PUTIN ENTERS PARTY POLITICS: WHAT IT MIGHT MEAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 004833 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/02/2017 TAGS: PGOV PINR KDEM PREL RS SUBJECT: PUTIN ENTERS PARTY POLITICS: WHAT IT MIGHT MEAN Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reasons: 1.4 (b,d). Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Vladimir Putin's October 1 announcement that he would head the pro-Kremlin United Russia (YR) party list and possibly opt to become Prime Minister exhibited the President's trademark preference for the unexpected, and again reminded observers that he is at the center of this managed transition. Putin's decision can only bolster the fortunes of United Russia, and complicate the prospects of the three other parties that were thought likely to cross the seven-percent threshold into the Duma on December 2. With seven months remaining until Putin's successor is sworn in, it is too early to forecast that Putin will become Prime Minister and current Prime Minister Zubkov - President. Past practice suggests that Putin is testing that possibility, and that a final decision will be made later, as the passage of time further clarifies the pros and cons of such an arrangement. In the scenarios being bandied about Moscow, the political fortunes of First Deputy Prime Minister Sergey Ivanov and others cut from the Putin mold are seen as dimmer. End summary. The Announcement -------------- ¶2. (C) Putin's October 1 announcement at the two-day United Russia (YR) party congress, that he would lead the party's federal list was greeted with a standing ovation and treated by delegates with whom we spoke immediately afterward as a surprise. In fact, the event was carefully stage-managed, from Putin's continued presence on the presidium following his keynote speech, to the appeals from a village woman and a para-athlete who asked him to remain for a third term, to a professional who urged Putin to become the link between the party and the Kremlin. YR Chairman Gryzlov told Putin he owed a response to those appeals and Putin obliged. He swatted away a third term arguing, that the Constitution should not be amended, but agreed to lead the YR list (although he refused to join the party). Putin dangled the possibility, if YR wins the Duma elections and voters choose a capable president that he can work with, that he could become Prime Minister. What it Means for the Duma Elections -------------- ¶3. (C) Putin's decision to throw his weight behind a Kremlin-sponsored party already polling near 50% caused opposition parties to further trim the numbers. Communist Party Chairman Zyuganov predicted that the elections would produce a two-party system, with his Communists on the left and YR on the right. Just Russia Deputy Chairman Ivan Kharchenko guessed that YR would surge 15 percent with Putin in the race. The LDPR's Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, as always, swam upstream in insisting that his voters would not support YR and, in contradiction to any reliable polling data, that YR would win only 40 percent of the vote on December 2. ¶4. (SBU) Non-party observers were more frank. The Center for Political Information's Aleksey Mukhin described Putin's decision as a "catastrophe for the other parties." The Center for Political Technologies' Tatyana Stanovaya agreed, and scored the October 1 events as a victory for the Presidential Administration's Vladislav Surkov, who had long advocated the maximization of YR's presence in the Duma. ¶5. (C) In fact, it is difficult to imagine all four of the parties earlier thought likely to win at least seven percent of the vote surviving determined campaigning by a re-fortified United Russia. Regional leaders can be expected to outdo one another in proving their loyalty to Putin's party, and those elites who previously had doubts about what party the Kremlin backed, YR or Just Russia, doubt no more. Parties that were on the fringe but in competition just two days ago, like SPS, may have been sidelined by the events of October 1. ¶6. (C) Putin's participation almost certainly will guarantee that YR wins more than two-thirds of the seats, enough to amend the Constitution when it chooses, and makes it unnecessary to rely on the goodwill of other parties, no matter how Kremlin-friendly they may be. What It Means for Putin -------------- ¶7. (SBU) Putin is allowed to campaign for YR while President, MOSCOW 00004833 002 OF 002 but he cannot be both a Duma deputy, or Prime Minister, and remain President. If he were to exercise his option to become Prime Minister, he would either have to resign the presidency or be appointed after his term expires. ¶8. (C) Putin did not have to sign on with YR in order to wind up as prime minister. It is the President who nominates a candidate for prime minister, and the candidate does not need to be drawn from the Duma, Putin is heading the party list as a non-party member. Some speculate that Putin allied with YR in order to spur interest in the lackluster campaign, or to try to boost the Kremlin's efforts to create a party-based political system. By lending his prestige to the set of elites represented in YR, Putin has ensured that they will be firmly in control of the Duma after December 2, and left himself the option of being their chairman. ¶9. (C) The unexpected announcement, the second in two and one-half weeks, reminded observers to keep their eye on Putin, who may be capable of many more surprises before leaving office in May. Although it is not clear what yesterday's events may ultimately mean for Putin, it is becoming clearer that he now plans to exert influence after leaving office from within the government. ¶10. (C) Observers are now suggesting three possible "in government" scenarios: Putin will use the YR majority to amend the Constitution in order to shift the center of power from the President to the Prime Minister; Putin will serve only temporarily, until the new President hands over power after a short time; or Putin will follow Yeltsin's example in leaving office early, in his case for the prime ministership. ¶11. (C) With every successive month that he is in office, the cult of personality surrounding Putin seems to grow. The President complained mildly in his keynote speech about YR's use of "Plan Putin" to describe its campaign platform, but the party has no intention of dropping the term. With Putin on the presidium yesterday, speaker after speaker turned to praise him, and Putin's expressions of mild exasperation or impatience that used to mark such displays have been replaced by ones of indulgence. A vivid illustration of the growth of that cult is YR's October 2 decision to field a federal troika of one candidate: Vladimir Putin. Party Chairman Boris Gryzlov, who three days ago was slated to top the federal list, will be number one on YR's St. Petersburg regional list, instead. Other Successors -------------- ¶12. (C) With the appointment of Zubkov and Putin's entry into electoral politics, the prospects of First Deputy Prime Ministers Ivanov, Medvedev, and other contenders have been eclipsed by talk of a weak Zubkov presidency paired with a Putin premiership, or a brief Zubkov presidency followed by an encore for Putin. Both Medvedev and Ivanov continue to get ample air play, however, and it is too early to write their political epitaphs, if only because so little is known about Putin's intentions. U.S. Influence on the Process -------------- ¶13. (C) The USG will be able to do little more than watch as this sometimes embarrassing, sometimes ugly, process unfolds over the coming months. Each speech at the October 1 congress was marbled with the accomplishments --many real, some imagined-- of the Putin administration. Even before announcing his intention to lead YR, Putin offered delegates a short course in Putinism, and chapter one of the course stressed Russia's determination to listen to no one. This state of mind is likely to endure, and the only successful counter to it may be to focus on process in those areas where U.S. and Russian interests might converge, and push back in tandem with the Europeans when they don't. The coming weeks will see many opportunities for the U.S. and its Allies to engage the Russian leadership, and to remind Putin of the international community's expectations of Russia's further democratic development. Burns