Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07MOSCOW4807
2007-10-02 03:25:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Moscow
Cable title:  

Russian Human Rights Observers See Problems, Some Possible

Tags:  PGOV PHUM RS 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO3856
RR RUEHDBU RUEHLN RUEHPOD RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHMO #4807/01 2750325
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 020325Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4281
INFO RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHVK/AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK 2447
RUEHYG/AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG 2733
RUEHLN/AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG 4570
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 004807 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PHUM RS

SUBJECT: Russian Human Rights Observers See Problems, Some Possible
Solutions

MOSCOW 00004807 001.2 OF 003


-------
Summary
-------

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 004807 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PHUM RS SUBJECT: Russian Human Rights Observers See Problems, Some Possible Solutions MOSCOW 00004807 001.2 OF 003 -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (SBU) During discussions with Embassy officers and EUR/RUS Human Rights Officer Mary Glantz from September 17-18, local observers of corruption issues, religious freedom, and media rights saw political and press freedoms shrinking within the country, but were guardedly optimistic about guarded optimism for change in some spheres. Yelena Panfilova of Transparency International described a host of problems related to corruption, but also voiced some hope for changes under the new Premier Zubkov. In contrast, Lyudmila Alekseyevna took a much darker view of events and expected a downward trajectory. On religious freedom, Geraldine Fagan of "Forum 18" reported that religious groups face considerable bureaucratic hurdles, but noted that the administration largely imposes those difficulties equally on all groups. Andrey Richter of the Media Law and Policy Institute cited the need for legal reform to help guarantee press freedom, questioned whether the new Duma would be any more disposed towards creating such a system of laws, but pointed to positive steps by the Supreme Court to protect editorial opinion. -------------- Two Views on Corruption Trends -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Embassy interlocutors on corruption in Russia differed sharply in their assessments of recent developments. Yelena Panfilova of Transparency International (TI) was realistic about the problems that corruption posed to Russian society, but expressed hope that the Duma would soon pass anti-corruption laws and start a reversal of Russia's current poor record. Panfilova acknowledged that corruption in the country was endemic and pervasive, from the traffic police that collect 'on-the-spot' fines to university professors who provide a passing grade for a fee. She further claimed that the inflows of money from global high oil and gas prices have intensified corruption in the country. (The international parent organization of TI Russia issued its annual global corruption index on September 26 and "downgraded" Russia from 121st to 142nd place -- ranking Russia below Cameroon and alongside Indonesia.) ¶3. (SBU) Panfilova saw the fight against corruption as Putin's last unfinished business and posited that with only a few months left in �
A;office, he would need to address this problem seriously. Otherwise, she believed Putin's place in history would always be marked with an asterisk, noting that he failed to address this basic problem in Russian society. Panfilova drew some encouragement from the appointment of Zubkov as Prime Minister and the Russian Duma's consideration of a new anti-corruption bill. She saw Zubkov's experience fighting financial crime as a plus; not only did he know where the bodies were buried, he also know how to dig them up. According to Panfilova, Zubkov would also need to create a "brand" for himself quickly to make his premiership successful. If he could push through anti-corruption efforts, Russians would see him as heroic, assuring his future political (or non-political) career. ¶4. (SBU) Panfilova did not see the entrenched bureaucracy as a problem in this battle. In a sense, she argued, the vertical, top-down authority structure Putin has created would be an advantage -- those at the top would hardly be in a position to fight any anti-corruption plan. Indeed, they would see active participation as a pre-requisite for continued participation in the government. She saw Putin's powers of summary dismissal as a strong tool that would intimidate any truculent bureaucrat from cabinet ministers to oblast governors and even to clerks issuing driver's licenses. ¶5. (SBU) The main problem she saw with Russian anti-corruption legislation concerned the lack of basic legal definitions. She said that Russian law has not defined illegal enrichment, conflicts of interest, or other forms of corruption. However, she pointed out that in early October the Russian Duma would begin considering a draft law that would bring Russia into compliance with the United Nations Convention against Corruption by establishing what the courts will allow and setting punishments for violations. Once anti-corruption laws are enacted -- an eventuality that she considered inevitable -- the pent-up frustrations of Russians would finally have a release. She believed that as ordinary Russians began to understand there were mechanisms to control corruption, they would begin to avail themselves of the courts. As she imagined the process developing, slowly but surely society would bring the bureaucrats to task on this issue. ¶6. (SBU) Pamfilov's optimism contrasted sharply with the view of Lyudmila Alekseyevna of Moscow Helsinki group, who dissident in the MOSCOW 00004807 002.2 OF 003 Soviet Union and viewed the current situation in Russia in stark terms. She saw similarities between the current administration and the previous Soviet authorities, characterizing the courts as under the control of the bureaucracy, and the bureaucracy as clearly under the control of the president. The elected Duma, she contended, does not and cannot express its own, independent will. She did not see much hope for change in the upcoming December Duma elections and the March presidential elections. ¶7. (SBU) Alekseyevna described the political situation in almost feudal terms, seeing the Kremlin keeping power close and distributing the benefits and proceeds to friends or relatives. She said that the current situation is different from that under the USSR in that private property did not exist. With current property laws, she said that those in power have the capability of gathering much more wealth than had been possible under the Soviet system. She said that those in the Kremlin basically run Russia as a private fiefdom for their own personal enrichment. -------------- Freedom of Religion -------------- ¶8. (SBU) Geraldine Fagan of "Forum 18," a news agency that monitors religious freedom in the former Soviet Union, cautiously described the situation in the country as good, with no government policy of religious discrimination or preference. She pointed out that while there are tendencies within society to advantage Russian Orthodoxy over other religions, she acknowledged that most efforts to institutionalize this preference were at the local level. At the Federal level, she noted that Putin had resisted attempts to put Russian Orthodox culture and religion in the national school curriculum. On September 13, Putin publicly said that any adoption of such a national policy on religion would require a constitutional amendment -- a step he considered ill-advised. ¶9. (SBU) Despite the fact that some religious organizations have experienced problems (such as Jehova's Witnesses and the Salvation Army),Fagan pointed out that most organizations could operate unhindered in the country. Fagan indicated that all religious organizations to one extent or another feel the burden of the bureaucracy, but she had seen few reports of administrative excesses that can be traced solely to an organization's religious status. She said that even under the new NGO law, most organizations have been able to register. On the other hand, Fagan noted that burdensome registration and auditing demands seem to hit harder on smaller or less well organized religious organizations that do not have the resources and sophistication to manage the paperwork and other requirements. She would not rule out that in the future, the government could use bureaucratic measures to target particular religious organizations. -------------- Media Law and Policy -------------- ¶10. (SBU) Andrey Richter of the Media Law and Policy Institute viewed the legislature as the biggest impediment to changing the situation for media freedom. He described the Duma as unable or unwilling to pass needed legislation for an independent press to function. Regarding print media, he noted that since 1991, some legislation has assured the editorial independence of newspapers and journals; however, this freedom has been eaten away as prosecutors (with the complicity of the courts) have used anti-terrorism and anti-extremism laws to cower the press. Since the 2006 amendments to the extremism law, local prosecutors have found it easy to pursue "extremism" cases against media outlets. Most such outlets quickly came to understand that the authorities could close their presses if they continue publishing controversial material. Richter noted that currently few media outlets choose to publish articles critical of the current administration, and those that do serve mainly the larger cities, often only Moscow or St. Petersburg. The remainder of the country lacks access to balanced news outlets. ¶11. (SBU) Richter painted a more distressed situation regarding broadcast journalism, in large part because the Duma has not passed any legislation governing the use of public airwaves. Richter said that as a result of this vacuum, only a presidential decree governs the distribution of spectrum and the regulation of television content. Moreover, the government organization that regulates broadcasting serves mainly at the pleasure of the president; not only are the heads of this organization, Rossvyazokhrankultury, appointed by the president, but the organization can be changed fairly easily by presidential proclamation. He characterized Rossvyazokhrankultury as "very political" and capricious in its decisions, since it can issue official warnings to broadcast MOSCOW 00004807 003.2 OF 003 outlets, and these warnings cannot be appealed in court. After two such warnings, the agency can close a given outlet. ¶12. (SBU) Richter noted that the Supreme Court has aided the cause of press freedom. The court ruled that lower courts must differentiate between fact and opinion in all press cases. As a result, journalists can no longer be punished for editorial content. Also, the court indicated that public figures, by virtue of their positions, can be subject to greater press criticism that other people. Finally, Richter noted that the Supreme Court ordered lower courts also to consider the importance of media freedom when deciding a case. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶13. (SBU) Discussions with human rights experts illustrate the complex and nuanced aspects of Russia's difficult development path. Corruption in Russia poses significant challenges to Russians and those living or doing business in the country and it is difficult to predict how (or if) the government can meet this challenge. Moreover, there seems to be little political will to establish a legal framework that would strengthen media freedoms -- particularly over the coming months of the electoral season. The bright spot appears to be religious freedom issues; ironically, all groups appear to be equally disadvantaged by the heavy burdens of the bureaucracy.

Share this cable

 facebook -  bluesky -