RUSSIA ON DEVELOPMENTS IN GEORGIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 004852 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/01/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV GG RS SUBJECT: RUSSIA ON DEVELOPMENTS IN GEORGIA REF: TBILISI 2438 Classified By: Political M/C Alice G. Wells. Reasons 1.4 (B/D) ¶1. (C) Summary. On October 2, the GOR requested U.S. assistance in the release of the two South Ossetian PKF personnel in Georgian custody (non-paper emailed to EUR) and in blocking the OSCE's planned October 17 session to re-examine the August 6 South-Ossetia missile incident. GOR officials emphasized that a goodwill gesture on the PKF release will much contribute to improving the atmosphere of GOG-GOR relations, while condemning the OSCE session as counter-productive. GOR officials termed Georgian President Saakashvili's UNGA speech, "abusive and unhelpful." In the prevailing bad atmosphere, high-level talks are unlikely in the near future although the two presidents will be at the October 5 Dushanbe CIS Summit. The Duma issued a statement on October 2 accusing the Georgian government of large-scale violations of human rights, while criticizing Washington for what it called "blind support" for Tbilisi's treatment of the opposition. The Joint Control Commission (JCC) for the South Ossetian conflict is scheduled for the second half of October in Tbilisi. End summary. August 6, When All Changed for the Worse -------------- ¶2. (C) MFA Director of the Fourth CIS Department Andrey Kelin told us October 2 that Russia-Georgia relations had returned to the record lows of Fall 2006. The negative turn, following the better-than-expected July 2007 session in Sochi between Saakashvili and Putin, came out of "nowhere" on August 6, the date of the missile incident. Insisting on GOR innocence, Kelin said that the dramatic change was "inexplicable" and "had nothing to do with Russia's deeds." The August 6 incident was followed by the August 28 seizure of two PKF personnel and subsequent sporadic shootings in South Ossetia and the September 20 killing of two Russian "anti-terror trainers." (reftel) According to Kelin, the September 27 New York meeting between the two foreign ministers produced "nothing." Requesting U.S. Assistance -------------- ¶3. (C) Kelin requested U.S. assistance in the release of the two South Ossetian PKF in Georgian custody, arguing that they are Russian passport holders and conveyed a non-paper outlining Russia's position on the legal status of the individuals. Russia's Special Negotiator for South Ossetia, Ambassador Yuriy Popov, told us October 2 that the U.S. needs to make a "political decision" to orchestrate the release, in order to create an environment of goodwill. ¶4. (C) Kelin said that the planned OSCE session to "revisit" the August 6 missile incident in South Ossetia -- at the U.S. and Georgian Missions' request -- would be counter-productive and urged us to rescind our request. Kelin said that the GOR would send an expert team if the session takes place and promised that the Russian experts would be prepared to raise a host of unanswered questions and counter-charges. We stressed that U.S. had drawn its own conclusions on the August 6 incident and supported the results of the independent investigations. While it was important to look ahead and to encourage steps to reduce tensions, the Russian had circulated their own investigation results to OSCE Participating States and the OSCE remained an appropriate forum for this issue. Kelin emphasized that a similar session on the margins of UNGA, suggested earlier by the Georgians, would be even more detrimental. Duma Speaks Up -------------- ¶5. (C) In a statement entitled, "On the Anti-Democratic Policy of the Georgian Government and on the Violation of Human Rights in Georgia," unanimously adopted on October 2, Russian parliamentarians expressed "serious anxiety over the latest political developments in Georgia," which demonstrated the country's "problems of freedom of speech, human rights and democratic standards." The Duma also criticized the Department's "blind support" for Georgia. Kelin expressed amusement over U.S. statements that supported the legal process against Okruashvili, arguing that his arrest was motivated by political retribution. The GOR does not believe that Saakashvili faces a serious challenge from the opposition, although the Georgian President's image has been blackened. Kelin underscored that the GOR held strong convictions on Saakashvili's own involvement in corruption and viewed unwavering U.S. support of Saakashvili in critical terms. Kelin dismissed the evidence of Georgia's economic and democratic development as inflated or manufactured, MOSCOW 00004852 002 OF 002 saying, "We know Georgia better than you." Saakashvili Unhelpful But So Is Everyone Else -------------- ¶6. (C) Both Kelin and Popov expressed dissatisfaction with Saakashvili's UNGA speech and his September 29 statement at the opening ceremony for an Upper Kodori Gorge road. Popov said that Saakashvili believes that abusing Moscow works well for his domestic audience and U.S. friends. Admitting that the GOR's "clients" are equally guilty, Kelin and Popov described Russian efforts to direct "presidents" Bagapsh and Kokoitiy to more balanced and less emotional statements. Popov worried that there was no political will to reach a settlement on either side of the conflicts, while Moscow efforts are looked upon with deep suspicion by the Georgians. JCC In October -------------- ¶7. (C) Reiterating FM Lavrov's announcement in New York, Popov told us that his South Ossetian counterpart, Boris Chuchev, consented to an October JCC meeting in Tbilisi; most likely around October 20, although Kelin flagged continuing South Ossetian security concerns over meeting in Tbilisi. Popov reaffirmed GOR support for Georgia's territorial integrity, but stressed that the "evolutionary and not revolutionary" process will take 3-4 years. Comment -------------- ¶8. (C) We would appreciate the Department's guidance on the PKF detainment. Burns