise with the inevitable. Still, Belykh
thought that the outcome would have little influence on the
campaign.

Putin's Entry Into Race
Makes Things More Interesting
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3. (C) Belykh took in stride Putin's announcement that he
would head the pro-Kremlin United Russia's party list. "It
makes the campaign more interesting," he offered, and would
stimulate SPS's "lazy" voters to go to the polls. Putin's
participation would have greater consequences for the second
pro-Kremlin Just Russia party and for Vladimir Zhirinovskiy's
LDPR. Administrative resources in the regions, and regional
elites, would leave Just Russia for United Russia, while the
increase in the number of votes United Russia is expected to
win with Putin at its helm would make it difficult for four
party's to enter the Duma. Things had gotten better, or at
least not worse, for SPS with Putin's announcement, Belykh
optimistically concluded.


4. (C) Possibly working in Just Russia's favor, Belykh
thought, was party chairman Mironov's close relationship with
Putin. That could mean that the Kremlin would "somehow" find
a way to have Just Russia represented in the Duma. It is
just as possible, Belykh thought, that Just Russia would fail
to cross the seven-percent threshold, and cease to exist with
this election.

SPS Campaign Strategy
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5. (C) In devising its campaign strategy, SPS assumed it
would have little media access, and had, Belykh said, focused
on door-to-door work instead. In his trips around the
country, Belykh was meeting with campaign staff, not voters,
in a bid to stimulate their efforts. He had just been in
Smolensk, and was leaving after his meeting with the
Ambassador for Krasnoyarsk and Chita.


6. (C) Belykh thought that United Russia would campaign on
its "Putin Plan," although "no one, including United Russia,
knows what that means." SPS would concentrate on corruption;
regional rights, including a return to elected governors;
social politics (especially pensions); military reform; and
the excessive privileges of Russia's burgeoning bureaucracy.
Belykh thought the government was especially vulnerable on
military reform, where an increase in the amount of money
spent on defense had not produced better conditions for the
nation's soldiers. It was vulnerable, as well, on
corruption. The government's monopoly on power made it more
difficult to fight corruption and the problem was getting
worse, Belykh thought. In his conversations with voters, it
was apparent that the recent, high-profile arrests had
impressed no one. There had been arrests of individuals, but
no sweeping arrests in offices where corruption was known to
be endemic. No governors had been arrested, and arrests were
unlikely during the campaign, as governors were needed to
deliver the votes.

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7. (C) Belykh offered a practiced answer to the Ambassador's
question about the fate of Duma Deputy Vladimir Ryzhkov, who
had lobbied SPS for inclusion in its list. There had been
negotiations, Belykh said, but focus groups showed that in
the end Ryzhkov did little to expand the list of potential
voters beyond those who would vote for Belykh and Nemtsov.
Marietta Chudakova (number two in SPS's federal troika)
extended the party's reach. She had gender appeal and a
background in the humanities. In addition, Ryzhkov had
lobbied for the inclusion of confederates from his now
defunct Republican Party of Russia. That proposal was not
acceptable to SPS activists, who wanted to preserve party
list slots for SPS loyalists.

Zubkov as Successor?
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8. (C) Belykh termed recently-appointed Prime Minister Zubkov
as the most likely successor in a scenario in which Putin was
likely to remain in power. Zubkov is "aged," and he has no
great political ambition, Belykh thought.

Comment
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9. (C) Belykh offered thoughtful, in some cases practiced,
answers to questions posed by the Ambassador. He seemed to
have carved out a strategy for his party that makes a virtue
of SPS's comparatively limited access to the media and
inability to call on administrative resources. That the
advent of Putin at the head of United Russia's list left
Belykh unfazed is perhaps not surprising for someone so
experienced in the rough and tumble of Russian politics.
Still, it seems likely that a Putin-led United Russia can
only reduce further SPS's already slim chances of crossing
the seven-percent threshold to the Duma on December 2.
Burns