RUSSIA: VIEWS OF TWO GOR HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICIALS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 000476 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2017 TAGS: PHUM PINR RS SUBJECT: RUSSIA: VIEWS OF TWO GOR HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICIALS Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Alice G. Wells: 1.4 (b, d). ¶1. (C) Summary: The Deputy Chairman of the Human Rights Council and the Deputy Chief of Staff to the GOR Human Rights Ombudsman described a year of democratic retrenchment, with "definite improvement, amidst profound violations," but a more positive long-term prognosis based on changes within Russian society. Putin's attitude towards civil society is described as love-hate, with presidential actions taken to reinforce human rights ombudsmen in the provinces. End Summary -------------- Democracy Shrinks, but Horizon Widens -------------- ¶2. (C) The Deputy Chairman of Civil Society Institutions and Human Rights Council to the Russian President, William Smirnov, told us that democratic institutions had been constricted over the last year. The key threat to the Putin government and to the functioning of Russia's democracy, he argued, were the restrictions in the mass media, brought about by government ownership, or by control of state-friendly corporations, over television stations and the popular mainstream press. As a result, the GOR was losing channels of communication with the Russian population, which was "self-destructive." Other problem areas listed by his boss, Chairwoman Ella Pamfilova, in the civil society forum meeting with Putin on January 11 included: implementation of the NGO law, amendments to the electoral legislation, the vulnerability of journalists, and NGO access to the prison system. ¶3. (C) Pointing to Putin's two-hour participation in the forum meeting, Smirnov said that, while difficult to classify the Russian president, he placed him within the liberal wing of the ruling elite. "While I would not call him a democrat," he noted, "like any intelligence agent, he likes independent information, and appreciates what civil society can bring to the table." At these sessions, he noted, Putin made a point of accepting documents directly from NGO activists, with GOR remedies later providing proof that the President had ensured corrective action was taken. However, even before the outbreak of color revolutions and the heightened sense of anxiety within the GOR over the political potential of civil society, an inherent suspicion of NGOs prevailed. Without specifying, Smirnov reiterated that, drawing on his personal experiences in the Council, Putin was a brake against much darker forces within the Kremlin, who sought to "liberate" themselves entirely from the overview of civil society. ¶4. (C) Smirnov attributed Putin's recent comments on the need to establish a committee to monitor the implementation of the NGO registration bill as indicative of his love-hate relationship toward civil society. While adamant that NGO activities be fully transparent and under the supervision of the GOR, Putin accepted the role that NGOs (or press) could play in uncovering inefficiencies and exposing low-level corruption (a point Putin made in his February 1 press conference). Smirnov maintained that over the course of the last year, Ella Pamfilova had played an important role in modifying the worst elements of the NGO law -- a role she could only play with the support of Putin. As a result, Smirnov added, she picked her battles carefully. ¶5. (C) Despite short-term pessimism, Smirnov argued that long-term trends were sound. As economic growth translated into higher living standards, fewer Russians had to fight for their day-to-day survival and more were selectively protesting against infringements on their civil rights. While most Russians remained preoccupied with questions of social justice and economic welfare, real grassroots movements had gained momentum, which were not dependent upon Western financing and, thus, enjoyed greater legitimacy in the eyes of Russian citizens. These NGOs have increased their fundraising and are benefiting from Russia's growing corporate philanthropy. As Russian mobility increased, Smirnov argued, an important by-product was increasing tolerance of diversity (which received less attention than its flip-side, inflamed nationalism) and the destruction of rigid rules of behavior. Citizens who came of age in the late 1980's and 1990's knew how to say "no" and could be expected to do so again in the future. ¶6. (C) On the bitter divide between traditional human rights NGOs and the official human rights watchdogs, Smirnov was philosophical. "There should always be a Lev Ponomaryov (who rejects cooperation with the GOR)," but "it would be a terrible mistake if all refused to engage." He described engagement as "mutually beneficial and mutually restricting," but said that dialogue destroyed the excuse of those GOR MOSCOW 00000476 002 OF 002 officials, who did not want to work with civil society. "Of course, there are compromises," but Smirnov concluded that "we're doing something good, which would not be done without us." -------------- Human Rights Becomes Black and White -------------- ¶7. (C) Deputy Chief of Staff to Russia's Human Rights Ombudsman, former Russian Ambassador to South Korea Georgiy Kunadze, provided a similar analysis. Without tipping his hand on the details of the Ombudsman's end-of-year human rights report, which had yet to be sent to Putin and then onward to the Duma, Kunadze noted that last year was a period of "definite improvement, amidst profound deterioration." One feature of this year's document, he noted, would be a sharper analysis, less ambivalent about trendlines, with more pronounced judgments on both the good and bad news in Russian human rights. ¶8. (C) Where Putin has been helpful, Kunadze clarified, was in reinforcing to regional governors the desirability of establishing provincial human rights ombudsmen, who now number 34. This was significantly less than the total of Russia's 88 regions, which he attributed to entrenched local resistance to the establishment of quasi-independent monitors outside the immediate purview of the governor. As an aside, Kunadze noted that the area of greatest resistance was Moscow city, where Mayor Luzhkov rejected the establishment of an ombudsman, with federal authorities unwilling (or unable) to intervene. ¶9. (C) Reviewing the NGO registration law, Kunadze noted that the NGO community had not responded to Lukin's solicitation, requesting evidence of the difficulties of the process. "Nobody" volunteered any details. The Ombudsman is convinced that any NGO that "takes the pains" to jump through the bureaucratic hoops will be registered. Nevertheless, the Ombudsman's office would take up the law in the annual report, focusing on the costs of the bureaucratic procedure, in lost efficiency and professional activity. It was time to consider amendments to the legislation, Kunadze commented, although it was more likely that an "informal understanding" based on indirect guidance from the Presidential Administration would filter down to the Federal Registration Service. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶10. (C) Smirnov and Kunadze are representative of those figures who have chosen to work with the GOR. They do not hesitate to criticize the government, but believe they can be a force for incremental change. They are regarded skeptically by both elements within the GOR hostile to civil society and representatives of civil society implacably opposed to "co-optation" by the GOR. BURNS