RUSSIAN DFM KISLYAK: IRAN, MD, CFE, ARMS

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 MOSCOW 004897

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/04/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PARM EAID MASS ETTC RU SY IR IZ
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN DFM KISLYAK: IRAN, MD, CFE, ARMS
TRANSFERS, ELECTION ASSISTANCE

REF: STATE 137954

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns: 1.4 (b, d).


1. (C) Summary: In an October 4 meeting with the
Ambassador, DFM Kislyak staked out familiar positions on
missile defense, arguing that U.S. insistence on radar and
interceptor facilities in the Czech Republic and Poland meant
the 2 2 delegations would "talk past each other" and accusing
the U.S. of using negotiations to "soothe" Europe. He
rejected alleged U.S. "threats" to retaliate against a
potential Russian moratorium on CFE and expected Duma
approval in November for Putin's strategy of "freezing" the
treaty. While Putin would insist that Iran halt its
enrichment program during his October 16 Tehran visit,
Kislyak did not rule out progress on the Bushehr payments
issue. Kislyak re-affirmed that if Iran paid cash and
adhered to full scope safeguards, Bushehr could move forward
and ruled out the need for additional nonproliferation
measures at the facility. Referring to talks with acting U/S
Rood, Kislyak reiterated there was no cooperation with Iran
by Russian entities and emphasized that Russia "cut it off."
In response to grave U.S. concerns over Russian arms
transfers, including RPG-29's to Syria, Kislyak questioned
their origin, said Russia would investigate, and requested
additional information. Flagging a media attack on U.S.
electoral assistance, the Ambassador stressed the Embassy's
readiness to brief any concerned Russian agency on the scope
of our programs. End Summary

Missile Defense: Approaching 2 2
--------------


2. (C) In an October 4 meeting with Deputy Foreign Minister
Kislyak, the Ambassador encouraged Russia to use the upcoming
2 2 visit of Secretary Rice and Secretary Gates to frame what
could be accomplished in the remaining period of Putin's
tenure as President, and to push forward initiatives in the
areas of civilian nuclear energy, the stewardship of our
nuclear arsenals, and missile defense cooperation. The U.S.
delegation would approach the discussions in the spirit set
by the Presidents at Kennebunkport and continued to see
Putin's offer of missile defense cooperation in strategic
terms. The Ambassador expressed concern, however, that
despite successive discussions on missile defense and a
positive exchange of information at the Qabala radar
facility, the extent of possible Russian cooperation still
remained unclear. While the U.S. had heard Russian
dissatisfaction over the placement of radar and interceptors
in the Czech Republic and Poland, what was missing was
Russia's strategic vision of the potential for U.S. and
Russian cooperation.


3. (C) Kislyak responded in familiar terms. Putin's
initiative was premised on a halt to the development of the
"third site" in Europe, since Russia would not actively
cooperate in sabotaging its own national interests. The more
the Russians engaged, Kislyak complained, the more frequently
GOR officials heard that the Czech and Polish sites were
nonnegotiable. Even as the visit was underway in Qabala,
Kislyak stressed, LTG Obering dismissed the site publicly as
unsuitable for American needs. The Russian General Staff was
responding to frequent American statements that Russia could
only be an addition to -- and not a substitute for --
existing U.S. plans. The Ambassador responded that the
General Staff had contributed more than their share of
unhelpful statements on U.S. intentions and the security of
European allies. Kislyak insisted that Russian military
angst stemmed from an analytical assessment that the European
sites filled a gap in global U.S. coverage that would
ultimately, even unexpectedly, be directed against Russia.
While the GOR understood the rationale behind the American
arguments on the technological gaps bridged by X-band radar,
it also judged that the radar facilitated the tracking of
Russian missiles. Russia would not provide the U.S. with
"stereo coverage" of its territory.


4. (C) To date, Kislyak concluded, the American and Russian
delegations had talked past one another. There was no
"rapprochement" in positions; the U.S. used negotiations to
pacify the GOR and to soothe the Czechs and Poles. Russia
had warned both countries that they enjoyed the sovereign
right to choose to cooperate with the United States on
missile defense, while the GOR retained the sovereign right
to respond. "There should be no surprises." Russia did not
want a discussion that led nowhere or that served as a cover
for expansive American designs. "Either we wQhonestly, or
not at all." Kislyak reiterated that the Iranian threat
remained years in the offing and that there was time to
explore the Russian offer seriously. Touting Qabala, Kislyak
stressed that while the technology was dated, the facility

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was reliable and powerful. Kislyak repeated the analysis of
Russian experts that there was no realistic way for the
Iranians to utilize North Korean technology: it was too
difficult, even too difficult for the Russians to do
accurately, which is why the GOR had shifted designs, and
Tehran simply did not have the industrial base or resources
to make this effort.

CFE: Bridling at American "Threats"
--------------


5. (C) Based on a readout from MFA Disarmament Director
Antonov, Kislyak said he was "very disappointed" by the
Berlin CFE seminar and what he termed American "threats" to
retaliate through NATO against a potential Russian
moratorium. Noting that he would ratify the A/CFE
immediately, if we were a NATO country, and then take up the
issue of flank limits, Kislyak said the "lingering problems"
were getting more difficult every day. NATO had decided to
let Georgia and Moldova use the treaty as leverage against
Russia, which was a mistake. Russia, he repeated, would
"freeze" the treaty. Kislyak warned the Ambassador that
anyone who doubted Russia's resolve would soon be mistaken.
Russia was not posturing, and not seeking to blackmail
Europe. Rather than serve as a forum for rational
discussion, Berlin had produced a series of ultimatums.
While the GOR was told to take the American paper "or else,"
the Russians had tabled their own proposal and had every
right to expect it to be the basis for discussion. Kislyak
highlighted the lack of clarity and absence of firm
guarantees in the parallel plan and said that Russia did not
trust the U.S. to deliver, given a record of disappointment,
including on Jackson-Vanik. The Ambassador told Kislyak not
to conflate CFE with other negotiations, especially WTO, on
which the U.S. was bending over backwards to help Russia.
(Kislyak conceded that point, grudgingly.) The Ambassador
added that the U.S. did not doubt the seriousness of Russia's
position on CFE, and defended the parallel action plan as
detailed and credible, addressing both sides' concerns.


6. (C) Unmoved, Kislyak sketched out a timeline whereby
Putin's decision to "freeze" the treaty would be ratified by
the Duma. Following his initial testimony to the Duma on
September 19, Kislyak said he would testify again in a few
weeks, and by early November expected a vote in parliament
approving Putin's course of action.

Iran: Bushehr and Putin's Caspian Sea Visit
--------------


7. (C) The Ambassador stressed the importance of
maintaining a two-track approach to Iran and the concern
generated by Putin's October 16 visit to Tehran for the
Caspian Sea Summit. Kislyak replied that the U.S. could
"rest assured" that Putin will call strongly for a freeze to
the Iranian enrichment program, and pointed to the good
exchange between Putin and the President on this topic at the
APEC Summit. When pressed by the Ambassador on whether there
were any "imminent" developments on Bushehr to be expected,
Kislyak allowed that the reactor had its "own dimension" of
discussion. The Russian decision to complete Bushehr had
been made previously, it was a technical and economic
question as to when that would occur. The Russian position
was "cash on the barrel head," and Kislyak pointed to a
series of Iranian mis-steps that had produced construction
delays and the drawdown of Russian workers. However, Russia
and Iran were "almost in agreement" on resolving these
bottlenecks and Kislyak did not rule out that progress on the
payment dispute could be announced by October 16, although
actual completion of the project would still be some time off.


8. (C) Kislyak underscored that Putin would not focus on
Bushehr, but that the Russians had consistently said that if
the Iranians paid their bills and adhered to full scope IAEA
safeguards, with the return of the fuel to Russia for
reprocessing, the project would move forward. The Ambassador
underscored that the timing of the Bushehr announcement would
be interpreted as a diplomatic win by the Ahmadinejad regime,
and pushed the GOR to focus on additional measures (reftel)
that could be taken to reaffirm our nonproliferation goals,
such as remote monitoring and the negotiation of additional
IC-66 safeguards. Kislyak replied that Russia would, as per
standard practice, rely upon the IAEA to determine the
appropriate mix of measures to monitor the Bushehr facility.
Kislyak dismissed a separate IC-66 as inapplicable, given
Iran's membership in the NPT and adherence to full scope
safeguards. If Iran were to pull out of the NPT, Kislyak
argued that Iran would still need to maintain safeguards at
Bushehr; if the regime did not, it would run out of fuel
within a year and was technologically unable to produce
replacement fuel rods. Kislyak concluded that it was

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unlikely that Western firms would step up and supply
replacements.


9. (S) The Ambassador underscored the importance of the
Russian track record in halting all cooperation with Iran on
nuclear processing, particularly in light of the
congressional linkages drawn to passage of the 123 agreement.
The Ambassador reaffirmed the Administration's opposition to
HR 1400, especially in the absence of waiver authority, and
its commitment to moving ahead in concluding a 123 with
Russia, but sought additional assurances from Russia that its
record of halting all assistance was clean. Kislyak referred
to his last meeting with acting U/S Rood and noted that the
MFA had spoken to Rosatom Director Kiriyenko, who "knew
nothing" about any allegations, with a similar response from
the appropriate law enforcement agencies. Russia was serious
about its commitment, Kislyak stressed, and urged that more
information be provided if there were any lingering
questions. Russia, he repeated, had earlier "cut it off."
The Ambassador pushed again on the possibility of any more
recent contacts and Russian assurances that they did not
constitute assistance. Kislyak responded that Russia would
"triple check," with the Ambassador adding that further
assurances prior to the 2 2 meetings on October 12-13 would
be welcome.


10. (C) Kislyak clarified that he would be available for
the next P5 1 Directors meeting on October 16 or 17, but
would have to leave the afternoon of October 18 for
bilaterals the next day.

Arms Transfers
--------------


11. (S) Noting the grave and growing concern in Washington
over Russia's arms transfer policies, the Ambassador
delivered (reftel) demarche and non-paper, outlining Russian
arms sales to Iran and Syria, and the mounting evidence of
the retransfers of those weapons to non-state actors such as
Hizballah and insurgents in Iraq, despite Russian end-user
controls. Noting FM Lavrov's explicit encouragement on
September 24 that we should elaborate our concerns, the
Ambassador drew Kislyak's attention to the appearance of
RPG-29's in Iraq, following their transfer to Syria in
1999-2000, and their use in at least three attacks on U.S.
armored vehicles. The Ambassador stressed that this
represented an unacceptable threat to U.S. and coalition
forces and called for the GOR to investigate immediately the
circumstances that appeared to have led to the Syrian
retransfer of weapons.


12. (S) Kislyak questioned how the U.S. had determined the
weapons were of Russian origin, given that RPGs were common
throughout the former Soviet Union, and asked whether the
U.S. had any identifying numbers that could be matched to the
RPG's production. Kislyak said that any additional
information that could be provided, including who was using
the weapons against American forces, would be helpful. While
he wasn't familiar with the history of the 1999-2000
transfer, Kislyak took on board the Ambassador's insistence
that the Russians double-check their end use controls with
Syria. Kislyak commented that the inclusion of arms
transfers on the 2 2 agenda was a mistake, since the issue
could best be handled by experts, but the Ambassador noted
that expert level discussions had proved inconclusive and
American forces were now under attack by Russian weapons.

U.S. Electoral Assistance
--------------


13. (C) The Ambassador flagged a recent television program
on RTR that attacked the U.S. Embassy and alleged American
"secret" interference in the electoral process through the
funding of GOLOS, an NGO engaged in election monitoring
activities. Kislyak interjected "you mean you are not?" The
Ambassador replied that he had previously conveyed personally
to FM Lavrov, as well as to Central Election Commissioner
Churov, Kremlin Deputy Chief of Staff Surkov and Federal
Security Services Director Patrushev, a standing offer for a
detailed briefing on all U.S. funded activities in Russia.
The U.S. was scrupulous about adhering to Russian law and the
Ambassador reiterated that if Kislyak had any concerns, he
should raise them directly.

Comment
--------------


14. (C) Kislyak appreciated the gravity of our concerns
over the arms transfers and clearly recognized the new
sensibilities involved with the attacks on U.S. personnel in
Iraq. We appreciate any additional information that can be

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shared with the GOR on the cited incidents, in order to push
the Russians to undertake a serious investigation.
Burns