GOR PLAYS DOWN BURMA DEMONSTRATIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 004774 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/27/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM BM RS SUBJECT: GOR PLAYS DOWN BURMA DEMONSTRATIONS REF: MOSCOW 4480 Classified By: Political M/C Alice G. Wells for reasons 1.4 (b/d). ¶1. (C) Summary: The GOR again rejected U.S. calls for a strong UNSC response to the Burma crisis, but has urged restraint on both the Burmese government and pro-democracy demonstrators. Warning against "counterproductive" involvement by external forces, GOR officials emphasized publicly and privately that the worsening political situation is an internal matter. The MFA made it clear that Russia's main interest remains Burma's political stability and potential as an economic partner. Russia will continue to allow the PRC take the lead in blunting international pressure against the Burmese regime. End summary. "Guilty" Party -------------- ¶2. (C) On September 26, the MFA issued two terse statements calling upon the Burmese government and pro-democracy demonstrators to "show maximum restraint" and warned against "counterproductive" attempts by external forces to influence an internal matter. Head of MFA Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Thailand Division Anatoliy Borovik told us September 27 that Burmese Special Representative Woo Taung's September 18 Moscow visit aimed at discussions on Burma's democratization process through its National Convention and had no connection to the current situation in Burma. ¶3. (C) Borovik maintained that the GOR had shown evenhandedness by emphasizing peace and stability as a priority for the country and "unreliable" press reports could not determine who was "guilty" of creating the current crisis. Borovik suspected that the demonstrations were timed to coincide with UNGA in order to yield maximum media attention, and expressed surprise at the "unlikely" participation of Buddhist monks who typically avoid politics. He criticized the demonstrators for threatening Burmese "peace and stability," which he suggested are more important than democracy. We underscored that the demonstrators had risked their lives for democracy in the face of a Burmese regime that had resorted to indiscriminate violence. Economic Interests First -------------- ¶4. (C) When we urged the GOR to support a more active UNSC role, Borovik reiterated that the current situation does not threaten international security (reftel). Borovik plainly stated that the GOR's primary concern was stability, a necessary condition in developing Burma's potential as an economic partner of Russia. Borovik, characterizing Russia-Burma relations as "cordial," added that Burma is a "unique" country where it was best to leave internal problems to the current regime. Comment -------------- ¶5. (C) The GOR will continue to take a "wait and see" position, while warning against efforts by external actors (read the West) not take advantage of the instability to instigate regime change. It also seems clear that Russia will allow China to take the lead in thwarting or minimizing international pressure against the Burmese dictatorship, and may even view support for China's hardline as a necessary quid pro quo for PRC support in opposing Kosovo's independence. Russell