KPRF ZYUGANOV UP ON PARTY, DOWN ON GOVERNMENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 004966 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2017 TAGS: PGOV PINR RS SUBJECT: KPRF ZYUGANOV UP ON PARTY, DOWN ON GOVERNMENT Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reasons: 1.4 (d). Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) In discussions with the Ambassador on October 9, Gennadiy Zyuganov -- the head of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF) -- demonstrated the resilience, determination, and political wiles that have kept him on the national stage far longer than any might have imagined. At the same time, his ideologically-tinged rhetoric, nostalgia for a system long gone, and insular world view provided continued evidence as to why he has never been able to go much beyond the narrow constituency that forms the backbone of the KPRF. He appeared confident that the KPRF would continue to play a role in national politics, and spoke frankly and often humorously about the challenges and benefits engendered by Putin's decision to stand on United Russia list for the Duma elections in December. Zyuganov aired sometimes insightful criticisms of the Putin administration and its policy failures, but offered only his usual helping of socialist solutions to address those problems. End summary. Putin, Putin, Putin -------------- ¶2. (C) Putin's association with United Russia had fundamentally changed the election dynamic, according to Zyuganov, and posed a challenge for the KPRF in December. He posited that the move made the President the virtual "Secretary General" of a party of power, with a political infrastructure extending to the regions, where the governors stood ready to implement the Kremlin's commands. Zyuganov estimated support for United Russia at about 25-35% and Putin's popularity at 50% -- a formidable challenge in a fair fight for the KPRF and other political parties. And in Zyuganov's eyes, the fight will not be fair. He predicted that governors would be under the threat of losing their jobs if they failed to ensure a strong United Russia victory and thus would use administrative resources to achieve a further 10-15% vote for the President's party. ¶3. (C) Zyuganov lamented the financial support and media coverage that United Russia enjoyed, blustering that if he had the same resources, the KPRF would win both the Duma and the Presidency. He claimed that more than 90% of press coverage favored United Russia (according to data collected by a KPRF-linked media monitoring group),leading to problems �A;for the party's ability to get across its message. Moreover, with Putin now aligned with United Russia, the overwhelming tide of press coverage focused on the President would benefit the party of power, as well. Zyuganov said that he was going to raise the issue of media bias in discussions in the Duma, with Putin, and with heads of the networks. He had few expectations that things would change. ¶4. (C) The silver lining for Zyuganov is that he saw Putin's decision as having a far greater impact on his party's main competitors for the left vote -- Just Russia (SR) and the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR). He has long condemned SR as an empty shell without ideology or real organization, and he has nothing but invective for his nemesis Sergey Mironov, who heads the party. Now that SR is experiencing some real trouble, he likely sees his critique as being vindicated. Ultimately, he expects SR and LDPR to surmount the 7 percent threshold needed to enter the Duma, but only with the Kremlin's help. Having the two parties in the legislature would allow the Kremlin to gain a constitutional majority, according to Zyuganov. Plus, the Kremlin benefits from "alternative voices" to raise controversial issues and concerns, including those expressed by the LDPR "clown" Vladimir Zhirinovskiy. ¶5. (C) Speaking about the younger electorate, Zyuganov posited Russian youth, despite their inactivity in politics, are "fed up" with the system and infused with a leftist orientation. He reiterated KPRF claims that the party is gaining support among the younger generation and cited as evidence the strong showing by the KPRF in regional elections last spring, particularly in "education" towns like Novosibirsk as well as in Omsk and Krasnoyarsk. (Comment: Polling data and analysis by other political observers suggest that the KPRF's gains in attracting younger voters are regional, not national.) Zyuganov also stated that his party would monitor the elections process in December by creating 5-person teams of observers, vote counters, and journalists. The KPRF has implemented similar oversight operations in the past. Zyuganov cited an earlier effort in Orel oblast, in which the communists' count was made more quickly than the official tally and was on the mark. "Plan Zyuganov" MOSCOW 00004966 002 OF 002 -------------- ¶6. (C) Zyuganov appeared confident that his party's message -- a "red-left" agenda -- was in tune with the mood of the population. He argued that compared with other European countries, the share of government controlled companies in Russia's economy was too small. From 35 - 40 percent of industries in "advanced" European countries were controlled by the state, while in Russia only 10 percent belonged to the government. Zyuganov was particularly piqued about the sale of the state military-industrial complex -- a likely reference to the possible IPO for arms giant Rosoboroneksport -- and its transfer to people "who know nothing" about the industry (a likely reference to Putin pal and Rosoboroneksport head Sergey Chemezov) ¶7. (C) The Putin administration's energy policy also drew criticism, as Zyuganov claimed that the share of oil sale revenues that the Russian government takes -- which he said was only 34 percent -- compares unfavorably with other oil producers such as the US and the United Arab Emirates, which he claimed had tax rates of 60 percent and 90 percent, respectively. (Comment: This assessment contradicts the opinion of energy sector experts, who see Russia's tax burden as excessive and a disincentive for investment.) The result, according to Zyuganov, is insufficient funding for social programs. He estimated that only 3 percent of expenditures are on social programs compared to 19 percent under the Soviet system and 22% in the U.S. Further, he claimed that 60 percent of government expenditures were spent in "the center," with the regions competing for the rest. Voicing the concerns of his primary constituency -- the AARP generation -- he despaired of the low pension payments of five thousand rubles per month, three-fifths of which was needed for rent. Zubkov: One of the Clan, But Not of the Family -------------- - ¶8. (C) Zyuganov is one of the few prominent politicians for whom the moniker "Soviet-style administrator" is a compliment, and he employed it in discussing newly appointed Premier Viktor Zubkov. He noted that Zubkov had been a capable leader during Soviet times, turning a "broken-down" state farm into a model for others to emulate. Zyuganov had little optimism that Zubkov and the government would be able to do much besides managing day-to-day crises, especially when the Kremlin and the Duma were focused on elections. ¶9. (C) In contrast to his warm words for Zubkov, Zyuganov was dismissive of the rest of the government and complained that Putin merely reshuffled the same deck when selecting cadres. He criticized Dmitriy Kozak's work on administrative reform when in the Presidential Administration. (Zyuganov said the reform was so complex and poorly presented that it did not delineate who was responsible to whom.) He was also critical of Kozak's performance as Polpred for the Southern Okrug, indirectly blaming him for the continuing instability in the North Caucasus. He further blamed Kozak and the Putin administration in general for an insensitivity to "nationalities" (inter-ethnic) issues and called for the revival of a ministry to deal with those topics. Comment -------------- ¶10. (C) Zyuganov looked like a man ready for a fight, even one that he considers to be stacked against him and his party. He remains engaging in his own way, and he uses humor to deliver some of his hardest blows -- perhaps a skilled learned as captain of his college comedy team long ago. Despite his populist style, he is pragmatic enough to recognize that he too plays a role for the Kremlin that is useful to Putin and his circle. Burns