Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07MOSCOW484
2007-02-05 14:36:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Moscow
Cable title:  

ZATOKA CASE: THE POWER OF NGO PRESSURE

Tags:  PREL PGOV PHUM SENV TX RS 
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VZCZCXRO8069
OO RUEHDBU
DE RUEHMO #0484/01 0361436
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 051436Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7183
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 000484 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/RUS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/05/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM SENV TX RS
SUBJECT: ZATOKA CASE: THE POWER OF NGO PRESSURE

REF: ASHGABAT 124

Classified By: Political M/C Alice G. Wells. Reason 1,4 (B/D).

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Summary
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 000484 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR EUR/RUS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/05/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM SENV TX RS SUBJECT: ZATOKA CASE: THE POWER OF NGO PRESSURE REF: ASHGABAT 124 Classified By: Political M/C Alice G. Wells. Reason 1,4 (B/D). -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Unexpected public attention to the arrest in Ashgabat of Russian-Turkmenistani dual citizen and environmental activist Andrey Zatoka (reftel) sparked GOR engagement in the case. An NGO representative raised the Zatoka case with President Putin, which apparently prompted Foreign Minister Lavrov to broach the matter with his GOT counterpart. Moscow experts attribute Zatoka's quick release to the combined pressure from the GOR and Russian NGOs. End summary. -------------- MFA: Right to Consular Access -------------- ¶2. (C) Maksim Peshkov, Director of the MFA's Third CIS Department (Central Asia),told us that although the GOR failed to secure consular access to Zatoka during his incarceration, its active involvement in the case played a major role in the positive result, Zatoka's release after receiving a three year suspended sentence. Addressing the citizenship issue, Peshkov underlined that the Turkmenistani government could not cancel Zatoka's Russian citizenship; only the Russian government could do that. As a dual citizen who "permanently" resides in Turkmenistan, Zatoka was naturally subject to Turkmenistani laws, but the GOR had a right to defend the interests of its citizens. Peshkov noted that the 1993 agreement recognizing dual citizenship should be still operative, as a 2003 rewrite had never been completed. It was Turkmenistan that had insisted on a visa regime; most CIS country citizens enjoy visa-free entry to Russia. ¶3. (C) Moscow Turkmenistani watchers said in unison that it is not easy to discern what had prompted the Turkmenistani government to act -- either in arresting Zatoka or in his early release. Aleksey Malashenko of the Moscow Carnegie Center claimed that no one in Moscow understood the Turkmenistani visa/citizenship regulations. All agreed that there had been a breakdown of the system after 2004. Andrey Grozin criticized the GOR for not acting quickly enough and said a response had come only under NGO pressure. He added, "had it not been for a human rights group, we would not have even known of Zatoka's case." Grozin claimed that about 100,000 dual citizens now residing in Turkmenistan could not expect help from the GOR in the event of problems with the GOT. -------------- NGO's Grateful for GOR Interest, -------------- ¶4. (SBU) The NGO community in Russia was elated that Zatoka had been freed, but did not se any broader message in the court's decision. Svyatovlav Zabelin of the International Socio-Ecological Union (ISEU),a Russian NGO that had focused attention on the case in Russia, said the Turkmenistani government responded to the unexpected attention Zatoka's case attracted. The International Public Committee in Defense of Andrey Zatoka, formed January 23, promoted a letter-writing campaign and grassroots support in conjunction with Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, Greenpeace Russia, the ISEU, the Open Society Institute, and the Turkemenistan Helsinki Foundation, among others. The evidence against Zatoka, Zabelin asserted, was weak, and the GOT realized it could not convict without fabricating a case. Zabelin cautioned that similar cases could happen again and other incarcerated activists may not benefit from the Zatoka's case. ¶5. (SBU) Unlike Moscow's Turkmenistani watchers, Zabelin was impressed by the GOR's response to the case. Zabelin personally raised the Zatoka case with President Putin during the Russian President's January 11 Civil Society and Human Rights Council meeting. Per Zabelin, after the meeting, FM Lavrov spoke to his Turkmenistani counterpart. The World Wildlife Fund's Yevgeniya Shvarts joined Zabelin in asserting that the MFA had the lead on the issue and handled it well. ¶6. (C) Ivan Blokov of Greenpeace Russia said that until Zatoka returns to Russia, he was unwilling to consider the case closed. Both Shvarts and Blokov maintained that the trial date was advanced without warning because the Turkmenistani government wanted to avoid having diplomatic MOSCOW 00000484 002 OF 002 observers present. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶7. (C) The limited expert community in Moscow that follows Turkmenistan lacks reliable information about the post-Turkmenbashi situation and foresees continued unpredictability. However, in a small but a concrete manner, the Zatoka case illustrated that even tightly controlled Turkmenistan will respond to outside pressure. Our NGO contacts are pleased as well that in this case, NGOs and the GOR managed to work together to a common end. BURNS

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